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A b s t r a c t
This thesis examines how Australian politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of- 
crime. Fears and anxieties, not necessarily spurred by criminal behavior, have increasingly 
been grouped under the phrase “fear-of-crime”. After much research investigating 
demographic and environmental factors, it is now recognized that political debate on law 
and order may also affect public feelings of fear. This recognition includes a largely 
untested assumption that such debates can be depicted as the ‘selling’ of ‘tough’ policies 
within a Taw and order auction’. Further research has focused on discovering the impact of 
these auctions on the public’s level of fear.
I argue that an important step has been missed by these later attempts determining the 
public impact of political debates. This step is to discover the characteristics of the debates 
themselves. By identifying these characteristics, there is the potential to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the role that fear-of-crime plays in political rhetoric and the 
impact of such rhetoric on the public’s level of fear. This thesis is intended to begin 
developing that understanding.
Data is drawn from proceedings within Australian state and federal parliaments from 1960 
to 2003. Using a data-driven exploratory structure, the thesis focuses on the analysis of five 
characteristics:
1. Use of the passive voice, the definite article and nominalization;
2. Use of (war and fight) metaphors;
3. Appeals to common sense;
4. Attributions of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime; and
5. Balancing ideology and expediency in political debate.
Common themes among these characteristics suggest three discourses about fear-of-crime. 
The protector discourse depicts a passive and frightened public requiring protection from 
the government to reduce their fear-of-crime. In the supporter discourse, an active and 
frightened public needs support to protect themselves from crime and reduce their fear. 
Finally, the manipulator discourse depicts the parliamentarian as selfishly oriented towards 
personal gain by making use of the public’s fear-of-crime.
With these characteristics and discourses identified, I discuss the implications of this 
research for criminological literature. Common depictions within the literature present 
political debates as characterized by the use of experiential knowledge about frightened 
members of the public as dictated by the parliamentarian’s political ideology, while 
parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing fear. After presenting 
their theoretical background, I test hypotheses about this description’s three main 
components: knowledge, identity and responsibility. I suggest instead a more nuanced 
description:
Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by hybridity: of 
technical and experiential knowledge about a frightened public; of portrayed 
identities of this frightened public as both active and independent, and passive 
and dependent; and of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. The existence 
of a frightened public serves an evidentiary and not ideological role in 
parliamentary debates about crime and its control.
I argue that this description is reflective of the complex and hybrid nature of political 
rhetoric about public fears. To conclude, I provide examples of how this nuanced 
understanding enhances criminological research by clarifying and sensitizing arguments 
that critique politicians, and their use, rather than misuse, of fear-of-crime in law and order 
politics.
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Chapter  One
In tr od uc ti on
Introduction
Fear-of-crime was first formally ‘named’ by researchers in the United States of America in 
the early 1960s (Harris, 1969). Since this time, there have been widespread efforts around 
the world to examine fear-of-crime. First conceptualized as a fear of street crime or of 
strangers (Sheley, 1985) with strong racial (i.e., anti-black) overtones (Moeller, 1989; St 
John & Heald-Moore, 1996), fear-of-crime is now understood to represent a variety of 
insecurities such as personal safety, job insecurity, housing status and position, personal 
status, international relations and familial social position (Taylor & Jamieson, 1998). In 
other words, the phrase “fear-of-crime” can be seen as a codeword for people’s fears, 
worries and concerns about a range of stimuli that are not necessarily classified as criminal 
by a society’s legal system.
Despite this variety in content, one sentiment has been frequently reiterated. Fear-of-crime 
is so commonplace that it “requires no explanation, no exact location ... Everyone is afraid 
of crime, whether or not they have experienced it” (Young, 1996: 5). Fear-of-crime is a 
phenomenon that has been shown to affect the lives of people well beyond those who have 
been the direct victims of criminal behavior (Zedner, 1997). Many researchers have 
concluded that it is a major social problem (Archer & Erlich-Erfer, 1991; Liska et al., 1982; 
Liska et al., 1988) that can be judged to be “as serious as crime itself’ (Clemente & 
Kleiman, 1977: 519).
Concern about levels of fear-of-crime in the community has not been limited to academic 
circles. There has been growing political effort dedicated to both recognizing and 
addressing the problem. In Australia, the National Crime Prevention Program was launched 
by the Australian Government in 1997 with a budget of $38 million to identify and promote
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“innovative ways of reducing and preventing crime and the fear of crime” (Attorney- 
General's Department, 2004). Attempts were also made to address fear-of-crime 
specifically in a number of government funded research projects including one 
appropriating approximately $13 million in public monies (National Campaign against 
Violence and Crime, 2000). Parliamentary inquiries such as Crime in the Community in 
2003/2004 have also been set up to gather information on the public’s response to crime. 
These programs, projects and inquiries have been accompanied by passionate debate from 
Australian politicians wanting to show their compassion for members of the public who are 
afraid of crime.
However, in recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the impact that this 
political debate may have on the number of people who report being afraid of crime. Levels 
of fear-of-crime have been shown to be positively correlated with the amount of attention 
given to law and order issues by the political elite (Beckett (1997) see also Braithwaite et 
al. (1979)). As the public is more likely to respond to political depictions of the events 
rather than to the events themselves (Witko, 2003), it is conceivable that the very process of 
shaping or distorting images of crime within law and order politics may be partly 
responsible for changes in the actual level of fear-of-crime reported in the community 
(Scheingold, 1984).
Assumptions about Law and Order Politics
Underlying these empirical results and academic warnings about the potentially negative 
impact of law and order politics, has been an assumed knowledge about the characteristics 
of such debates. For example, political speeches, especially in the lead up to elections, have
3
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become grouped under the banner of ‘law and order auctions’ (e.g., Black & Phillips, 2001; 
Sarre, 2002; Silverman, 2005), where electoral success is perceived to flow to the political 
candidate promising the most punitive policy on crime -  the highest bid. The underlying 
argument is that politicians will selfishly use law and order, or more specifically fear-of- 
crime, to support their political agenda (Wilson & Brown, 1973).
Much of the research on law and order politics, fear-of-crime, and criminal justice more 
generally, is based on this largely untested perception that political debates can be depicted 
through the analogy of the auctioning off of law and order issues - that such auctions are 
intended to generate public support by presenting the ‘toughest’ policies on crime that 
appeal to allegedly frightened constituents. Academic research on politics and fear-of-crime 
has focused on attempting to discover the impact that these auctions have on the public’s 
reported level of fear.
However, I argue that it has not been conclusively demonstrated that politicians do in fact 
talk about fear-of-crime as if they were participating in a law and order auction. In effect, 
an important step has been missed by these attempts focusing on determining the public 
impact of political debates about fear-of-crime. This step is to discover the characteristics 
of the debates themselves. How do politicians talk about fear-of-crime? When are they 
most likely to debate the issue? What content is discussed? What are their motivations? 
What are the grammatical or linguistic characteristics of the debates? Are there consistent 
images used and if so, what are they?
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Alternatively, questions can be formulated in regard to the theoretical implications of 
political debates about fear-of-crime on issues such as responsibility for reducing that fear, 
attitudes of politicians towards the public (and vice versa), democratic participation and the 
role of government, and the power of political communication. The answers to these 
questions, and others, have the potential to complement previous academic research by 
sensitizing and clarifying results on the impact on public attitudes and opinions of political 
debates about fear-of-crime. This thesis is intended to make a start in attempting to answer 
some of these questions and in doing so, argue for a more nuanced understanding of the 
role of fear-of-crime in political debate.
Thesis Purpose: Verifying Assumptions
The purpose of this thesis is to verify assumptions that have been made by criminologists 
about politicians’ use of opportunities to talk about fear-of-crime. In so doing, I will be 
checking the accuracy of the foundation premises of previous criminological research and 
will be providing an empirical evidence-base informing future analyses of the effect of 
political law and order debates. Without thoroughly testing the accuracy and 
generalizability of their assumptions, researchers in this field will continue to run the risk of 
potentially developing insensitive and unreliable theoretical models of the relationship 
between political debate and public levels of fear-of-crime.
Thus my aim is to demonstrate the necessity for criminologists of developing a fuller, more 
nuanced understanding of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. A nuanced 
understanding will be achieved through empirical analysis of the political debate 
hypothesised to impact on fear-of-crime. It is not possible to ascertain, in this work alone,
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all characteristics of political debate on this topic in every political arena. However, I do 
want to show that criminologists cannot assume that the law and order auction analogy is 
always applicable.
Consequently, I argue that the vital first step in analysing the effect of political debate on 
the public’s response to crime is to determine the characteristics of the political debate 
itself. In this thesis, I seek to demonstrate that it is by taking this first step, by determining 
the characteristics of the political debates being studied, that researchers can improve their 
understanding as to why such debates may have an effect on the public’s emotional 
response to crime.
Thesis Research Questions and Data 
The main question that guides the research is:
How do Australian politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime?
To provide answers to this question, the thesis will focus on the debates about fear-of-crime 
that occur in Australian state and federal parliaments. The thesis will not examine the 
impact of these debates on the Australian public’s level of fear or concern about crime. 
Instead, this research will begin to determine the characteristics of the debates, identify 
discourses in use and examine the implications of this nuanced understanding for past and 
future criminological research. In this way, the focus will be maintained on how politicians 




Data will be drawn from formal parliamentary debates as recorded by Hansard. The 
decision to draw data from parliamentary debates was made to ensure that the data 
examined was as unmediated as possible. It was an attempt to eliminate the influence that 
the media has on the content, style and presentation of political debate. Thus, while 
characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime will be identified by this research, they 
should not be generalized past the scope of the data from which they were drawn. The 
research is focused on how politicians talk about fear-of-crime within the social context of 
Australian state and federal parliaments.
Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured into 14 chapters. After this introduction, the first two chapters 
present a review of the literature relevant to the research contained herein. The next two 
chapters will detail the methodology used in the research and provide an overview of the 
general results gained from these methods. The five chapters that follow present a series of 
case studies identifying particular characteristics of parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime and discussing their potential impact. Chapter Eleven will explore the existence of 
three suggested discourses, as evidenced by the characteristics identified, that occur in the 
parliamentary debates studied. The final three chapters will examine the theories behind the 
concepts of knowledge, identity and responsibility that are entailed in criminological 
studies of political rhetoric in law and order politics. After testing a number of hypotheses 
drawn from this literature, I argue that a more nuanced understanding is needed of political 
rhetoric about fear-of-crime. The specific structure, contents and purpose of each individual 
chapter will be detailed below.
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Chapter Two presents a review of literature on language, political communication and 
rhetorical techniques that are commonly used in political debate. The review begins with an 
introduction to language and the general functions that it fulfills in society. From there, the 
discussion is narrowed to the role that language plays in politics. Three political 
communication-related techniques of agenda setting, priming and rhetoric are given as a 
way of illustrating this role. Finally, the categories of persuasion and propaganda will be 
used as a means of examining how these functions, roles and techniques exist and perform 
together. The overall purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the literature 
on political communication and even more simply, to highlight the function that language 
fulfils in politics and the presentation of particular social realities.
Chapter Three details two histories that are inherently interlinked. The first history is that of 
the rise to prominence of law and order as a political issue, especially at the federal level. 
Crime and criminal justice have long been a responsibility of the modern state, to protect 
their citizens from harm. Under Australia’s constitution, that responsibility is held by state 
governments. ITowever, more recently law and order issues have begun to gain some 
prominence alongside economic issues in national political campaigns (i.e., at a federal 
level). This chapter will detail the history of law and order politics, first worldwide and 
then with a specific focus on Australian political responses to crime.
The second history that will be examined in Chapter Three is that of fear-of-crime. It is a 
history that is intertwined with both government responses to crime and law and order 
politics. This chapter will present the development and politicization of fear-of-crime, as 
well as the academic research and results on the topic. In addition to international sources,
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the growing recognition of fear-of-crime in Australia and the political response to that 
recognition will be examined. Chapter Three seeks to provide a background review of the 
literature pertaining to law and order politics and fear-of-crime. This review is intended to 
complement the literature discussed in Chapter Two on political communication and the 
role of language in politics. It is on the basis of the literature reviewed in these two chapters 
that an attempt can be made to determine the characteristics of parliamentary debates on 
fear-of-crime.
Chapter Four presents the methodology used for the research component of this thesis. 
Given the desire to explore language and the concepts that it embodies, the data collected is 
necessarily qualitative. Simple quantitative data such as counts and percentages are 
generated, in the case studies, only as a means of informing the qualitative data. The broad 
analytical framework that is employed is that of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This 
framework is chosen because it allows for the analysis of both the linguistic and social 
factors that exist in the parliamentary debates being characterized. CDA attempts to 
describe the language that is used, show the shaping of discourse by societal influences and 
unpack the ideological underpinnings of that language. As such, CDA is an analytical 
framework that will facilitate the exploratory aims of this research.
Chapter Five gives an overview of the general results to present a description of the 
documents collected -  their authorship, origin and intended audience. A description is also 
given of the content of the documents. This includes an outline of the types of topics that 
were collected under the banner of fear-of-crime. While greater detail will be given in later
9
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chapters, this chapter is intended to provide the background context of the documents in 
wlhich the case studies can be situated.
Chapters Six to Ten contain five case studies that analyze characteristics of parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime from the perspectives of language, society and politics. These 
caise studies are intended to act as points of entry along a continuum from the linguistic 
influence on society to the societal influence on language (see Figure 1.1 at the end of this 
introduction). Therefore, the case studies are designed to provide general indicators for 
where further research may be warranted at a later date. While an entire thesis could be 
dedicated to either one of these influences on their own, it was felt that, at this point, it was 
necessary to show that parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime should not be treated as 
homogenous; and to show this through a range of influences.
Chapter Six is the first of these case studies and begins from the perspective of examining 
particular linguistic features of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. The features are 
nominalization, passivity (or the use of the passive voice) and the definite article ‘the’. It is 
shown that these features work to depict two images of the public. First, there is a public 
that is active and able to participate in their own victimization prevention and control their 
level of fear; and second, another depiction of the public exists simultaneously where the 
public is passive and dependent on the government for action to reduce their suffering due 
to the fear-of-crime. It is argued that these dual images of the public, and their impact on 
the formulation of political responses to the problem of fear-of-crime, will reduce the 
efficacy of those responses.
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Chapter Seven again looks at the influence that language can have on the construction of a 
social reality. However, this time it is from the perspective of a linguistic form that is 
strongly bound to the culture in which it is used. In this chapter, the use and impact of 
metaphoric language in parliamentary debates is examined. General metaphoric expressions 
and conceptual metaphors are identified before focusing on the discursive function of 
metaphors grouped under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR 
(AACIW). These metaphors define the actors and their roles in a threatening and dangerous 
reality. In doing so, metaphors serve to maintain an identity of a fearful public. Whereas in 
Chapter Four, the language used potentially decreased the efficacy of political efforts to 
address actual levels of fear-of-crime in the community, AACIW-related metaphors and the 
identity of the fearful public may increase the effectiveness of political attempts to shape or 
distort images of crime in order to generate support for parties, individual politicians or 
policies.
Chapter Eight stands midway on the continuum between linguistic and societal influences. 
With the intention of studying the data from a perspective that attempts to grant equal 
weight to linguistic and societal influences, the chapter examines appeals to common sense 
made in parliamentary debates. Common sense is a body of knowledge rather than a 
particular characteristic of language; it exists within a group of people as simple, apparently 
self-evident truths relating to action, human nature and experience. Three common sense 
statements are analyzed: the streets are dangerous because of crime, the public is afraid of 
crime and the level of fear-of-crime increases with increases in rates of crime. It is argued 
that politicians are able to create, manipulate and use the power of common sense that is
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granted by its perceived legitimacy and authority in order to portray a particular social 
reality. Consequently, it is warned that the language of fear may become a reality of fear.
With Chapter Nine, the focus of the case study begins to shift to the influence that society 
may have on the language that is used. This chapter examines attributions of responsibility 
that are made by politicians for crime and fear-of-crime. It is argued that politicians want to 
avoid causal responsibility and the associated blame. The current trends in crime policy 
towards holding the community responsible are evidence of this desire to avoid blame. 
However, politicians also want to appear in control and the powerful protector of the 
community; and accepting attributions of treatment responsibility is a means of creating 
this image. The language that is used to talk about the problems of crime and fear-of-crime 
is a key mechanism by which attributions of responsibility are made.
The analysis of the final case study, presented in Chapter Ten, examines the balancing of 
short-term self-interested advantage in politics (termed “political expediency”) with the 
dictates of political ideology. It is shown that there is evidence in the debates that 
politicians are required to balance expediency and ideology. Put more simply, the desire to 
gain votes and win office is limited by a philosophical stance on policy content. Discussing 
fear-of-crime was found to be useful for politicians as rhetorical support for their arguments 
desiring the realization of both their image of an ideal society and the policies which they 
believed would achieve that society. In this chapter, it is shown how the ideas about society 
guide the choice of language that is used to discuss fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments.
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The five case studies presented in Chapters Six to Ten are intended to form points of entry 
into the different influences on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime and thereby 
highlight characteristics of those debates. The main focus of this thesis is on the question of 
how Australian parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime. The analyses of five 
linguistic/societal case studies have provided suggested characteristics of these debates.
Chapter Eleven seeks to present a potential categorization of these characteristics into three 
discourses -  the protector discourse, the supporter discourse and the manipulator discourse. 
Each of these discourses is taken from the perspective of the parliamentarian and their 
speeches about fear-of-crime. This perspective is dictated by the sources from which the 
data is drawn and the methodological directions that generated and analyzed the data. It is 
likely that additional discourses may be identified with different data and methods.
The protector discourse depicts the government as in control and protecting the public from 
a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The public is legitimately afraid but is 
passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering. In the supporter 
discourse, the government argues that it will support the public and cannot be blamed for 
the actions of the criminals who cause the public to be afraid. The public is active and 
responsible for their safety, the opportunities they grant to others that threaten that safety 
and the fear caused by street crimes and other threats in the environment. Lastly, the 
manipulator discourse depicts the politician as selfishly oriented towards personal gain and 
making use of only the (self-interested) utility of the public’s fear-of-crime.
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The final three chapters of this thesis are dedicated to examining the implications of this 
research for the existent and future criminological literature. Chapter Twelve presents the 
research gap that this thesis is intended to begin to fill. However, in contrast to its 
presentation in Chapters One to Three that focuses on practical aspects of political talk 
about fear-of-crime, Chapter Twelve presents the theoretical aspects of the research gap as 
drawn from the academic study of crime, justice and the state.
To do this, I use Garland’s (2001) study of the social, political and cultural changes that 
have occurred in regard to the criminal justice state. Then, I outline the criticisms of 
Garland’s work as a means of developing a more comprehensive ‘history of the present’. 
The last criticism given is that Garland does not examine, in sufficient depth, the way in 
which political rhetoric influences public fear; and it is this criticism that highlights the 
research gap. While criminologists have attempted to measure levels of fear-of-crime and 
its correlation with political rhetoric, they have not fully ascertained how politicians 
actually talk about it. This, I argue, is the first step to a greater understanding of the 
relationship between fear-of-crime and politics. It is towards this end that this research is 
directed.
In Chapter Thirteen, I examine the theoretical background and test a number of hypotheses 
about three components of the general description of parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime that can be drawn from the literature. These components are: the type of knowledge 
claims made by parliamentarians; the type of agency used in the evocation of a fearful 
public identity; and the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. By 
examining these components, I am able to give a description of parliamentary debates about
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fear-of-crime that is sensitive to the complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric on 
public fears that I argue is currently missed by criminologists. In effect, I attempt to verify 
researchers’ assumptions with empirical data on how politicians, when in parliament, talk 
about fear-of-crime.
Finally, Chapter Fourteen concludes this work by discussing the implications, of both the 
data-driven exploratory study and the testing of research questions and hypotheses, for 
criminological literature. I provide examples of how a more nuanced description of political 
talk about public fears could extend and improve the study of fear-of-crime. In the final 
section, I suggest that the way forward is for criminologists, studying fear-of-crime and 
political rhetoric, to focus on the multidimensional use rather than necessarily the misuse of 
a politician’s opportunities to talk about public fears. This shift in focus would encourage 
discussion about how fear-of-crime is ‘used’ and the potential of political rhetoric to 
decrease as well as increase fear. In effect, it would encourage a more complex yet 
complete understanding of the political use of fear-of-crime in debates and the impact of 
those debates on the public’s response to crime.
Justification of Approach: Inter-disciplinary and Exploratory
While ultimately the aim of this thesis is to expand and contribute to criminological 
thought, I have taken a fundamentally inter-disciplinary and exploratory approach. Both 
aspects of this approach need justification because: they go against the strategic direction of 
current movements in the discipline of criminology; and they comprise an unusual 
approach for a PhD thesis.
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First, the literature, methodologies, analysis and discussions presented here are drawn from 
multiple academic disciplines. The majority of the chapters draw on knowledge derived 
from the disciplines of linguistics and political science. Apart from the initial two chapters 
reviewing literature relevant to the thesis as a whole, criminological literature is not the 
focus of discussion until the last three chapters. The reason for this seemingly counter­
intuitive approach is that when a criminologist hypothesizes that political debate increases 
the public’s fear-of-crime, they are hypothesizing on the impact of language about crime 
used in the political arena. Crime is the topic, language is the medium and politics is the 
domain. Hence, criminology is but one of at least three academic disciplines that should be 
involved in an analysis designed to fully understand the relationship between political 
debate and public feelings about crime. This thesis makes an original contribution in 
demonstrating the value of inter-disciplinarity by using linguistics and political science to 
enhance criminological undertakings to analyse fear-of-crime.
Exploration is the second aspect of the approach taken in this thesis. As stated above, my 
aim is to demonstrate the necessity of identifying the characteristics of political debate 
before studying the impact of that debate on the public. To identify potential characteristics 
and their effects, I wanted to let the data guide the analysis. A data-driven approach 
encourages the exploration of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime rather than testing 
for the existence of specific characteristics of political debate identified by or derived from 
a theoretical perspective. The intention by exploring is to demonstrate to all areas of 
criminology that investigate this topic, and not just one theoretical perspective, that the 
identification of the characteristics of these political debates is of vital importance.
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The effect of adopting an inter-disciplinary and exploratory approach is potentially a sense 
in the reader of wariness or threat to the ‘correct’ order of analysis and generation of new 
theoretical insights. This thesis does not begin with an exposition of one school’s theory, 
the identification of a research gap, testing of hypotheses to fill this gap and a write-up of 
results, discussion and conclusions for the original theoretical framework. Instead, I give an 
exposition of the intersection between criminology, linguistics and political science in 
regard to one topic: fear-of-crime. Then on the basis of a broad research question, I explore 
that intersection using five case studies to demonstrate how the research question could be 
answered. It is only after this sizable work that I take the traditional approach of presenting 
a criminological theory and a theoretical research gap and testing hypotheses; and even 
then the theory critiqued is only used as an example for indicating the potential 
consequences of more nuanced understanding of political debate on fear-of-crime.
It is important to demonstrate to criminologists the necessity of developing a fuller, more 
nuanced understanding of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. My aim is not to give a 
definitive answer but to show the need to ask questions. Through this thesis, I hope to show 
that the law and order auction analogy is not always applicable because politicians, when in 
parliament at least, talk about fear-of-crime in many ways. The analysis of just five 
characteristics of parliamentary debates has identified a variety of ways of talking made up 
of different knowledge claims, types of agency and locations of responsibility. I argue that 
benefit to future research efforts will come from discovering such differences by focusing 
on the multidimensional use, and not only misuse, of political opportunities to talk about 
fear-of-crime. Thus, the original contribution of this thesis to criminological thought is 
raising awareness that political rhetoric about fear-of-crime is complex and it is essential
17
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that that complexity is identified in order to better understand the impact of political debate 
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Chapter Two Talking Politics
This chapter will present a review of the literature on language, political communication 
and the traditions of linguistics that inform the present research. It begins by seeking to 
define what ‘language’ is and describe the general constitutive parts of that system. From 
there, the role that language plays in politics will be discussed. This discussion is then 
illustrated by three common strategies used in political communication (agenda setting, 
priming and rhetoric) as well as two common types of communication that are used in 
politics (persuasion and propaganda).
One restriction will be placed on the review of literature presented in this chapter. There is 
a great body of political communications research studying such topics as:
• Why citizens respond in different ways and how much they do or do not know
(e.g. Durr, 1993; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1996; Moore, 1987; Mueller, 1973;
Mutz et al., 1996; Tan, 1980; Verba et al., 1997);
• The way in which different types of appeals (particularly fear or threat related)
function and their effectiveness (e.g. Beck & Frankel, 1981; Boster &
Mongeau, 1984; Janis & Feshbach, 1953, 1954; Leventhal, 1971; Ruiter,
2003; Stemthal & Craig, 1974; Wheatley & Oshikawa, 1970);
• The success or failure of information and political campaigns (e.g. Ansolabehere
& Iyengar, 1995; DE Butler & Rose, 1960; Dalby, 1990; Harrop, 2001;
Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947; Meadow, 1989; Nimmo, 1970);
• The effectiveness of the media in conveying a political message (e.g. Brunt &
Jordin, 1987; Miller & Krosnick, 1996; Negrine, 1996; Press & VerBurg,
1988; Welch, 2003; Windschuttle, 1984); and
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• Multiple theories (mostly based in political science) about the functioning of 
political communication (e.g. Gräber, 1976; Gusfield, 1963; Jacobs, 1992; 
Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2001; Sigelman & Rosenblatt, 
1996)
These topics will not be examined in this thesis. Instead, the focus will be on how 
politicians (and more specifically parliamentarians) debate issues relating to fear-of-crime. 
The success or failure of the speeches on their target audience is not of direct consequence 
for this research. These examples are intended to explore the interactions between 
language, language usage and language users in the domain of politics. In effect, the first 
part of this chapter seeks to serve as an introduction to examples of the general use of 
language and more specifically, political communication.
The standpoint from which language will be approached is discussed in the second part of 
this chapter in the form of critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. This approach 
seeks to study the interconnected nature of things, the structures (both personal and social) 
that influence language usage. The recognition by critical linguists of the two-way 
interaction between language and social processes makes it a useful theoretical framework 
for the current research.
L a n g u a g e  -  S y m b o l s  and  S y s t e m s
The parliamentary debates that form the data for this research are treated as examples of 
political communication and language. Very broadly, communication can be understood as 
the exchange of symbols between two or more people with the intention of conveying a
23
Chapter Two Talking Politics
message, where language is generally used as the framework of organizing those symbols 
to facilitate effective exchange.
More specifically, language is an arbitrary system of using accepted or conventionalized 
symbols (Andersen, 1971). An image is the first step in the construction of symbols. It is a 
“subjective representation of something previously perceived. It is an interpreted sensation 
or, in other words, a meaningful impression, appearance, semblance, or similar mental 
representation of our perceptions” (Nimmo, 1974: 5-6). Images are largely resistant to 
change and assist the individual to interpret their sensations. This interpretation of 
sensations is called a sign. When that sign is used to stand for something other than itself, it 
then becomes a symbol. The interaction between signs and images which results in the 
creation of a symbol is imagery -  an interaction that is present in all behavior. Thus, 
language is based on the relationship between and use of signs, symbols and imagery.
In contemporary human society, that relationship between the three elements just outlined 
is dictated by an arbitrary, conventionalized yet dynamic system: language (Kelley, 1990). 
Convention prescribes the use and meanings of sounds as they are constructed into words, 
and later into sentences, conversations, arguments and other forms of verbal interaction. 
For instance, when learning a language, a person tends to learn to construct sentences 
“correctly” according to grammatical rules and placing objects into their “right” categories 
(Widdowson, 1978). It is this arbitrary system of rules of using symbols that form language 
and facilitates communication.
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P o l i t i c a l  C o m m u n i c a t i o n
On the basis of the above description of language, I will now focus on the language and 
communication that occurs specifically in the political arena. Political communication is the 
communication that surrounds political affairs. This type of communication occurs 
everyday (Herrera, 1996/1997) and is an essential part of the process of democratic politics. 
Unlike in communicating about medicine or law, there is no significant shift to a different 
vocabulary. Instead, political communication is identified by its content rather than its form 
(Corcoran, 1979).
As a result, this type of communication is based on the same tools of imagery, symbols and 
language as other generalized forms. Symbols themselves are very useful in politics 
because they can exist in a phrase or two whilst acting as referents to a vast argument 
(Mutz et al., 1996): they provide instant categorizations, vivid impressions and evaluation 
of events (Gräber, 1976). These benefits granted by the use of symbols provide politicians 
with the ability to construct a reality for their citizens (Gusfield, 1963; Hinds & Windt, 
1991). The words used by politicians can become part of the political landscape and can 
construct that landscape (Maddox, 1989). Politicians use symbols, most often ordered by 
language, to arouse, provoke, dissuade, demonstrate strength of commitment and affirm 
group membership in an effort to control an issue’s salience and relevancy to different 
audiences (Cobb & Elder, 1972). On the basis of the importance of symbols, language and 
communication in politics, political elites attempt to use words or phrases strategically to 
convey a desired meaning (Kuklinski & Hurley, 1996), to generate support and acceptance 
of policies and, ultimately, to win re-election.
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In the following two sections, I will present two groups of examples of the potential use of 
language in attempts to communicate in politics. The first group will provide three different 
strategies for using language as a means of succeeding or even merely surviving in politics. 
The second group will detail two types of political communication that are most relevant to 
the research presented later in this thesis. These illustrations are intended as examples of 
language, language usage and language users before introducing the theoretical filter of 
studying language from the perspective of critical linguistics.
Strategies of Political Communication
The way in which politicians strategically use language to communicate with the public 
will impact on the achievement of their desired goals. Three examples of such strategies 
will be discussed here -  agenda setting, priming and rhetoric. These examples are given as 
a means of highlighting the strategic thought that occurs in political communication 
through the choice of language, symbols and imagery.
The first strategy that is frequently discussed in regard to political communication is that of 
agenda setting. This is the process or contest that is undertaken in negotiating what is 
discussed and thereby gains a perceived importance (Cobb & Elder, 1972). What topics are 
discussed in politics can have a dramatic effect on the outcome of the discussion, images of 
the party and politicians and the public’s eventual choices at politically important times 
such as elections. For a political party to benefit from the discussion of certain issues, the 
issue itself must arouse strong feelings in the voters, be held disproportionately by one side, 
and be an issue that demonstrates clear differences between the stances of each side (David 
Butler, 1979). Agenda setting is a phrase that is used to describe the process by which
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problems become political issues or gain the perceived importance or legitimacy to be 
addressed by the government or parliament (Cook et al., 1983).
Another strategy is to control the standards by which issues are judged. This process is 
called “priming”. It is the ability to change the “standards that people use to make political 
evaluations” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The concept of priming is based on the underlying 
cognitive assumptions that humans’ attention is highly selective and frequently uses short 
cuts or rules of thumb in order to make decisions (or “satisficing” (Miller & Krosnick, 
1996)) (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). Consequently, the political 
candidate wants to influence which standards, events or attitudes are brought to mind first 
(Miller & Krosnick, 1996) and often do so by providing voters with fragmented 
information on selected issues to raise their importance “by increasing the frequency, 
strength and extensiveness of the candidate’s statements” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 1994: 529). In 
taking a priming approach, candidates raise the possibility that individuals will assign 
particular (hopefully politically advantageous) attitudes to their stored memories which can 
then be drawn upon in public statements (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000).
The final example of a strategy to be used in political communication is that of rhetoric. 
Rhetoric is simply persuasive speech (Burke, 1969) but has increasingly gained negative 
connotations of being a “process of manipulating symbolic devices by human agents to 
form attitudes or induce actions in other human beings” (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 
1997: 63). Many scholars argue that the classical form of political rhetoric with its 
emphasis on persuasion through argument, logic and the presentation of information are 
rarely heard in modern politics. Instead, such debate has become “oversimplified,
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personalized, trivialized, and dramatized” (Whaley & Holloway, 1997: 294). It has also 
been argued that the classical forms of rhetoric and argumentation have been made obsolete 
by modem technology’s mediation of political communication (Atkinson, 1984). 
Technology and the broadcast media have isolated the politician from the public. An 
example of this danger is the political speech which has largely been discarded as too 
burdensome on the time and attention of busy publics and has been replaced by rapid sights 
and sounds presenting fragmented information. The desire of the politicians to engage with 
the public’s cognitive and rational faculties has been replaced by the focus on the 
production of a specific emotional reaction (Corcoran, 1979).
At the same time, it could be argued that there are some forms of classical rhetoric that 
have survived. The error-free broadcast enabled by the use of takes and editing is reflective 
of the fluency of speech held by the good orator. Similarly tropes, figures and 
commonplaces are still used to sustain the flow of speech. For example, commonplaces 
such as “I come before you today” and “no effort will be spared” are used to indicate the 
authority of the speaker and their intention to say something important. Commonplaces are 
frequently used in the form of the cliche and the slogan, although the slogan (a string of 
symbols that gain meaning by repetition and context (Lasswell, 1949)) is indicative of the 
shift from conveying information or logical persuasion to arousing emotions (Corcoran, 
1979).
To summarize these discussions, political communication has been described as the 
exchange of symbols among political elite(s) (and the citizenry), with those symbols being 
used as a means of expanding expression, judgment and understanding of politics (Nimmo,
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1974). As shown by the examples of political communication strategies, such 
communication can be used to establish what might be rather than necessarily what is; it is 
a show of power to effect change and maintain social order through the use of non-violent 
means and its use is an expression of the values and characteristics of the communicator 
(Weaver, 1953).
Types of Political Communication
The strategies just discussed as used by politicians can be grouped into general types of 
political communication of which there are many types. For example: authority or 
command, coercion, influence, and inducement (Connolly, 1974; Nimmo, 1978; R. Smith, 
1997). For the purpose of this thesis, only two types of political communication (persuasion 
and propaganda) will be investigated in depth. This is done to restrict the discussion to a 
manageable size. Moreover, it can be argued that parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime 
are most representative of these forms. For instance, it is not possible to say that the public 
is afraid because the state demands it of them (authority), has used physical force (force) or 
the threat of physical force (coercion) to make them feel afraid, or because the state has 
offered them a reward for being afraid of crime (inducement). Rather it is argued that any 
examination of debates about fear-of-crime will benefit most from an understanding of 
political communication techniques that are overtly less forceful and directive but no less 
powerful: persuasion and propaganda. It is these types of political communication that will 
provide relevant examples of the cross-influence between linguistic and societal features on 
the attempted construction of various social realities, and more simply the use of language 
in politics to communicate on a particular topic.
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Persuasion
In themselves, language and communication form a part of daily life and inherently give 
the ability to persuade (Andersen, 1971; Brown, 1968; Reardon, 1991). Persuasion allows 
people to come to mutual agreement on issues (Bettinghaus, 1968), although it does differ 
from general communication in that persuasion is an attempt to direct the response of the 
target towards a relatively specific goal. In politics, the ability to persuade is often used to 
generate attention, increase the comprehension of issues among the audience and the 
acceptance of policies (Andersen, 1971).
There are four characteristics of persuasion that distinguish it from other forms of political 
communication. The first is the formation of the intention to change the response of another 
person/s. Secondly, it is decided that that objective should be reached through the mutual 
exchange of symbols (i.e., language). Thirdly, the response that is achieved is different to 
what would have occurred had the exchange not occurred. Finally, the target was free to 
choose their response (Andersen, 1971; Nimmo, 1978; Reardon, 1991). While there is 
intent to change another’s behavior, persuasion does not impinge on the individual’s ability 
to choose. The persuader may manipulate stimuli and selectively present information but 
they rely on the receiver being free to choose their response. Once these four characteristics 
are present, one person is said to have persuaded another.
There are two general categories of appeals that are used to persuade another to change 
their response. The first is that of logical appeals or appeals made on the basis of reason and 
argument. The second is what I term emotive appeals. In contrast to logical appeals where 
the audience is approached on relatively rational levels, emotive appeals aim to cause the
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audience to respond with feeling rather than thought. They are appeals that are directed 
towards the needs and perceived wants of the audience: the basic values, attitudes and 
beliefs. These appeals tend toward the evocation of fear, anger, discontentment or 
frustration, gratitude, hope, and pride.
The manipulation of emotions has been a ubiquitous tool of political elites for centuries 
(Way & Masters, 1996) and set the scene for some of the most powerful and widely 
accessible methods of persuasive communication. Of the two types of persuasion, emotive 
appeals are used the most in political messages probably because they are memorable and 
dissuade the target from critically assessing the message (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 
1997). The emotional appeal can be useful in the absence of strict “proof’ as to the reasons 
for the desired change. They are also one of the most difficult for the persuader to effect 
and control. It requires a greater knowledge on the part of the persuader as to the basic 
values, beliefs and likely emotional response to stimuli that are largely driven by culture. 
Such appeals only become realized in how and to what the receiver responds.
In summary, persuasion is a type of political communication that focuses on the efforts of 
one person to change the (voluntary) behavior of another through reasoned argument. To do 
so, the general categories of logical appeals (argumentation or reasoned discourse) or 
emotive appeals are often used. Persuasion, as a type of political communication, 
demonstrates how language is used in politics to voluntarily change the behavior of a target 
audience.
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Propaganda
Propaganda is the second form of political communication that will be examined in this 
section. “Propaganda” comes from the Latin word “propagare” meaning to spread or to 
grow (Brown, 1968; Larson, 1992). The term “propaganda” was originally used in the 
English language to revive, propagate and strengthen Catholicism. In this context, 
propaganda meant to propagate the faith (Qualter, 1985). However, the desire and 
consequent attempts (actions associated with the term “propaganda”) to manipulate public 
behavior, control information and manage public opinion have been recorded since Ancient 
Greece (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986).
Despite these early beginnings, the term “propaganda” did not enter common usage in 
English until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. At this time, there were 
significant improvements in the ability to communicate to ever increasingly large audiences 
through different media. In addition, advancements were also made in transportation 
technologies allowing greater movement and interactions between different populations. As 
a result, there was a need to emphasize and impose one’s culture against the tide of other 
cultures; and propaganda became a tool to do it. This was especially evident in war 
propaganda during the First and Second World Wars (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Qualter, 
1985). As a result, propaganda has become a prominent technique of (non-violent) ruling in 
the modem world (Combs & Nimmo, 1993).
Defining Propaganda
For the purposes of this thesis, propaganda will be defined as “the deliberate and systematic
attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a 
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response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986: 
16). This definition highlights some of the key differences between persuasion and 
propaganda. First, persuasion is the interactive exchange of information where the 
persuader has the desire for the target to voluntarily adopt his/her views. The propagandist 
attempts to remove that sense of choice from the target. The communication is no longer an 
interaction but is one way and tends to be directed at many people.
Second, it is the intention of both parties to satisfy both the needs of persuader and the 
audiences should the persuader’s argument be adopted. In propaganda, it is only the 
propagandist’s needs that are intended to be satisfied (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Reardon, 
1991). The resulting conclusion is not a mutual agreement based on the consideration of 
choices. Propaganda removes that sense of choice and the mutual satisfaction of needs.
Third, it is in the interests of the persuader that his/her intent to persuade is known (Jowett 
& O'Donnell, 1986; Reardon, 1991). However, because propaganda seeks only one sided 
satisfaction of needs, the propagandist does not benefit from others having knowledge 
about his/her intent. Quite often the propagandist will give one intent and follow through 
with another (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986). The audience would understandably show some 
resistance to adopting a behavioral change that would adversely affect their situation. In 
order to avoid that resistance, the propagandist hides their true intention of political 
communication.
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Many different types of propaganda have been identified by academic research. Each type 
is more a result of an alternative method of division than a fundamentally different type of 
propaganda. For example, propaganda can be divided into those that have been grouped by:
(1) Purpose: a positive or negative message being delivered (Fraser, 1957; T. J.
Smith, 1989); to agitate or integrate a group of people (Ellul, 1965; Lasswell 
& Kaplan, 1950).
(2) Source: black (from the ‘other side’), white (from ‘our side’), grey (source
unknown) and sub-propaganda (propaganda that prepares (either side’s) 
people for a later call to action (Ellul, 1965; Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986).
(3) Context: propaganda that is grouped by the context in which it is delivered. For
example: bureaucratic propaganda (Altheide & Johnson, 1980); corporate 
propaganda (Carey, 1995); treetops versus grassroots propaganda (Carey, 
1995); domestic versus international propaganda (Carey, 1995); political 
versus sociological propaganda (Ellul, 1965; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; 
Quaker, 1985).
(4) Method: senso- versus ratio- propaganda (Chakotin, 1940) or appealing to the
emotions or to one’s sensibilities.
For the purpose of this thesis, propaganda will be treated as one homogeneous type of 
political communication because the main aim of the present discussion is to provide an 
example of the interaction between language, usage and users and political agendas. The 
remaining discussion about propaganda will be presented in two sections. The first 
investigates the relationship between the democratic state and propaganda. The second 
section gives an overview of the general strategies of propaganda. These sections will
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review both the overall concept of propaganda and the strategies that are employed to use it 
to full effect.
State use of Propaganda
It has already been argued the propaganda is a common part of political communication. 
However, propaganda was initially considered to be something used solely by totalitarian 
governments. Despite this beginning, there is now the increasing recognition that:
• “the modem democratic state is, necessarily and inescapably, the propagandist
state” (Robins et al., 1987: 7);
• “propaganda is the rhetoric of modem politics, stirring emotions to direct public
opinion” (MacDonald, 1989: 29); and
• propaganda is essential part of modem world (Hummel & Huntress, 1949).
Manipulation through propaganda is one of the chief instruments in most forms of 
government including the democratic state. It allows the image of active participation in the 
running of the state while at the same time denying the benefits of actual citizen control and 
government accountability. The public is susceptible to manipulation because: “most 
people want to feel that issues are simple rather than complex, want to have their prejudices 
confirmed, want to feel that they 'belong' with the implication that others do not, and need 
to pinpoint an enemy to blame for their frustrations” (Brown, 1968: 26). As discussed 
above, political communication has the power to create the political reality for many 
citizens. In propaganda, this power can be used to manipulate information and create a false 
sense of reality and ultimately a passive citizen base (Schiller, 1973). This allows the state 
to claim public support for policies where that support was manufactured by the selective
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presentation of information that hides the true agenda and denies public choice by 
propaganda.
Propaganda and the management of information are strongly linked. “The propagandist 
seeks to control the flow of information, manage public opinion, and manipulate behavior 
patterns” (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986: 34). Some would argue that all information is 
actually propaganda because of the necessity to present selectively that information in order 
to achieve the purpose desired by those providing the information. “Information has, and is 
intended to have, a propaganda effect” (Qualter, 1985: 139-140). Others argue that the 
manipulation of information especially when it is linked to the promotion of fear, is 
justified because it is a good way to get a message across to the public (Furedi, 1997). 
Either way, propaganda is reliant on the spread of information to deliver its message to the 
target/s.
Ultimately, propaganda can be used to influence the reality perceived by citizens because it 
is directed towards the behaviors of the public (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986; Qualter, 1985). 
It does so through the manipulation or influence of the beliefs of the target (T. J. Smith, 
1989) rather than direct coercion of force or command (Qualter, 1985). In using 
propaganda, there is a recognition that attitudes are the source of behavior (Qualter, 1985; 
T. J. Smith, 1989), and, as a result, some propaganda may be directed towards the 
manipulation of attitudes despite the main goal of state-based propaganda being to change 
behavior.
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The Strategies of Propaganda
As suggested above, the type of propaganda does not substantially change the underlying 
techniques of the propaganda message. After its use in the World Wars, propaganda in the 
West was mostly considered to refer only to lies, deceptions and other negatively perceived 
manipulative tactics of the state to control the citizenry (Bytwerk, 1989; Ellul, 1965; 
Hummel & Huntress, 1949). However since Jacques Ellul’s work in the mid-1960s, 
propaganda has developed into its modem form whereby a wider variety of objectives are 
achieved through more diverse strategies than merely lies.
The general characteristics of successful propaganda are now described as encompassing 
all forms of media through which a message can be delivered to the mass audience (see 
Carey, 1995; Ellul, 1965; Fraser, 1957; Hummel & Huntress, 1949; Lasswell & Kaplan, 
1950; Nimmo, 1978; Quaker, 1985). That message must be directed to the masses but 
appear personal to every individual. To do this, the values, beliefs, group characteristics 
and emotional responses must be acknowledged by the propagandist.
Consequently, propaganda will be most successful when it is conveying a message that 
supports and encourages popular sentiments. “People tend to accept as fact what they want 
to believe and interpret reality in terms of what they already know” (Quaker, 1985: 137). 
The propaganda message will be clear, and will embody fundamental structures such as 
sociological presuppositions and social myths. Modem propaganda seeks to create 
confusion through the use of language that is more emotional than functional. This 
confusion then allows the state to guide its floundering citizens toward the desired course of 
action.
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Thus I have shown that these strategies are characteristic of a modem version of 
propaganda that reaches further than merely lies and deceptions. The state is able to use 
propaganda (and the management of information) in order to fulfill the requirements of 
democracy to appear to have an informed and participatory public. Language in the form of 
propaganda assists in the creation of a false reality of participation and the manufacture of 
public support for the political policies, and functions as a form of social control through 
initiating and maintaining certain forms of behavior.
CD A -  S t u d y i n g  P o l i t i c a l  L a n g u a g e
For the purposes of the research presented in this thesis, I will be approaching the study of 
how parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime from the traditions of critical linguistics (CL) 
and critical discourse analysis (CDA). This is a linguistic perspective that seeks to elucidate 
the interconnected nature of things: it seeks to study the (opaque or transparent) structural 
relationships that are expressed through language use. CDA studies not only texts 
(instances of written or spoken language use) but also the social processes and structures 
that produce the text and its meaning (Wodak, 2001). Critical linguists argued that the 
relationship between society and language was in fact two way -  language was both 
influenced by and an influence on social processes (Fowler et al., 1979). Language enables 
social interaction while also being a key part of socialization (Kress & Hodge, 1979). In 
order to capture this reflexive relationship, critical linguistics sought to provide a 
framework that encompassed the disciplines of linguistics, psychology and sociology; a 
theoretical framework that studied “syntax and the basic rule systems of the language along 
with the social uses of language, that is, the relations between language and society and 
between language and mind” (Hodge & Kress, 1993: 3) (see also Fowler et al. (1979) for a
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longer discussion of the history of critical linguistics). It is from this perspective that a two- 
way relationship between language and society in regard to parliamentary debates on fear- 
of-crime will be examined in the chapters that follow.
It is important to note that CDA is an approach with many variations between the main 
proponents rather than a single unified methodology. However, in general, it is 
characterized by a perceived need to recognize the historical context of all discourses, 
analyze the relationships between texts, and recognize that language mediates society 
(thereby adopting a non-deterministic view of language). However, there is no all- 
encompassing theoretical viewpoint or methodological framework (Meyer, 2001).
In this research, CDA will be used as a guiding approach for recognizing both the linguistic 
characteristics of and the societal influences on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. 
It is through this approach and the specific methodologies used for the case studies that the 
implications from the way in which fear-of-crime is discussed in politics will be drawn out 
on issues such as perceptions of human agency, identities and relationships between 
governments, politicians and the public.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
I began this chapter by describing the construction of language as a system of images, signs 
and symbols where communication is the exchange of those symbols between two or more 
people. From there I described political communication as the exchange of symbols among 
political elites (and the citizenry). While political communication can take many forms, two 
types were singled out as being relevant for analyzing parliamentary debates about fear-of-
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crime. The first was persuasion or the attempt to change the behavior of another through 
communication. The second type of political communication (propaganda) while also 
attempting to change behavior, did so through the means of manipulation, tricks of 
presentations and methods of depicting the truth. After these illustrations of how language 
can be used in politics, I then presented an overview of CDA within which the remainder of 
this thesis will approach political talk about fear-of-crime. This chapter was intended to 
highlight the constructed nature of language, the utility of communication in politics, and 




T w o  Histories of 1960 to 2003
Chapter Three Two Histories
This chapter will discuss the history of law and order politics and fear-of-crime from 1960 
to 2003. By history, I refer to both the events and the growing body of knowledge relevant 
to these issues during the 43 years being studied. Both histories are linked by their 
discovery, development and political currency. Law and order politics gained prominence 
in the United States in the 1960s, with Britain and Australia to follow shortly thereafter. 
Fear-of-crime was also “discovered” in the late 1960s in the United States. This 
phenomenon has since become a substantial part of criminological research and is 
increasingly gaining prominence in government policies on crime.
After discussing these histories from an international perspective, I will focus on law and 
order politics and the development of fear-of-crime in Australia. This history will begin 
with a discussion of Australian law and order politics and government responses to crime 
and fear-of-crime from 1960 to 2003. Together with the history of fear-of-crime, the history 
of Australian law and order politics will provide essential information on the social 
structures in which the parliamentary debates exist. It will also provide an overview of the 
academic knowledge surrounding the topic of those debates -  fear-of-crime. It is on the 
basis of those structures and the benchmark provided by academic research that the way in 
which politicians talk about fear-of-crime can be characterized in later chapters.
Before beginning, I want to note that terrorism has been excluded from these histories. This 
was done because fear-of-crime and indeed much of law and order politics that relates to 
fear-of-crime has been constructed and debated in terms of fearing domestic crimes such as 
burglary, rape and assault (see for example the questions in the National Crime Survey and 
the British Crime Survey attempting to measure fear-of-crime). While such crimes may be
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perpetrated by members of an international crime syndicate (as a hypothetical example), it 
is their domestic nature that is considered when assessing their impact on fear-of-crime. In 
other words, the underlying motivation of the ‘terrorist’ crime to use extreme violence to 
force regime change and the fear that such violence is intended to create in the general 
populace has not generally been included in debates about fear-of-crime. While this is 
changing since the events of September 11, 2001 the concepts of fear-of-crime and fear-of- 
terrorism have not been treated as synonymous by academics and politicians alike, with the 
type of crime (and its consequences for addressing fear) being the distinguishing feature 
(see Mythen & Walklate (2006) for a discussion of criminology and terrorism). Therefore, 
as the subject of this thesis is fear-of-crime and not fear-of-terrorism, the history presented 
in this chapter will focus on domestic crime related law and order politics and exclude that 
related to terrorism.
L aw and  O r d e r  P o l i t i c s
Many western countries such as Australia, United States of America and Britain are now 
obsessed by crime (Adler, 1983). It is a political and highly emotive issue with few other 
topics being able to arouse such passionate debate (Downes & Morgan, 1997; Freiberg, 
2001; Hogg & Brown, 1998) or such prejudices (Kettle, 1983). Crime is frequently given 
first priority in news reports and the entertainment media (see research on media influences 
and cultural indicators e.g., Gerbner et al., 1977; Gerbner et al., 1978; Gerbner et al., 1979; 
Gerbner et al., 1980; Signorielli et al., 1995); and discussions about crime and other social 
issues often take precedence over economic issues in many political campaigns (Ratner & 
McMullan, 1983).
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Crime has gained such prominence by becoming symbolic of many tensions, insecurities 
and anxieties in the late-modern society (Ismaili, 2003). Crime symbolizes far more than 
just criminal offences; it also reflects civil rights, urban riots, lifestyle changes, race and 
immigration, economic worries and a general feeling about disorder, authority, status and 
self-control (Dionne, 1992; Hall Jamieson, 1992; Hogg & Brown, 1998; Rosch, 1985). 
Crime and law and order are useful codewords -  brief referents that belie the complexity of 
the issues involved.
The phrase law and order politics refers to the political maneuvering around issues such as 
punishment or rehabilitation, crime control and prevention, and legislation (Kettle, 1983) as 
well as a belief in the underlying need for discipline in a civil society (Brake & Hale, 1992) 
(see Hinds (2006) for a discussion about conceptions of law and order). Such debates have 
long been part of local and state government portfolios but have become a mainstay of 
federal political in the United States from the mid-1960s, with Britain also overtly 
expressing political concern about crime in the 1970s and Australia in the 1980s (Feeley & 
Sarat, 1980; Hogg & Brown, 1998; Rosch, 1985; Thranbhardt, 1995; Zedner, 1995; Loader, 
2006).
The general political response to crime has been to reinforce the definitions of where the 
boundaries of citizen behavior lie rather than to protect the public from crime (Rosch, 
1985). Law and order politics represent the normative aspects of a society’s legal system; 
the setting of boundaries of behavior and fostering social integration (Zedner, 1995). In 
what Hinds (2006) calls the politicized conception of law and order, politicians are able to 
respond to the public demands for protection and the reinvigoration of crime legislation and
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policy (Castellano & McGarrell, 1991; Sheley, 1985) with tokenistic policy initiatives that 
are more effective in gathering votes than addressing crime. Thus the declaration of “war 
on crime” and the use of “get tough” policies has arguably minimal results for preventing 
crime but contain highly visible actions such as increased sentences, harsher punishments 
and the building of more prisons (Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1993). These initiatives 
gain politicians popularity through their “fight against crime”; and it is within this context 
of law and order politics that fear-of-crime was first identified.
F e a r - o f - C r i me
The history of fear-of-crime will be discussed in three sections: the discovery of the 
problem, academic research, and government attempts to reduce the level of fear-of-crime 
in Australia. It will be shown that fear-of-crime was discovered in the United States during 
a period of increased focus on the victim in the criminal justice system and the use of 
victimization surveys in local and national populations. It was also a period of strong racial 
tensions and civil unrest that some have argued may have influenced the general feeling of 
insecurity felt by the American public. In response to the discovered the problem of fear-of- 
crime, academic researchers investigated the effect that variables such as personal and 
environmental characteristics, the media, policy decisions and the police, and the perceived 
risk of victimization may have had on the level of fear in the community. These findings 
are examined below along with the problems that plague this research such as the lack of 
conceptual definition and measurement issues surrounding fear-of-crime.
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The “Discovery” of Fear-of-Crime
The phenomenon that is now tagged under the phrase fear-of-crime arose out of a question 
in the National Crime Survey conducted in the United States at the beginning of the 1960s 
(Harris, 1969). At this time there were two strong influences at work. First, the victim was 
slowly gaining prominence in the criminal justice system through the efforts of the 
victimology movement that blossomed fully in the 1970s (Laster & Erez, 2000; Ryan, 
1971; Walklate, 1992, 1998).
At the time of the National Crime Survey, there were increasing attempts to gauge the 
extent of victimization through both national and local surveys of the population (Phipps, 
1986). The discovery of fear-of-crime was linked to this burgeoning field of victimization 
surveys that highlighted the large proportion of the population that felt unsafe walking 
alone at night1. General public opinion polls in the United States especially (Harris, CBS 
news and Gallup polls) also showed that “crime” was increasingly concerning to the public 
(Erskine, 1974). Consequently, it has been argued that the change in academic and policy 
thinking to focus on the victim as well as the offender played a significant role in the 
identification and development of fear-of-crime (Zedner, 1997).
The second influence has been relatively ignored in later academic research and fear 
reduction policies. This is the influence of race and political action. During the 1960s, the 
United States was experiencing an influx of racial tension and civil unrest especially
1 For example: British Crime Survey (e.g. (Box et al., 1988; Hough, 1995; Maxfield, 1987; Simmons, 2002)), 
National Crime Survey (e.g. (Balkin, 1979; Block, 1993; Brantingham et al., 1986; Killias, 1990; LaGrange & 
Ferraro, 1989)), and local surveys such as the Islington Crime Survey, Broadwater Farm Survey, Merseyside 
Crime Survey, Newham Crime Survey (Young, 1988).
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concerning the desegregation of public schools and extending the franchise to African 
Americans. More than two decades later, the case of Willie Horton (a black man who raped 
a white woman while on leave from a prison where he was serving time for a murder 
conviction) became a symbol of whites’ fears of black men and of violent crime in general 
(Dionne, 1992). Such a perception of difference, especially racial difference, has been 
shown to be a predictor of what is now known as fear-of-crime (Moeller, 1989; Pain, 2001; 
Parker, 1988; Sik Lee, 2000; Skogan, 1995; St John & Heald-Moore, 1995, 1996).
Political action has also been shown to have an influence on the discovery of fear-of-crime 
(see discussion by (Lee, 2001)). The issues placed on the political agenda during election 
campaigns in the United States during the 1960s changed to include social issues such as 
crime as well as the traditional economic issues (Scammon & Wattenberg, 1970). The 
streets suddenly became “full of violence” and “full of bloody crimes”, and the phrase of 
“violence in the streets” was soon to be heard in the 1964 political campaigns of 
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. The phrase fear-of-crime was used in speeches 
made by Attorney General John Mitchell (of the Nixon administration) in response to the 
high crime rates in Washington, D.C. Later, the American Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 was passed by Congress as a show of political action against the 
growing concerns reported about crime (Baker, 1985) .
These actions, along with the results from victimization surveys indicating a rise in public 
concern about crime and safety, have led some researchers to argue for a connection 
between political action and fear-of-crime (Collins, 2003; Lee, 2001). For example,
' In Britain, the British Crime Survey was instigated from a similar desire to demonstrate political action 
against crime while challenging public concern about the perceived rate of crime (Loader, 2006).
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Schwartz argued in 2000 that “people seem to be highly concerned with crime only when 
the media and politicians tell them that they should be highly concerned with crime” 
(Schwartz & Israel, 2000: 337). Beckett (1997) has also found that “public concern about 
crime and drugs is strongly associated with prior political initiative on the crime and drug 
issues” (Beckett, 1997: 10). This thesis is intended to contribute to this body of research 
investigating the influence of politics on fear-of-crime, while also acknowledging the 
reciprocal nature of the influence between public fears about crime and political debates.
Academic Research on Fear-of-Crime
Academic work on fear-of-crime began in the 1970s, with the initial focus being on the risk 
of victimization (Furstenberg, 1971), the relationship between fear of the police and fear- 
of-crime (Block, 1971) and the effects of the environment (Conklin, 1971; Poveda, 1972) 
on fear-of-crime. The impact on public policy was discussed shortly after (in addition to 
(Harris, 1969) see Brooks, 1974; Erskine, 1974; Skogan, 1976; Wilson & Brown, 1973). It 
was 1976 before the first research was published on demographic variables and fear-of- 
crime (Clemente & Kleiman, 1976; Cook & Cook, 1976; Lalli & Savitz, 1976; Sundeen & 
Mathieu, 1976). Finally, the potential influence from the media and television especially, 
began to enter academic research on fear-of-crime (Doob & Macdonald (1979) see also 
Ditton et al (2004) for a review of media literature on fear-of-crime).
The growing body of fear-of-crime research has remained largely focused on these areas 
with additional disciplines such as psychology making contributions only recently (for 
more details see the flowchart of fear-of-crime research given in Appendix One). The 
following sections will give an overview of the research results in the areas of measurement
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and definitional aspects, and demographic and environmental variables. It will also 
highlight some of the problems that have plagued these researchers.
Measurement and Definition Confusion
A number of different instruments have been used to measure fear-of-crime. These began 
from the initial ‘global’ question or a variation on “how safe do you feel walking alone at 
night?” such as that used in the British Crime Survey and the National Crime Victims 
Survey amongst many other studies (see Hough, 1995; Mulvey, 2002; Semmens et al., 
2002; E. E. Thompson & Krause, 1998; Warr, 2000). Other techniques have included using 
vignettes or hypothetical scenarios to capture different elements of fear-of-crime (Kelley & 
Evans, 1992; May et al., 2002), and using demographic and other social psychological 
variables to indicate fear-of-crime (Farrall et al., 2000; Killias & Clerici, 2000; Skogan, 
1987; Van Der Wurff et al., 1989). The subject of how to measure fear-of-crime has itself 
been the focus of much research, although many substantial problems remain (see 
discussions in Croake & Hinkle, 1976; Farrall, 2004b; Jackson, 2005; Keane, 1995; Killias, 
1990; Pleysier et al., 2005; Schneider, 1981; Thompson et al., 1992; Williams et al., 2000; 
Young, 1988).
One of the main problems that affect the measurement of fear-of-crime is that there is no 
universally accepted definition of the phenomenon. The following three definitions 
highlight the incredible broadness of the definitions that are used in research. Fear-of-crime 
can be defined as:
• “an emotional reaction of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person 
associates with crime” (Ferraro, 1995: xiii)
49
Chapter Three Two Histories
• “an emotional response to the possibility of a crime happening to oneself or to
others that incorporates elements of fear, worry, vulnerability and loss of a 
sense of security or safety” (Lupton 2000: 24).
• “the wide range of emotional and practical responses to crime and disorder made
by individuals to crime and disorder made by individuals and communities” 
(Pain, 2001:901)
It is now commonly held that the phrase fear-of-crime is used to indicate a wide range of 
emotions generated by the general category of crime (Hough, 1995) (although some 
researchers still try to restrict it to worry and anxiety but deny that it is a sole indicator of 
fear (Johnston, 2001)). While more detail will be given below about defining public fears, 
this lack of conceptual definition of fear-of-crime is an important factor in the varying 
success of measurement and fear reduction attempts by researchers and policy makers.
Demographic and Environmental Influences
The general findings of the academic work on fear-of-crime can be divided into two main 
groups. The first group comprises of those projects that studied the effect of demographic 
variables such as gender, age, income and education on fear-of-crime. From this research, it 
is possible to show that gender is the most reliable personal characteristic in predicting who 
will and will not be afraid of crime; and that women fear crime more than men (e.g. Alvi et 
al., 2001; Box et ah, 1988; Carcach et ah, 1995; Grabosky, 1995; Kelley & Evans, 1992; 
Phillips & Park, 2004; although Reid & Konrad (2004) argue that the gender difference 
may lie in the type of crime feared rather than the individual’s gender; and Sutton & Farrall 
(2005) argue that men may Tie’ or suppress their fear when answering surveys).
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The research on income is similarly unanimous, showing that those with higher disposable 
income have lower levels of fear-of-crime (Austin et al., 2002; Carcach et al., 1995; 
Lebowitz, 1975; Pantazis, 2000). For example, recent studies dedicated to determining the 
relationship between fear-of-crime and level of household income have suggested that: a) 
an 496% increase in income is required to offset the impact on happiness from increased 
fear-of-crime due to a threat of violence while walking in the dark; b) a 115% income 
increase is needed to offset fear of being home alone; and c) that such increases translate 
into €13,538 to significantly reduce someone’s fear-of-crime (Moore, 2006a, 2006b).
In contrast, the effect of age on the level of fear remains elusive to researchers with greatly 
differing views still being debated (for example see Biles, 1983; Box et al., 1988; Chadee & 
Ditton, 2003; Ferraro & LaGrange, 1988, 1992; James et al., 2003; Lebowitz, 1975; 
McLennan, 1999). Most recently, Moore and Shepherd (2006) have argued that age 
interacts with fear of different types of crimes: fear of personal harm is greatest at 23 years 
of age and fear of personal loss is greatest at 45 years of age. While there are attempts 
being made to unravel the interaction between these main variables, at present the most that 
can be said for the effect of age on fear-of-crime is that there may be a very minimal 
positive relationship -  fear-of-crime may increase with age.
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There is also some debate about the effect that differing amounts of education may have on 
a person’s fear-of-crime. The variation in results stems from the lack of research in the 
area; most studies that do include education as a variable use it as a means of dividing 
location or environment rather than people. In other words, some fear-of-crime studies have 
focused on fear held by people on educational institution campuses rather than the levels of 
education a person may have (for example see Fisher, 1995; Lalli & Savitz, 1976). 
However, there is some evidence to suggest that fear-of-crime tends to vary inversely with 
education (Box et al., 1988; Carcach et al., 1995; Grabosky, 1995).
The second group of research results pertains to environmental influences. It has been 
found that people who are sensitive to cues of disorder and live in an area with high levels 
of disorder will be more afraid of crime than those who do not have both of these qualities 
(e.g. Perkins & Taylor, 1996; R. B. Taylor & Hale, 1986). In addition, the type of 
environmental space (rural, urban and associated perceived rates of crime) in which people 
live can also affect the level of fear, but the mechanism for doing this is still in question 
(Austin et al., 2002; Austin & Spine, 1991; Chilvers, 1999; Conklin, 1971; Gray & 
O'Connor, 1990; Maxfield, 1984). However, the amount of social support that is available 
and the level of social cohesion in an area are generally considered to be of little 
consequence for a person’s fear-of-crime (Ross & Joon, 2000; Sacco, 1993; Yin, 1982).
Defining Fear-of-Crime
The complexity of these research findings on fear-of-crime has led to a general consensus 
among involved scholars that fear-of-crime is representative of more than previously 
acknowledged. One group of researchers has made the statement that “'fear' is now
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routinely used as all-encompassing shorthand to refer to anxieties about crime” (Hough, 
1995: 1) (although a recent study has attempted to separate fear-of-crime from concern 
about crime and their associated predictor variables (Amerio, 2005). In addition, Ditton and 
colleagues have argued that not only does the label “fear-of-crime” include fear-related 
emotions such as anxiety or worry but also anger about crime (Ditton et al., 1999). This 
latter emotion has been shown to be a more commonly felt emotional response to crime 
(Carvalho & Lewis, 2003).
Taylor and Jamieson (1998) and Jackson (2004) argue for the wider variety of emotional 
response, stimuli and cultural beliefs as being captured under “fear-of-crime”. This is a 
natural progression from the works of (Lee, 2001) and (Beckett, 1997). These scholars 
called for a type of research that recognizes the complexity of the concept itself. Fear-of- 
crime, they argue, is not solely a measure of an individual’s response to criminal behavior 
(their experienced fear). Instead, it incorporates: (a) a variety of other insecurities such as 
personal safety, job security, housing status and position, personal status, international 
relations and familial social positions; and (b) the cultural attitudes towards crime, social 
change, relations and the conditions conducive to crime. This variety is evident in the scope 
of the criminological area of “fear-of-crime” that encompasses local through to national 
crime prevention, security and safety initiatives and the changing social movements that 
change the social reality (I. Taylor & Jamieson, 1998). Thus “fear-of-crime” could be seen 
as a codeword for people’s fears, worries and concerns about any range of stimuli that are 
not necessarily defined as criminal.
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In summary, this section has sought to give a general introduction to both the development 
and recognition of the problem of fear-of-crime and the academic knowledge that has been 
generated about the phenomenon. It was shown that fear-of-crime was first recognized 
through a combination of influences from victimology, racial/civil unrest and political 
action. In response, academics have studied the effect of demographic and environmental 
variables on the public’s level of fear. However, much of this research has been plagued by 
measurement and definitional problems that have reduced the generalizability, reliability 
and validity of the results. It is on the basis of this introduction that fear-of-crime will be 
discussed specifically as it occurs in Australia. Before doing this, however, the following 
section will detail law and order politics in Australia. This will be done to provide 
information on the social structure and relations in which the parliamentary debates that 
form the data for this research were produced.
A u s t r a l i a n  L aw a n d  O r d e r  P o l i t i c s  
In Australia, law and order has become a significant and ubiquitous issue in politics. It rises 
to the fore in most election years and in most levels of government, when both the 
government and the opposition aim to show the advantages that their policies have over 
other party’s stances to make the streets safer and to be stronger against criminals. As 
discussed above, some have called this the law and order auction and believe that the 
success of law and order to catch votes has eclipsed the motivation to implement effective 
crime control policies (Sarre, 2002).
This section will give an overview of the history of Australian law and order politics at a 
federal level and introduce the main government institutions responsible for crime
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prevention, control and justice. Specific details of state level political responses to crime 
and fear-of-crime will be given in Chapter Ten. While government responses to crime and 
the administration of justice are traditionally the purview of state level politics, the decision 
was made to focus on federal level politics in order to clearly demonstrate the increasing 
prominence and salience of such issues in the political arena.
The History of Australian Law and Order Politics
To give an indication of the history of Australian law and order politics, I will highlight 
changes in the platforms and policy speeches of the major political parties. In the policy 
speeches of the 1950s to 1960s, it is evident that there was a convergence of economic 
policies followed by a dramatic polarization of these same policy issues in the 1970s (see 
below). The 1980s signaled an international convergence to more conservative and right- 
wing policies especially on social issues (McAllister & Moore, 1991). These trends have 
continued into the 21st century with law and order policies focusing on increased punitive 
and reactionary responses to crime.
Before beginning an overview of the history of Australian law and order politics, it is 
necessary to provide a cautionary note about platforms and policy speeches. In theory, the 
platform of a political party is a guide to the political reality in which that party exists. It 
reveals the “public intentions of the parties” and share the characteristic of being “coins in a 
political game” (Hawker, 1982: 1-2). They can be used by a party as propaganda to 
promote their own survival or by interest groups to place pressure on the party to act. The 
platforms provide a statement of party ideology which is readily comparable to other
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political parties and in theory, give the electorate a means of distinguishing between the 
parties.
Furthermore, the platforms are relatively durable documents that are not prepared 
specifically for an election (McAllister & Moore, 1991). Instead, this role is undertaken by 
the policy statement. Policies provide a public face to the competition between political 
parties. They give a concise form of the agenda which the party promises to follow should 
they be elected. In electing that party to office, the electorate is said to give the government 
a mandate to carry out their policies.
In practice, however, the policy speech and the platform hold differing values in the 
political strategies of each party. For example, in the Liberal Party of Australia, the 
platform is not binding on parliamentary representatives, but the ALP platform does bind 
members. The Liberal Party platform reflects the leaders’ politics; the ALP platform 
reflects the politics of the caucus. Different again, the platform of the Australian Democrats 
is intended to be reflective of the whole membership of the party through the participatory 
democratic process of construction (Hawker, 1982). Consequently, the platform of each 
party will contain not only differences in ideology but also differences that stem from 
organizational factors.
In the same way by 1970, the policy speech had slowly begun to decline in favor of 
piecemeal releases of policy statements issued throughout the election campaign. Quite 
often the majority of the policy content has been delivered prior to the policy speech and 
thus the speech, as part of a campaign “launch”, has become a mere formality. The policy
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speech has seen a decline in importance due to a convergence in ideology between 
previously opposed socialist and capitalist parties, by the emergence of catch-all parties and 
by survey results that show the public not using the policy speech to choose between parties 
(McAllister & Moore, 1991).
As a result of the decline of the policy speech and the problems discussed in regard to 
political platforms, the following historical sketch of law and order politics in Australia 
should be understood as providing only the broad context for investigating political debates 
about fear-of-crime. More detailed discussion of events, parties, policies and so on will be 
given as required in later chapters (especially Chapter Ten).
La wand Order in Political Pla tforms
Despite their great prominence today, law and order politics and the political treatment of 
(street) crime has not always been on the agenda at the national level. The early federal 
platforms of many political parties included no mention of crime or even law in the early 
1960s and 1970s (see for example: Liberal Party of Australia, 1960, 1971). In other years, 
the topic of law only arose in the field of law reform and constitution-related legal matters 
(see for example: ALP, 1967, 1973; Liberal Party of Australia, 1974, 1982).
It was not until the 1980s that the law and order issue with its current focus on street crime 
truly emerged in Australian politics. The notable absence of policy on law and order that 
was evident in earlier platforms is contrasted by more recent versions that have pages and 
even chapters devoted to the topic (see for example: ALP, 1998, 2000, 2004; Liberal Party 
of Australia, 1994).
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One reason for the late arrival of law and order onto the federal political scene may be due 
to the fact that the division of powers in the Australian constitution places the responsibility 
for law and order issues squarely on the states. This includes the portfolios of policing, 
criminal justice and corrections, and community initiatives (Sarre, 2002). State policies will 
be discussed in Chapter Ten. However, the constitutionally derived division of powers that 
sees responsibility for laws, police and so on, makes the rise of law and order politics at the 
federal level more notable.
Law  and Order in Political Policy Speeches
A comparison of the federal party leaders’ policy speeches from 1960 to 2003 reveals that 
the issue of law and order as it exists today did not emerge until the 1984 election. 
Statements of policy on legal issues began in 1969 with the then leader of the opposition 
Gough Whitlam calling for legislation to protect human rights and civil liberties and the 
liberalization of censorship laws (Whitlam, 1969). The phrase “law and order” was used by 
Whitlam in 1972 under the heading of “Freedom and Democracy”. This time Whitlam 
promised law reform and the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) 
(Whitlam, 1972). In 1974, as an incumbent party, Labor mentioned the establishment of the 
Australian Legal Aid Service, furthering the progress of the FOI Act and reforms of the 
structure of the courts and appeals to the privy counsel were mentioned under the heading 
of “The Law”. Labor policies on civil liberties were also clarified with the proposed 
introduction of an Australian Bill of Human Rights (Whitlam, 1974).
It was not until 1975 that the Liberal Party included policies relating to legal issues in their 
policy speech. Fraser pledged to introduce laws to protect privacy and anti-discrimination
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legislation (Fraser, 1975). Once on the scene, the Liberal Party initiated the first policy 
statement that is suggestive of the slant of “law and order” that was to come. In 1980 under 
the heading of “drugs” Fraser assures the electorate that if re-elected they would work with 
the States to combat the problem of illicit drug use (Fraser, 1980).
The 1984 federal election saw the issue of “law and order” as referring to criminal matters 
establish itself in the national political context. The ALP under the leadership of Bob 
Hawke spoke in relation to organized crime and drug use. Hawke promised to provide an 
“unrelenting attack on organized crime” through increased Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
resources. The problem of drug use was to be combated with the education of young people 
and attempts to rehabilitate drug users back into the community. Hawke also heralded the 
establishment of the National Campaign against Drugs. The statement ended with “this is 
one fight we must fight together” (Hawke, 1984).
The Liberal Party also made a statement about law and order in their 1984 policy speech. 
Similar to Hawke, Peacock promised to “crack down hard on drugs” and show “no mercy 
on organized crime”. He also suggested the concept of coordinated activities from a special 
surveillance command run by the Australian Defense Force out of northern Australia 
(Peacock, 1984). These statements made by both parties are strongly predictive of the 
stance taken by political parties today.
The problem of law and order was now firmly established in policy speeches at the federal 
level. In the 1987 election, Hawke promised to continue the law enforcement initiatives of 
previous years and to provide adequate resources to the National Crime Authority (NCA),
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the AFP and the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (Hawke, 1987). Howard on 
behalf of the Liberal Party (in opposition) met this statement with a pledge to provide 
additional powers to the AFP and NCA to fight organized and drug-related crime. In 
particular, the NCA was to have stronger powers to use surveillance on phone lines 
(Howard, 1987).
By the turn of the 21st century, it was clear that law and order was a political issue at the 
federal level. This has been demonstrated through the brief analysis of party’s platforms 
and policy speeches since 1960. The main purpose of providing this history has been to 
show that law and order has gained increasing salience and prominence on the political 
agenda. Specific details on each political party’s ideology and policies relating to crime will 
be discussed in Chapter Ten. The following section will introduce the main government 
institutions that are responsible for criminal justice and crime control in Australia.
Australian Government Responses to Crime and Fear-of-Crime
The following section details some of the initiatives, agencies and departments that are 
responsible for addressing crime and fear-of-crime across Australia. The discussion begins 
with programs that have been set up by individual governments to tackle specific issues 
such as crime prevention, community safety and fear-of-crime. These programs, along with 
the agencies and departments to be discussed later, play an important role in both advising 
the government on crime matters and the implementation of the resultant policies.
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Na tional Crime Prevention Program (NCPP)
The National Crime Prevention Program (NCPP) is a continuation of efforts and funding 
committed to the National Campaign against Violence and Crime (NCAVAC). The 
NCAVAC was a feature of the Coalition 1993 election policy “Law and Justice for Us All”. 
The Howard government supported the campaign by a further commitment of $9.2 million 
from 1996 to 1999. It sought to address a range of issues such as fear-of-crime, burglary, 
crime committed by young people, crime in indigenous communities and sexual violence 
(Sarre, 2002).
Launched in 1997 with $38 million in funding, the NCPP continued with many of these 
objectives of identifying and promoting “innovative ways of reducing and preventing crime 
and the fear of crime” (Attorney-General's Department, 2004). With further government 
funding of $20 million through the Howard 2004-2005 budget, the program seeks to 
increase the involvement of Australian communities in crime prevention primarily through 
a grants program for trialing prevention approaches. The program is situated within the 
portfolio of the Minister for Justice and Customs and involves a strong emphasis on 
developing partnerships both within the community and between the community and local 
governments (Attorney-General's Department, 2004).
The Na tional Anti-Crime Stra tegy (NA CS)
The National Anti-Crime Strategy was a nation-wide state and territory government
initiative beginning in 1994. NACS was coordinated from South Australia with each state
or territory assigning a minister to be responsible for implementing the initiatives at a local
level. The Strategy was intended to address issues of crime prevention through a national
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approach. It was hoped that crime prevention would assist in the control of crime where 
criminal justice responses had failed; and that the national approach would reduce 
duplication of efforts across Australia. The Strategy focused on key areas such as the 
development and promotion of best practice in crime prevention, and bipartisan 
commitment to crime prevention action. These areas touched on issues included fear-of- 
crime and community safety, government roles in crime prevention, and the evaluation of 
crime prevention efforts (Crime Prevention Unit, 2003).
The A ustralian Institute of Criminology (AIC)
The Australian Institute of Criminology is a Commonwealth statutory authority that was 
founded in 1973 for the purposes of “conducting criminological research; communicating 
the results of research; conducting or arranging conferences and seminars; and publishing 
material arising out of the AIC’s work” (AIC, 2004). The AIC also provides policy advice 
and consultation services to governments and to private industry. It operates under the 
Criminology Research Act of 1971 and also falls within the portfolio of the Minister for 
Justice and Customs.
The Criminology Research Council (CRC)
Similar to the AIC, the Criminology Research Council is also a Commonwealth statutory 
authority operating under the Criminology Research Act of 1971. The CRC controls and 
administers the “Criminology Research Fund”. This fund is designed to provide researchers 
in universities, government departments and other institutions with funds to undertake 
criminological research. The research itself can be in a variety of areas such as sociology,
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psychology, law, statistics, police and so forth but must be policy-oriented with research 
outcomes that are applicable in multiple jurisdictions (CRC, 2004).
The A ustralian Crime Commission (A CC)
The Australian Crime Commission is the resulting organization from the amalgamation of 
three agencies in 2003: the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (established in 1981 
to “provide a national criminal intelligence service for law enforcement), the National 
Crime Authority (established in 1984 to “provide an effective countermeasure to Australian 
organized crime”), and the Office of Strategic Crime Assessments (established in 1994 to 
“provide strategic intelligence advice on emergent criminal issues) (ACC, 2004). The 
amalgamation was intended to increase coordination and effectiveness of intelligence 
collection and analysis while decreasing the duplication of materials and resources.
The ACC is primarily focused on the collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal 
intelligence and information to law enforcement agencies. Current special investigations 
and intelligence operations include: south east Asian organized crime, established criminal 
networks, firearms trafficking, money laundering and tax fraud, Victorian established 
criminal networks, amphetamines and other synthetic drugs, vehicle rebirthing, identity 
crime, and people trafficking for sexual servitude. The activities of the ACC are scrutinized 
by an inter-governmental committee, a parliamentary joint committee and the ACC board 
(ACC, 2004).
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GO VERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
At a federal level, the Attorney-General’s Department is responsible for law and justice in 
Australia. The Department is divided into four groups: Civil Justice and Legal Services, 
Criminal Justice and Security, Information and Knowledge Services, and Corporate 
Services. The Criminal Justice Division of the Criminal Justice and Security group is most 
relevant to the issues discussed in this thesis. It is “responsible for legal and policy advice, 
and for the administration and improvement of legislation and international arrangements 
... relating to criminal law and criminal justice process”. The National Crime Prevention 
Program is also administered by this division (Australian Government, 2004).
At a local level, the state and territory governments hold powers over law and justice as 
given by the Australian Constitution. Each state/territory also has an Attorney General who 
is the principal adviser to the (state/territory) government on legal, constitutional and legal 
policy issues. As the most senior member of the Bar, s/he may represent the crown in some 
litigation matters. In NSW, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General’s 
Department were amalgamated in 1901 to form the Department of Attorney General and 
Justice (NSW Attorney General's Department, 2004). A similar arrangement exists in 
Queensland (Queensland Government, 2004). These departments manage the courts, 
tribunals, laws and justice programs within each respective state.
In Victoria, the Department of Justice answers to four Ministers who cover six portfolios 
(The Attorney-General, Minister for Police and Emergency Services, and Minister for 
Corrections, Minister for Consumer Affairs and Minister for Gaming and Minister for 
Racing). The department is responsible for the “reform, administration and enforcement of
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the law in Victoria”. This includes police and prosecution of offenders, the court and prison 
system, other tribunals designed to protect citizens’ rights, emergency services, gaming, 
racing, liquor licensing and trade measurement, legislation and legal advice to the 
Government (Department of Justice, 2004).
The departments in Western Australia, South Australia, Northern Territory, the Australian 
Capital Territory and Tasmania have a very similar role to that of Victoria. Each 
department functions to provide systems and services for the provision of law, legal and 
policy advice, licensing, correctional services and criminal justice. Crime prevention is 
taken up to varying degrees in each state as discussed above in regard to NACS. The state 
and territory departments are responsible for the implementation of services at a local 
community level as well as the provision of advice to their premiers or chief ministers and 
the government. These departments are also concerned with protecting the rights of the 
individuals -  both victims and offenders of crime (see for further information: (ACT 
Department of Justice and Community Safety, 2004; Justice Tasmania, 2004; Northern 
Territory Government, 2004; SA Department for Correctional Services, 2004; WA 
Department of Justice, 2004)).
The Police
The police in the modem state are traditionally viewed as the frontline against crime. In 
Australia, there are eight police services: one federal and seven state- or territory-run 
services. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) “enforces Commonwealth criminal law, and 
protects Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. The 
AFP is Australia’s international law enforcement and policing representative, and the chief
65
Chapter Three Two Histories
source of advice to the Australian Government on policing issues” (AFP 2005). It is an 
organization that undertakes targeted work as directed by the Government (for example, 
combating organized crime, transnational crime and money laundering) and also provides 
protection services to dignitaries and crucial witnesses. Community policing services are 
provided to the ACT, Jervis Bay, Norfolk Island and Christmas Island. Finally, the AFP 
maintains a network of liaison officers in more than 20 countries and contribute to overseas 
peacekeeping missions. The AFP is a statutory authority established by Federal Parliament 
in the Australian Federal Police Act of 1979. Though it is part of the Attorney-General’s 
portfolio, the AFP Commissioner reports to the (Federal) Minister for Justice and Customs.
Each of the six state-based police services come under the auspice of their respective state 
law and parliaments:
• New South Wales Police was formed in 1789 and now comprises 13,300 sworn 
officers (NSW Police, 2005);
• Victoria Police was established in 1853 and has developed to an organization 
employing 13,100 people including Police, Public Servants and Protective Security 
Officers (VIC Police, 2005);
• Western Australia Police employs over 6,000 people with almost 5,000 of them 
being sworn officers (WA Police, 2005);
• Queensland Police Service was established in 1864 and in 2005-2006 had a funded 
strength of 9,378 police officers and 3,360 staff members (QLD Police, 2006);
• Tasmania Police employs 1,139 officers (TAS Police, 2006); and
• South Australia Police, as at 30 June 2006, had 4,283 police officers supported by 
1,125 unsworn employees (SA Police, 2006).
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The two territories in Australia have had a more complex policing history. The first police 
in the NT were officers from the SA Mounted Police (from 1870), in 1911 policing came 
under control of the Commonwealth, and in 1978 when the Territory won self-government 
it was given full control of the police. In December 2003, it comprised 760 sworn officers 
with 227 uncommissioned officers. In the ACT, the AFP are contracted to provide 
community policing services despite the Territory having gained self-government in 1989. 
There are approximately 790 sworn and unsworn officers assigned to ACT Policing.
Each of these police services have the similar goals of protecting the community and its 
property by enforcing the law, maintaining order, monitoring road safety and so on. Most 
relevant to this thesis, there is a strong rhetoric of working to create a safe environment 
through community partnerships, crime prevention and crime reduction. This rhetoric is 
acted upon by the development of ties with partners such roads authorities, Crime Stoppers 
and Neighborhood Watch organizations. Similarly, there is an increasing uptake in the use 
of community volunteers in administrative role to promote links with the community and 
enable sworn officers to concentrate on traditional police activities.
In summary, the programs, agencies and departments that have been discussed here 
function to create the law and criminal justice environment in Australia. From the local 
neighborhood level increasingly becoming involved in crime prevention to the national 
federal level of departments and agencies addressing organized crime and collecting 
criminal intelligence, such efforts necessarily affect the discussions about and actions on 
crime and fear-of-crime. Their discussion here was intended to describe the basic functions
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and portfolios of each body as a means of indicating the social structures in which the 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime are situated.
H i s t o r y  of  F e a r - o f - C r i me  in A u s t r a l i a  
Fear-of-crime in Australia has mostly been studied in the context of international research 
and their results. General demographic and environmental variables’ contribution to fear- 
of-crime has been studied through national or state based population surveys. Like the US, 
Australia also has a National Crime Victims Survey that has been run by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) since 1975 (Biles, 1983). This survey is run at irregular 
intervals, however, with surveys only occurring in 1975, 1983, 1990, 1998 and 2002. More 
recent results are being published in the ABS’ Crime and Safety statistics. The main focus 
of this survey is to measure victimization and its impact (Kelley & Evans, 1992).
State based surveys of crime levels and perceptions of safety are also conducted but little 
academic analysis has been done with the data on fear-of-crime because of a lack of access 
to ABS unit record data. One exception to this has been in QLD, where Carcach and 
Mukherjee have published a number of articles based on the data from the Queensland 
Crime Victims Survey and those run by the ABS and AIC (Carcach, 1999; Carcach et al., 
1995; Carcach et al., 1998; Carcach & Mukherjee, 1999; Mukherjee & Carach, 1998; 
Mukherjee et al., 1990). The following section chronologically details the academic 
research focusing on fear-of-crime in Australia.
Wilson and Brown (1973) were among the first to investigate fear-of-crime in Australia and 
did so with an emphasis on policy implications. They found that while there was a high
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degree of public concern about crime it was not as high as that reported in America (Wilson 
& Brown, 1973). This result was consistent with other research completed at approximately 
the same time. The authors observed that the Australian public did not report a level of fear 
comparable to that reported in the US and that those feelings of fear were limited to specific 
pockets of the community (Braithwaite et al., 1979).
However, Wilson and Brown also found that Australians were still modifying their 
behavior in similar ways to Americans such as avoiding talking to strangers, walking the 
streets at night and being out alone. The authors concluded that because little had been done 
to address public concern about crime, they were “fighting only half the battle and losing 
the war by default” (Wilson & Brown, 1973: 106). While this work was based on a survey 
of Australians, the influence of American research was strongly evident through the 
rhetoric and the conclusions drawn.
The majority of work on fear-of-crime in Australia for the next 10 to 15 years was focused 
on the elderly and associated variables such as social support and community cohesion. The 
focus on the elderly at this time is probably due to a similar international direction being 
taken in fear-of-crime research. In 1983, Biles wrote that the elderly were reporting 
significantly higher levels of fear than younger people in the National Crime Victims 
Survey of 1975 based on the global question (a measure later found to be inappropriate for 
use with older people) (Biles, 1983).
Mugford (1984) also found that older people were probably more fearful of crime but that 
the influence of other variables such as social support, demographics and especially gender
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may reduce the level reported (Mugford, 1984). In 1990, Green tempered the level of 
concern about crime attributed to the elderly in Australia by arguing that other concerns 
such as lack of transportation and health are more important than crime (Green, 1990). 
Research into fear-of-crime among the elderly in Australia has continued since these early 
efforts (see Costello, 1996; Grabosky, 1995; James, 1993; Ranzijn & Howells, 2002).
1990 saw the publication of the first research on fear-of-crime in rural areas of Australia. 
Gray and O’Connor (1990) studied perceptions of crime in Walcha, NSW -  a small country 
town populated by less than 2,000 people at the time. The authors found that although the 
level of fear-of-crime was less than that reported in city areas, crime itself is perceived as 
significant problem in some parts of rural Australia (Gray & O'Connor, 1990). Gray and 
O’Connor called for greater recognition of community characteristics in the study of fear- 
of-crime. The need for such recommendations was justified by the research coming mainly 
from the US where research on environmental variables was having a significant influence 
on the conclusions drawn about the strength of demographic variables.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, work on fear-of-crime in Australia again reflected 
international trends. The focus changed to study the implications of risk on fear. This 
change began through the work of Warr and associates in the US (see for example Warr, 
1987, 1990, 2000) and the common findings from many researchers that fear-of-crime was 
not directly related to risk of victimization. Lupton published two articles (1999, 2000) that 
focused on perceptions of risk and also types of environmental spaces. These articles 
highlighted the influence of the unpredictable stranger and the dangerous “other” on levels 
of fear-of-crime, as well as the perception that some areas are more risky than others for
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personal safety (Lupton, 1999, 2000). Lupton’s writings show the growing influence of 
theoretical models about risk and safety on the analyses of fear-of-crime.
The strong influence of interdisciplinary theory that was evident in Lupton’s work has 
matured into the self-reflective criminology written by Murray Lee out of the University of 
Sydney. Based on doctoral work, Lee (1999) published a genealogy of fear-of-crime in the 
style of Foucauldian analysis. Lee situated the research on fear-of-crime firmly within 
previous criminological traditions and pressures of social movements in more recent times 
(Lee, 1999). This analysis culminated in a further publication that cited the circularity of 
creation in the history of fear-of-crime between government attempts to reduce it and the 
levels reported in surveys and other academic work (Lee (2001) see also Farrall (2004a)). 
Both Lee, Lupton and their colleagues have participated in the changing focus of 
criminological research on fear-of-crime internationally to incorporate theoretical notions 
of risk, crime control and government efficacy begun by Garland (for example Garland, 
1996, 2000, 2001,2003).
So far I have traced the journey of the relatively meager writings of researchers on fear-of- 
crime in Australia. It is evident that little is known about fear-of-crime in Australia 
specifically and that much of the policy decisions have, by necessity, been based on 
American and British sources of research. While Australian work has followed and 
sometimes led international trends in this field, they have been mostly based on 
comparative data sources or theoretical foundations based on overseas results.
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Government Research on Fear-of-Crime
There have only been two (major) attempts by the Australian government to ascertain the 
impact of fear-of-crime and possible strategies for fear reduction in the community. Most 
recently, the Minister for Justice and Customs referred the matter of crime in the 
community (victims, offenders, and fear of crime) to the Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs in May 2002. The terms of reference for the inquiry directed the 
committee to “inquire into the extent and impact and fear of crime within the Australian 
community and effective measures for the Commonwealth in countering and preventing 
crime” (Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 2003).
This committee made five recommendations in 2004 specifically about fear-of-crime. It 
sought to encourage state and territory governments to work more closely together with 
organizations to collect data on underreporting of crimes. This was particularly in the areas 
of crimes against women. The Committee also recommended that there be greater 
representation of ethnic groups in Australian police forces in order to reduce ethnic-based 
crime and fear-of-crime in these communities. The fourth recommendation was that 
statistics of the level of fear-of-crime in the community be published in order to reduce 
fear-of-crime. Finally, the committee praised the work of the National Community Crime 
Prevention Programme and recommended further funding be made available (Bishop et al., 
2004).
The second attempt was a major academic research project. Fear-of-crime was identified by 
the National Anti-Crime Strategy (NACS), the Criminology Research Council (CRC) and 
the Commonwealth Government’s National Campaign Against Violence and Crime as a
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priority for research and action. This resulted in the Centre for Cultural Risk Research at
Charles Sturt University being commissioned by the CRC to undertake stage one of the 
project: a consultancy intended to “explore the ways in which people conceptualise and 
manage fear, especially in relation to the risk of becoming a victim of crime” (National 
Campaign against Violence and Crime, 1998: 2).
The fear-of-crime project team began with literature review of qualitative and quantitative 
work on the topic and also took in research on risk communication and the media. The 
fieldwork was divided into three studies. First, the Main Study involved qualitative 
interviews and focus groups of 148 participants drawn from Sydney, Wollongong, 
Bathurst, and Hobart. The second study looked specifically at fear-of-crime in public 
spaces and again used focus groups and long interviews. This study drew its participants 
from Sydney and the Blue Mountains areas who were regular users of the commuter rail 
link. The Transport Study also sought qualitative information from rail staff to elucidate 
expert versus lay persons’ feelings of fear on public transport. Finally, the third study 
investigated the impact of the media and audience viewing patterns on fear-of-crime.
The main findings of both the literature review and the results of three fieldwork studies 
were produced in a two-volume 610 page report. The fear-of-crime project team concluded 
that, similar to other academic research, age and gender were the strongest predictors of 
fear. The types of offences feared differed between the genders. The project team found 
that public transport was a source of fear for many people and that older people have a 
more generalized and pervasive fear than younger people. Additional conclusions were also 
given about the contexts in which people are afraid, levels of fear, relationship with actual
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risk of victimization and fear/crime reduction strategies. The then Minister for Justice, 
Amanda Vanstone, promised to use these conclusions and recommendations in 
implementing practical projects to make the community safer (National Campaign against 
Violence and Crime, 1998, 2000).
These two attempts by the federal government to gather information on fear-of-crime 
demonstrate the political recognition of academic research on the issue and the problem 
itself. They also highlight the intertwined existence of law and order politics and public 
concerns about crime with both becoming increasingly prominent in politics at local, 
state/territory and national levels. It is within this dynamic social and political context that 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime have occurred, the characteristics of which will 
be the subject of later chapters.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
In summary, this chapter has provided an introduction into law and order politics first at the 
global level. This introduction described the rise to prominence of the ‘crime problem’, the 
politicization of that problem, the political utility of crime politics and the effect that such 
politics have had on academic research into crime. The history of fear-of-crime provides a 
classical example of these events from its discovery and political adoption in the United 
States to its importation by different continents. It has been shown that the development 
and sustenance of fear-of-crime research is inextricably linked to the political utility of law 
and order issues.
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Finally, I gave an overview of law and order politics in Australia at the federal level. This 
was followed by an examination of the academic research carried out by Australian authors 
on fear-of-crime in this country. That examination, sadly, highlighted the lack of specific 
knowledge held by academics or by the Australian government. The only two attempts by 
the government to understand more fully fear-of-crime has been a federal inquiry and the 
NCAVC initiative and projects that stemmed from it. These attempts were argued to 
indicate the coexistence of law and order politics and fear-of-crime. It is on the basis of the 
social and political environment depicted by these two histories -  law and order politics, 
and fear-of-crime -  that the following examination of the debates surrounding fear-of-crime 
by Australian politicians will be undertaken.
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Chapter Four Methodology
This chapter will present the methodology employed to gather and analyze debates in 
Australian parliaments about fear-of-crime. The data is largely qualitative with simple 
quantitative counts and percentages given to indicate frequencies of use only in cases where 
it informs the text-derived analysis. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the 
methodology is intended to explore debates surrounding fear-of-crime. Consequently, the 
aims, research questions and even the potential analyses presented in this chapter are broad. 
They are intended to provide the freedom to let the data guide the analysis rather than the 
analysis being directed by a theoretical framework or proposition. Individual hypotheses 
drawn from criminological literature will be empirically tested in Chapter Thirteen. The 
chapter following this will give an overview of the general results with specific 
characteristics being discussed in later chapters.
A im
The aim of this research is to begin to identify characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime 
in Australian parliaments.
R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s  
The main research question guiding this research is:
How do Australian politicians, in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime?
This can be divided into more specific research questions of:
RQ1: What are the characteristics of debates on fear-of-crime?
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RQ2: How and by whom are debates on fear-of-crime used?
RQ3: When (in what situation) are debates on fear-of-crime used?
RQ4: What discourses are evident in debates on fear-of-crime?
M e t h o d o l o g y  T h e o r y
The following methodology is based on four points. First, it is primarily qualitative 
research. Techniques of such research are drawn from many different disciplines and in 
general do not favor one method over another. The main objectives of qualitative research 
stresses the socially “constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the 
researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003: 13).
Secondly, this research is mostly involved with unobtrusive qualitative data. Such data has 
advantages over the obtrusive qualitative methods in that it is non-interactive and the data 
itself exists outside the research process (i.e. is not generated through the research) (Hesse- 
Biber & Leavy, 2004).
Thirdly, the research analysis and results are based on a corpus of documents. A corpus is 
intended to identify what is central and typified in the language being studied (Stubbs, 
1996). This is in marked contrast to the techniques employed by linguists following the 
generative grammar traditions for example, where sentences are examined in isolation from
the context.
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Finally, the research is based in the guiding principles of CDA. The theoretical background 
to CDA has been explained in Chapter One. However, specific methodological approaches 
and analyses will be explained in each of the case studies.
D a t a  S o u r c e s
Data was sourced from on-line databases from Australian Federal and State parliaments. 
These databases commonly contained Hansard records and transcripts from committee 
proceedings. Some parliaments also maintained an on-line source of media releases and 
political publications. The time period for which these databases were accessible was 
approximately from 1980 for the Federal Parliament and from 1990 for most state 
parliaments. The ACT Legislative Assembly and WA Parliament were exceptions, coming 
on-line in 1995 and 1997 respectively.
Hansard
The main content of Hansard is the full report or transcript of Members’ speeches in 
parliament, with petitions, ministerial responses, motion notices, questions on notice (and 
their answers), results of divisions and requests for information from the Speaker also 
included. It is important to note that there have been some questions raised over the level to 




The debates are substantially the verbatim reports, with no unnecessary 
additions, with repetitions and redundancies omitted and with obvious mistakes 
corrected, but on the other hand leaving out nothing that adds to the meaning of 
a speech or illustrates an argument. (APH, 2003: 587)
Chilton (2004) has further confirmed that (the British) Hansard ‘corrects’ the speeches of 
members through removal of instances of discursive repair (self-corrections by speakers) 
and transformation of interrogatives into preferred format (e.g., “would my right honorable 
friend...”). In effect, Chilton argues, Hansard presents an idealized model of the events of 
each session (Chilton, 2004). Given that the focus of this research is to determine the 
characteristics of how parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime, it was felt necessary to 
ascertain the level of impact that such correction may have on the potential analysis of data 
drawn from the Hansards.
To do this, four sessions of question time (approximately one hour in length) in the House 
of Representatives and the Senate were recorded on audio tape. While all sessions of 
parliamentary sittings are broadcast on public radio (alternating between the House of 
Representatives and the Senate), question time was chosen as the session with the greatest 
possibility of impromptu, unplanned and spontaneous speech including mistakes and 
repairs. The transcript of each session was obtained from the Hansard (comprising 34,211 
words) and checked against the audio version of the parliamentary debate.
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Protocol-Determined Speech
It was found that the changes made by Hansard to that which was said in parliamentary 
debate could be classed into two categories: protocol determined speech and the 
transformation of spoken word into written text. Protocol-determined speech is the 
characteristics of the text that have been deleted or added to conform to Hansard preferred 
format. For example1, parliamentary protocol dictates that all answers to questions are 
directed through the Speaker of the House (or the President in the Senate). However, the 
“Mr Speaker” or “Mr President” is generally deleted from the written text. The following 
statement was made by Treasurer Peter Costello (House of Representatives Question Time, 
15 September 2005:
Verbatim:
The task ahead Mr Speaker will be to reform the industrial relations system. 
The task ahead Mr Speaker will be to bed down a competitive regime in 
relation to Telstra. Mr Speaker, are there any alternative views on managing 
the economy? Mr Speaker the opposition did say that they planned this term to 
build their creditability in relation to the economy.
Hansard:
The task ahead will be to reform the industrial relations system. The task ahead 
will be to bed down a competitive regime in relation to Telstra. Are there any 
alternative views on managing the economy? The opposition did say that they 
planned this term to build their creditability in relation to the economy.
1 The differences between the verbatim and Hansard transcriptions have been highlighted in bold font for all 
examples in the following section.
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In this example, as in the majority of Hansard texts analysed, “Mr Speaker” has been 
deleted from the written transcript.
Protocol-determined speech also includes the addition of phrases such as those referring to 
asking a supplementary question as the following statement by Senator McLucas 
demonstrates (Senate Question Time, 13 September 2005):
Verbatim:
Thank you Mr President. Why did the minister fail to ensure that the extreme 
impact of the government’s proposals on parents of children with disabilities 
was not taken into account in the first place?
Hansard:
Mr President, I ask a supplementary question. Why did the minister fail to 
ensure that the extreme impact of the government’s proposals on parents of 
children with disabilities was not taken into account in the first place?
Corrections were also made to the spoken text of the parliamentary debate in regard to full 
names and position titles. For example, Mark Vaile then acting Prime Minister stated 
(House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005):
Verbatim:
I welcome comments made by the EU Trade Commissioner, Peter 
Mandelson, that trade barriers are ineffective and only distract domestic 
industries from becoming competitive.
Chapter Four Methodology
Hansard:
I welcome comments made by the EU Commissioner for External Trade, 
Peter Mandelson, that trade barriers are ineffective and only distract domestic 
industries from becoming competitive.
Similarly, the text of a statement made by Treasurer Peter Costello was changed to confirm 
to the correct and full title preferred by Hansard (House of Representatives Question Time 
12 September 2005):
Verbatim:
I understand that the shareholding minister, Senator Minchin has indicated that
the government will not be voting against that resolution.......
Hansard:
I understand that the shareholding minister, Senator Minchin, the Minister for 
Finance and Administration, has indicated that the government will not be 
voting against that resolution.......
In summary, protocol-determined speech comprises a category of alterations that are made 
by Hansard during the transcription of parliamentary debates. These alterations included: 
the deletion of the explicit protocol-determined directing of the speech; the addition of 
preferred format for indicating the desire to participate in the debates; and the corrected 
names and titles of those involved.
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Transforming Spoken Word to Written Text
The second category of alterations made by Hansard involved modifying the 
parliamentarian’s speeches to conform to the traditions of written rather than spoken word. 
This comprised four main changes: hesitancies, repetitions and duplications, interjections, 
and clarity of speech. Each of these will be discussed below.
First, the spoken answers given by many of the parliamentarians were punctuated by 
hesitancies such as um, er, ah and so on. For example, Attorney General Phillip Ruddock 
made the following statement (House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 
2005)2:
Ah the er measures that we are pursuing will be ah will be ah advanced in 
those discussions urn with the leaders, um and er when that has been 
concluded and agreement is reached, because a number of these measures still 
require ah the er ah the willing engagement of the states and territories, ah 
when that has occurred um drafting of the more detailed provisions will 
commence.
While such hesitancies are common in speech, the written transcription of these words is 
not required for pragmatic purposes and provides only a distraction for the reader.
Second, due to the hearer’s need to process immediately what is said because of the 
inability to re-read the text, spoken word tends to have more repetition of the main points in
2 The underlined text indicates words that were in the verbatim recording but not included in the Hansard 
transcript. This will be discussed in detail below.
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an arguments. For example, Leader of the Opposition Kim Beazley stated ((House of 
Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005):
Verbatim:
Relevance Mr Speaker. I wanted to know whether the debate today is going to 
be gagged. Is it going to be gagged?
Hansard:
Mr Speaker, I rise on a point of order on relevance, I want to know whether the 
debate today is going to be gagged.
Similarly, Treasurer Peter Costello stated (House of Representatives Question Time 12 
September 2005):
Verbatim:
When the government did its last fuel tax inquiry, the fuel tax inquiry noted that 
there had been 44 inquiries into the oil market since 1983 Mr Speaker, 44 
inquiries into the oil market since 1983. I can assure the House that the 
problem in this industry is not a lack of inquiries. There have been 44 in the last 
20 years.
Hansard:
When the government did its last fuel tax inquiry, the fuel tax inquiry noted that 
there had been 44 inquiries into the oil market since 1983. I can assure the 
House that the problem in this industry is not a lack of inquiries. There have 
been 44 in the last 20 years.
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In these examples, Beazley and Costello are seeking to emphasize their points through 
repetition -  a feature that is less necessary in written text where the reader is able to return 
to earlier parts of the text at will. The speaker may also duplicate words or phrases that 
have been said not because of a desire to emphasize a point but to gain ‘thinking’ time. This 
was evidenced in to the Phillip Ruddock example given above with the duplication of will 
be.
A particularly common feature of question time that is not consistently transcribed by 
Hansard is interjections from other parliamentarians or the disciplining of those 
parliamentarians by the Speaker of the House or President of the Senate. For example: the 
following interchange took place in the House of Representatives 12 September 2005:
Mr Gavan O ’Connor -  My question is to the Acting Prime Minister -  
Indistinguishable Interjections
The Speaker -  Order! Order! Order! The member for Corio has the floor. 
Interjection -  Settle down big boy!
Mr Gavan O ’Connor -  Is the Acting Prime Minister aware that there has been 
little or no investment to the upgrade exchanges in regional South 
Australia....... [continued]
Hansard transcribed this as:
Mr Gavan O ’Connor -M y question is to the Acting Prime Minister. Is the 
Acting Prime Minister aware that there has been little or no investment to the 
upgrade exchanges in regional South Australia....... [continued]
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At other times, Hansard has recorded the interjections. For example:
Mr Dutton - .... We know that since the program started 90,000 people have 
become self-supporting and independent through that scheme.
It’s ours! It’s a Labor program.
We know that it has been an incredibly successful scheme—
Yes, and who set it up?
which has been supported and refined by this government. When I was in 
Hobart recently,.....
These examples seek to show that while Hansard transcribes some (probably when 
identifiable) interjections during parliamentary debate, the general noise that accompanies 
much of question time is not transferred into the written format.
The fourth change that is made by Hansard to transform the spoken parliamentary debates 
into the written text is what can be categorised as ensuring some clarity of speech. This 
includes deleting self-corrections by the speaker such as:
Verbatim:
For example, we have got Mr Sample, er Mr Speaker, we’ve got something 
like 700,000 children in Australia are growing up in jobless households
Hansard:
For example, something like 700,000 children in Australia are growing up in 





... and given the Commonwealth’s powers as recognised under the CSDTA
sorry CSTDA.....
Hansard:
.. and given the Commonwealth’s powers as recognised under the CSTDA.... 
(Senator Siewert, Senate 14 September 2005)
Ensuring clarity of speech also includes formalizing the language and correcting tenses. For 
example:
Verbatim:
If the minister wouldn’t work for $2.27 an hour, can he explain why the 
government is insisting that people with a disability should?
Hansard:
If the minister would not work for $2.27 an hour, can he explain why the 
government is insisting that people with a disability should? (Senator Sterle, 
Senate 13 September 2005)
Verbatim:
It was quite strict criteria because we had to ensure that we got the budget back 
into surplus....
Hansard:
There were quite strict criteria because we had to ensure that we got the budget 
back into surplus.... (Senator Patterson, Senate 13 September 2005)
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These changes to tense, formalization of language and the deletion of speaker’s mistakes 
ensure clarity of speech in the transcribed versions of the parliamentary debates. This, 
combined with the removal of hesitancies, duplications and repetitions, and interjections 
result in the idealised model of debate argued by Chilton (2004); an ideal that is further 
reinforced by changes made due to protocol determined speech.
The sum result of these changes made by Hansard can be seen in the final example given 
below. The lines marked by Arabic numerals represent the verbatim transcription and the 
Roman numerals represent the Hansard transcription. Spaces have been added to ensure 
matched words are aligned.
Statement by Philip Ruddock (Attorney-General)
House of Representatives Question Time 12 September 2005
1 I er thank the Leader for his question. I assume he is
1 I thank the Leader of the Opposition for his question. I assume he is
2 referring to the joint press release between the Prime Minister and
ii referring to the joint press release between the Prime Minister and
3 myself in relation to measures that were announced last Thursday
iii me in relation to measures that were announced last Thursday
4 and er as I recall, there were attached to that ah document some further
iv As I recall, there was attached to that document some further
5 elaboration but er the point we have now reached is that after the
v elaboration. The point we have now reached is that after the
6 discussion with state officials, involving Commonwealth officials
90
vi d iscu ss io n  w ith  state o ff ic ia ls , in v o lv in g  C o m m o n w e a lth  o ff ic ia ls
7 ah  th a t e r o p era te  er as a legal re fe re n ce  g ro u p , p re p a ra tio n s  are  u n d e r
v ii th a t o p era te  as a leg a l re fe re n ce  g ro u p , p re p a ra tio n s  are  u n d e r
8 w ay  fo r th e  m ee tin g  to  b e  h e ld  on the  2 7 th o f  S ep tem b er, ah jo in tly
v iii w a y  fo r th e  m ee tin g  to  b e  h e ld  on  27 S ep tem b er, jo in tly
9 in v o lv in g  the P rim e M in is te r , p re m ie rs  an d  e r an d  te rr ito ry  lead ers .
ix in v o lv in g  th e  P rim e M in is te r , p re m ie rs  and  te rr ito ry  lead ers .
10 A h  the  e r m easu re s  th a t w e  are  p u rsu in g  w ill be ah  w ill b e  ah
X T h e  m easu res  th a t w e  are  p u rsu in g  w ill be
11 a d v a n ced  in th o se  d iscu ss io n s  urn  w ith  the lead e rs , u rn  an d  e r w h e n
x i a d v a n ced  in th o se  d iscu ss io n s  w ith  the  le ad e rs , an d  w h en
12 th a t has b een  co n c lu d e d  and  ag reem en t is re a c h e d , b ec au se  a n u m b e r
x ii th a t h as b ee n  c o n c lu d e d  an d  ag reem en t is re ach e d , b e c a u se  a n u m b e r
13 o f  th e se  m easu re s  still re q u ire  ah  the er ah the  w illin g  en g a g em en t o f
x iii o f  th ese  m easu res  do re q u ire  the  w illin g  en g a g em en t o f
14 the  sta tes  and  te rr ito rie s , ah  w h e n  th a t h as o c c u rre d  urn d ra ftin g  o f
x iv th e  s ta tes  and  te rr ito r ie s , d ra ftin g  o f
15 th e  m o re  d e ta iled  p ro v is io n s  w ill co m m en c e . S o m e co n s id e ra tio n  has
XV th e  m o re  d e ta iled  p ro v is io n s  w ill co m m en c e . S o m e co n s id e ra tio n  has
16 b ee n  g iv en  er a lread y  to  th a t p ro c ess , urn b u t the  d e ta iled
xvi b een  g iv en  a lread y  to  th a t p ro c ess , b u t as fo r the  d e ta iled
17 leg is la tio n  er w ill u n d e rta k e  the  n o rm al re v ie w  th a t w e  w o u ld  ex p ec t
xv ii leg is la tio n  w e w ill u n d e rta k e  th e  n o rm al re v ie w  th a t w e  w o u ld  ex p ec t
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18 urn through the party room structures on this side of the House with time
XVlll through the party room structures on this side of the House with time
19 for your colleagues to also consider the matters
xix for your colleagues on that side of the House to also consider the matters
20 and er parliamentary committee examinations as appropriate. Urn and er
xx and for parliamentary committee examinations as appropriate.
21 we hope to get the passage of that legislation before the end of this year.
xxi We hope to get the passage of that legislation before the end of this year.
Within the 34,211 words used as a sample corpus to study the changes made by Hansard 
during transcription, 444 differences were found between the verbatim and Hansard texts 
(excluding hesitations of um, er, ah etc). It should be remembered that this corpus 
comprised of question time transcripts for the express purpose of gaining a sample of the 
most impromptu speech possible. The frequency of many features of this speech such as 
hesitancies, clarity of speech and protocol-determined speech changes could be expected to 
be less in recitations of written speeches during bill readings and so on. With only 7% of 
the documents collected for this research being from Question Time the spread of these 
higher frequencies is considered to be somewhat constrained.
Nonetheless it is important to acknowledge that the data for the proceeding research is not a 
100% verbatim record of parliamentary debates. This may have some unquantifiable impact 
on the research findings presented in the first and second case studies that have a strong 
focus on the linguistic characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime. However, the changes 
made by Hansard during transcription do not change the pragmatic intentions of the speaker
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as reflected in the language used, despite presenting a syntactically idealized version of 
events. Therefore, it is argued that the overall intentions of the approach used in this 
research and the goals of the research itself will not be impacted unduly by Hansard’s 
transcription practices.
D a t a  G e n e r a t i o n
The purpose of the approach presented here is to isolate data that will display the 
characteristics of debates on fear-of-crime in Australian parliaments. As such, it focuses 
solely on material that has been produced in an Australian parliament and excludes material 
which is produced from the media or other agency. Data was generated from the following 
political or government documents that originated during the period of 1980 to 2003:
• Parliamentary debates, papers, question time debates and questions
• Media releases
• Committee proceedings, papers and reports
• Political party platforms, position papers, policies and other documents in their
manifestos.
Not all databases provided the same access to such documents. The following table outlines 




Table 4.1: Availability of Documents From State and Federal Parliaments
State O n-Line Item s Searched Begun State O n-L ine Item s Searched Begun
Federal Parllnfo Web (Hansard) Not Listed WA Hansard 1997
Parliamentary Library Committee Reports
E-Briefs Publications
Vital Issues Seminars
Parliamentary Papers TAS Hansard 1992
Committee Reports Committee Reports
Publications
NSW Research Papers 1991
Bills Digests NT Hansard 1990
Inquires Index Committee Reports
Committee Reports Publications
Archival Records
Hansard ACT Hansard 1995
Committee Reports
VIC Hansard 1991
Committee Reports QLD Publications 1990
Committee Reports
SA Hansard 1993 Hansard
Committee Reports
K eywords
Individual documents were initially identified through keyword searches available in the 
data sources listed above. Two main keywords were used -  “crime” and “fear of crime”. 
While it was anticipated that the search results returned under the keyword “crime” were of 
a very wide scope, it was hoped that these searches would also identify documents which 
were exceptions to where fear-of-crime has traditionally been found. In addition, the phrase 
“fear of crime” may not always be used. Instead, other tag words such as “safe streets”, 
“home invasion”, “mugging” and “public safety” were employed to describe the same 
phenomenon. Instances of not using fear-of-crime and the substitution of different phrases 
to describe the issue are of relevance to the study and were included through the wider 
catchment capabilities of the keywords suggested.
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After this initial trawl, documents were identified through the bibliographic references 
listed in the original keyword documents as well as the dictates of parliamentary protocols. 
For example, under many Acts which provide for statutory agencies there is a reporting 
requirement. Should the anticipated number of reports not be identified initially, more 
targeted searches were undertaken. Alternatively, when a Bill that is introduced to the 
House on, for example, extending the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) in city streets 
and the transcript of second reading speeches not be captured by the initial search, 
individual searching was done to ensure that a comprehensive corpus of documents was 
generated.
A pilot of the keyword searches was carried out to check the feasibility of what was 
proposed. The pilot was conducted through online sources and excluded records dating 
before approximately 1993. Also excluded due to the resource demand of more manual 
searching methods, were State based committees and publications, political party 
documents and media releases. From this pilot search, 614 documents were identified that 
contained the phrase “fear of crime” and 6,444 documents under the keyword of “crime”. 
Included in these figures are the transcripts of 85 federal committees that would potentially 
provide examples of longer and more detailed participation in discourses relating to fear-of- 
crime (APH, 2004a, 2004b). On the basis of these results, it was estimated that 
approximately 1,000 documents would be identified as applicable to the study through the 
methods proposed.
Table 4.2 below gives a summary of the searches, keywords and number of documents 
collected from each state’s on-line databases. As predicted, 6,485 documents were
Chapter Four Methodology
identified through the use of the keywords. While some keywords were used purposively, 
all databases were searched using the words: “fear of crime”, “concern about crime”, “fear” 
and “crime”, “home invasion”, “mugged” and/or “mugging”, and “perception of crime”. 
The crimes of home invasion and mugging were used as case studies for identifying records 
that relate to specific crimes. Upon reading the documents, 969 were identified as 
containing a potential reference to fear-of-crime.
D a t a  C o l l e c t i o n  P r o t o c o l s
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Chapter Three Methodology
D ata  M a n a g e m e n t
Once completed, the IDQs were entered into a purpose built Microsoft Access database. 
There are a number of reasons that Access was used to manage the data produced from the 
study. First, the form facility allows data cleaning checks to occur automatically upon entry 
of the data. This prevented a large number of typographical errors, errors of form such as 
text in a number field, and missing data. Second, the relational setup of Access (compared 
to the flat structure of Excel) means that queries can be constructed to assist in cleaning and 
analysis of individual elements from each IDQ. In addition, it will facilitate the extraction 
of the rich text data into a suitable qualitative analysis program. Third, Access is 
compatible with the Word mail merge function that allowed the use of form documents for 
the presentation of argument structure examples if required. These qualities made Access 
an effective data management tool for this study.
D ata  S p e c i f i c s
The following section will provide details of the data that was collected. There were two 
main concerns when developing the final list of data to be collected. First, that list needed 
to be practicable in length. Above, it was suggested that approximately 1,000 documents 
would be included in the corpus of this study. Their eligibility would be determined by the 
use of certain key words such as “public safety” or “fear-of-crime”. However, in an attempt 
to gather documents that discussed fear-of-crime under different labels, broader keywords 
such as “crime” would also be used. Such searches were expected to return a great number 
of documents with some being judged as unrelated to the present research.
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Consequently, the questions asked about each document needed to act as a filter from what 
is essentially a ‘tick and flick’ form to indicate very basic details and the level of 
significance held by a discussion of fear-of-crime in that document; to detailed analyses of 
argument and grammar, verification of “facts” and statements by the authors, and the 
investigation o f the social context in which the text was made. That filtering process was 
intended to gather basic details of at least 1,000 documents collected but to ensure 
feasibility, detailed analysis conducted on far fewer documents depending on their 
relevance to discussions about fear-of-crime.
Stage 1
This stage is designed to gather quickly basic information about the debates. The main 
focus was to capture the details o f the source, target, topic of debate, production of the text, 
presentation, main objective and the level of significance that the subject of fear-of-crime 
held within the text. The level of significance for fear-of-crime was vital to determine how 
much further information should be collected (as the following Table 4.3 demonstrates). 
The level of significance then formed a filtering system of the documents into a final 
corpus.
Table 4.3: Criteria for Stage Completion
0% (not mentioned)
<10% (mentioned once) 
10-25% (approx 2-5 mentions) 
26-50% (short discussion) 
51-75% (moderate discussion) 
75%-100% (main topic)
End
Complete to Stage 2 
Complete to Stage 2 
Complete to Stage 3 
Complete to Stage 4 




Stage 2 was designed to gather information from texts where the subject of fear-of-crime 
was at least mentioned. The feedback from piloting the research design showed that such 
texts are sometimes only referring to fear-of-crime without entering into further discussion. 
For example, a speaker may state that the NCPP is intended to address crime and fear-of- 
crime in the community and then proceed to talk about funding amounts for the AFP. 
While it is important to collect information about even brief references such as these, it was 
considered unfeasible to collect the same amount of information as for texts that focused on 
fear-of-crime as their main topic. Instead, at this stage details were gathered on the inferred 
meaning of the text, the key words and phrases used, genres, tenor and mode of the 
discourse, and further details about the production of the text. These can be seen in the data 
specifics table below.
Stage 3
At this stage, the texts were judged to have a short discussion relating to fear-of-crime, 
public safety, security and so forth. Consequently, greater details about the language, 
arguments and rhetorical devices used were able to be collected. Information about the 
control of discussion, topic and agenda was also gathered. The focus of this stage was on 
how documents discussed their topic, the language used and the discursive relationship 
between the participants. Stage 3 was intended to capture characteristics of talking about 
fear-of-crime specifically that would be present in a minimum of a short discussion but 




The questions asked in stage 4 were designed to gather detailed information about the 
social context in which the instance of discourse occurred. In addition, questions were 
asked that required reference to external documents such as determining accuracy of the 
claims. A small amount of further information was also gathered about the language used 
compared to other documents such as the creation of new lexical items and rewording. 
However, most information about language use/usage has already been identified in 
previous stages.
It was at this point that the questions turned to detailed examination of the social context of 
the debates. These questions range from the relationship of the instance of discourse to 
social relations and identities, to the social and political effects of that discourse, and 
knowledge assumptions that are made by the authors. It was expected that many of the 
answers to these questions would be found outside of the document itself and may not be 
apparent until during the analysis of the final data set.
Each of these four stages was designed to work as a filter for the relevancy of the different 
debate subjects encountered. Table 4.4 gives the number of documents that were analyzed 
in each stage.











Each was intended to gather more detailed data than the last stage, resulting in a 
comprehensive data set produced for a selected group of documents where each instance of 
text was a moderate to lengthy discussion related to fear-of-crime in Australian 
parliaments.
D a t a  C l e a n i n g  and  F i n a l i z a t i o n
The collected documents (n = 969) were cleaned using two methods. First, the answers for 
each question were checked to be within the possible parameters as well as there being an 
answer for each question. Secondly, the tables in which there were corresponding fields 
were checked for consistency. Additional information about each politician was also 
gathered, checked for consistency and added to the collected data. These cleaning processes 
resulted in 12 changes being made to the data.
A smaller subset of data was then extracted and this formed the main data source for the 
following analyses and discussions. Due to the wide scope of the data generation and 
collection methods and the varying amount of resources online and effectiveness of each 
parliament’s search engines, it was not always possible to search comprehensively all or 
even the same type of documents from each state. However, it was considered necessary to 
standardize the document type so as to restrict the influence it may have on rhetoric, 
presentation, style and so forth. Similarly, it was also necessary to hold the type of author 




Therefore, the final data set fulfilled the following criteria:
a. The text was produced between 1st January 1960 and 31st December 2003
inclusive (n = 968)
b. The author was a state or federal member of an Australian parliament (n = 829)
c. The text contained at least one mention of fear-of-crime in its broadest
conceptualization (n = 755)
d. The text was recorded and disseminated by Hansard (n = 720)
In total, 249 records were discarded leaving a final data set of 720 pieces of political text 
about fear-of-crime. Smaller data sets were at times isolated in each of the case studies 
presented in later chapters. The methodology for isolating these data sets will be given in 
those chapters.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
The aim of this research is to examine the characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime in 
Australian domestic politics. Four research questions have been proposed that cover the 
characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime and how, by whom and when these debates 
occur in politics and identify possible discourses on which they participate. The research 
approach is based on critical discourse analysis of a variety of political and government 
documents written from 1960 to 2003 and sourced from the online databases housed by 
state and federal parliaments. A final data set of 720 documents was collected from these 
sources based on a specific set of selection criteria. The following chapter will present an 
overview of the general results. On the basis of these results, five specific characteristics 
ranging from micro to macro levels will be examined in parliamentary debates about fear-
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Chapter  F ive
Ov er vi ew  of R esults
Chapter Five Results Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the data collected as previously outlined. It will 
present general information about the documents collected such as authorship, audience and 
contents. The data analyzed has been restricted to the quasi-quantitative -  counts of 
categories and percentages. More in-depth analysis utilizing both these quantitative and the 
qualitative text-rich data will be given in the case studies that follow. The intention of this 
chapter is to provide the broader context within which to understand the analysis of 
characteristics of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that is presented in the case 
studies.
D o c u m e n t  D e m o g r a p h i c s
This chapter will provide an overview of the general results about the documents 
themselves. This will be done in three groups. First, the temporal authorship of the 
documents (time and place) will be examined. The politicians who authored the documents 
will not be discussed in this chapter in order to avoid undue overlap with the discussion 
presented in Chapter Ten. Second, the details of the target will be presented. This includes 
the source, dissemination and distribution of the document, as well as the presentation and 
intended audience. Finally, the contents of the documents themselves will be analyzed. This 
group will focus on the topic that is discussed with separate space given to the topic of fear- 
of-crime and types of fears that were identified in the debates. This chapter is intended to 
describe the general characteristics of the documents with the following case studies 
beginning to investigate the characteristics of the parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime.
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Authorship
This section investigates characteristics of the author -  the time period and where it was 
written. Details of the politician who spoke the document into the Hansard and their 
affiliated political party will be discussed in greater detail in the case study presented in 
Chapter Ten. Only general information about the politicians involved in debating about 
fear-of-crime will be provided in this section.
First, the time period from which each document was collected was examined. The 
restriction to on-line documents limited the range of time from which documents were 
collected. For the majority of parliaments, this meant that documents were collected from 
approximately 1990 onwards. Federal, ACT and WA parliaments were the only exceptions 
to this beginning from 1983, 1995 and 1997 respectively (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Number and Percentage of Documents Collected By State and Date
P a r lia m e n t A v a ila b le  D ates C o llec ted  D a tes # %
Federal Not Listed -  1 Jan 2004 23 Mar 1983 -2 7  Oct 2003 140 19
NSW 1 Jan 1991 -  1 Jan 2004 29 Oct 1991 - 4  Dec 2003 114 16
SA 1 Jan 1993 -  1 Jan 2004 4 Aug 1993- 12 Nov 2003 118 16
QLD 1 Jan 1990- 1 Jan 2004 4 Dec 1990- 19 Aug 2003 102 14
WA 6 Mar 1997- 1 Jan 2004 25 Mar 1997- 19 Nov 2003 73 10
VIC 1 Jan 1991 -  1 Jan 2004 27 Mar 1991 -  19 Nov 2003 59 8
TAS 1 Jan 1992 -  1 Jan 2004 15 Sept 1992- 12 Jun 2002 47 7
NT 1 Jan 1990- 1 Jan 2004 20 Aug 1991-16  Oct 2003 45 6
ACT 1 Jan 1995 -  1 Jan 2004 12 Dec 1995 -2 7  Nov 2003 22 3
Second, the state from which the documents were sourced was analyzed. The largest groups 
of documents came from the Federal, SA, NSW and QLD parliaments (66%). It is probable 
that WA would be one of the top discussants of fear-of-crime if their on-line records dated 
back to 1990. It is noteworthy that the greatest number of documents mentioning fear-of-
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crime came from the Federal Parliament given that law and order are traditionally (and 
constitutionally) a state responsibility.
Finally, general analysis of the author and their affiliated political party was undertaken. 
There were 397 politicians that mentioned fear-of-crime within the on-line documents 
(Table 5.2). The states with the highest number of documents also had the highest number 
of politicians who mentioned fear-of-crime. The smaller producing jurisdictions such as the 
ACT, NT and TAS had the higher ratio of documents per politician, although this may be 
the result of a smaller sample size.
Table 5.2: Counts of Politicians and Documents by State
S ta te N u m b er  o f  P o litic ia n s N u m b e r  o f  D o c u m e n ts R a tio  D o c s/P o lit ic ia n s
NSW 100 165 1.7
QLD 70 116 1.7
SA 62 135 2.2
WA 58 95 1.6
VIC 52 82 1.6
TAS 28 63 2.3
NT 19 43 2.3
ACT 9 21 2.3
The majority of politicians in Australia are associated with a particular political party. 
There were 12 parties that were identified in this research (Table 5.3). Over all of the 
documents, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) clearly mentions fear-of-crime more than the 
Liberal Party of Australia. However, both of these are higher users than the other parties. 
This follows the number of politicians that mention fear-of-crime when broken up by 
political party. The ratio of documents per politician by political party shows the Australian 
Democrats discussing fear-of-crime more than other parties, with the Australian Greens and
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the Country Liberal Party in the NT following. Again, the higher ratio for these parties may 
be due, in part, to the smaller number of documents collected.
Table 5.3: Counts of Documents and Politicians by Political Party
# o f  D o cs P o litica l P arty #  o f  P o litic ia n s R a tio  D o cs/P o li
310 Australian Labor Party 186 1.7
252 Liberal Party of Australia 133 1.9
47 National Party 28 1.8
41 Australian Democrats 12 3.4
29 Independents 18 1.6
18 Australian Greens 7 2.6
13 Country Liberal Party 5 2.6
5 One Nation Party 4 1.3
3 Christian Democrat Party 1 3
2 Shooters Party 1 2
2 A Better Future for Our Children Party 1 2
1 United Australia Party 1 1
In summary, documents were collected from 1990 for most State and Territory parliaments 
and 1983 for the Federal Parliament. Most of these documents came from SA, NSW and 
QLD in addition to those collected from the federal level. On average, each politician that 
mentioned fear-of-crime did so in two documents. Finally, the ALP and the Liberal Party 
were the parties that most often mentioned fear-of-crime out of the 12 parties identified in 
the documents collected. More detail will be provided in Chapter Ten about the author of 
the documents.
Document Origins and Target Audiences
The following section investigates the audience for whom the documents were judged to 
have been intended. There were a number of results for this section that were stipulated by 
the final inclusion criteria for the documents themselves. For instance, all documents were
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sourced from an Australian parliament and all documents were disseminated by Hansard 
(including the committee Hansard). The results for the source, the methods of 
dissemination and distribution as well as the style of presentation used in the document will 
be presented below.
There was remarkable consistency through many of the results with regard to the target 
audience details (Table 5.4):
■ Source: The majority of the documents came from the lower houses of the
parliaments (67%) with roughly one third coming from the upper house.
■ Type: Of the documents, 20 were transcripts of discussions (3%), five were a
written response to a question (0.7%) and 695 were transcripts of speeches 
(97%).
■ Distribution: The expected distribution of the documents generally aligned with the
level of parliament from which it was sourced. 583 had an expected 
distribution of the relevant state (81%) while 137 (19%) had an expected 
national distribution.
■ Audience: The majority of the documents were judged to have a target audience of
fellow parliamentarians (n=700, 97%). Three documents were targeted 
towards the general public while the remaining seven were transcripts of 
discussion with no apparent target.
■ Style: Finally, the vast majority of the documents were presented in a serious style
(99%) with seven being presented in an emotional style (1%).
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Table 5.4: Source of Documents by State
Parliament All Lower Upper Committee
Federal 140 88 51 1
NSW 114 48 64 2
QLD 102 82 11 9
VIC 59 43 16 0
ACT 22 22 0 0
NT 45 44 0 1
WA 73 49 23 1
SA 118 71 47 0
TAS 47 36 6 5
Total 720 483 218 19
100% 67% 30% 3%
In summary, all documents came from an Australian parliament and were disseminated by 
Hansard. The expected distribution was mostly state based (81%) and the type of document 
was generally a transcript of a speech (97%). Virtually all were seriously presented (99%) 
and were targeted towards other politicians (97%).
Contents
This section investigates the topics that were discussed with an emphasis on the frequency 
with which fear-of-crime is debated and the type of fear. There were 14 main topics that 
were the focus of the documents that mentioned fear-of-crime (with a further 16 that were 
discussed by only one or two). This demonstrates the variety of topics under which fear-of- 
crime is mentioned and is believed to be relevant.
■ Crime (16%) - There were 116 documents where the main topic was crime. These 
documents discussed crime rates and statistics, and more specific
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crimes such as stalking, juvenile crime, firearm offences, graffiti, 
racially and sexually based crimes and violence against women.
■ Government/Policy (14%) - There were 97 documents that discussed government
and government policy. These documents discussed the government 
in terms of their particular policies on crime, women, police and 
emergency services, law and order, juvenile crime and domestic 
violence. Broader government policies and performance especially in 
regard to election promises were also discussed at length.
■ Legislation (14%) - There were 102 documents that focused on legislation. All of
these documents were looking at specific pieces of legislation against 
crimes.
■ Police (11%) - There were 81 documents that talked about the police. These
documents were focused on police resources, numbers and 
practices/powers.
■ Criminal Justice System (9%) - 62 documents had their main topic as the criminal
justice system. These documents discussed mandatory sentencing, 
bail, drug courts, penalties and sentencing, prisons, alternatives to 
prison and the victims of crimes.
■ Politics (8%) - There were 58 documents about politics. These documents crossed
over (but were not double counted) with other topics such as crime, 
crime prevention, legislation, community safety and so forth. The 
main focus of these documents was the political use of and action on 
law and order issues.
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■ Agencies and Funding (7%) - There were 50 documents on government agencies
and spending policies. These were particularly focused on police and 
other law enforcement agency resources, and local and federal 
government budgets (e.g., senate estimates).
■ Crime Prevention (5%) - There were 34 documents that were focused on crime
prevention. These documents mainly looked at crime prevention 
initiatives at different levels of government. There were also brief 
discussions about juvenile crime, drugs and violence against women.
■ Safety (4%) - 27 documents were mainly focused on safety. These documents
discussed safety in terms of children, violence, police numbers and 
women.
■ Fear-of-crime (2%) - There were 13 documents with the main topic of fear-of-
criine. These documents discussed fear-of-crime in terms of the 
elderly, the elderly and youths, police and public relations, and 
violence and perceptions of safety.
■ Terrorism (2%) - Terrorism was discussed in 13 documents with a focus on Bali,
Iraq, Australian national security and legislative preparedness.
■ Security (1%) - There were nine documents about security. These documents
discussed security in terms of national and private security and 
security in specific areas such as work places or schools.
■ Violence against women (1%) - There were nine documents about violence against
women (1%); and nine about community values and opinions. This 
last set of documents tended to argue about community support for 
tougher penalties and sentences.
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■ Miscellaneous (6%) - The remaining 40 documents looked at a variety of topics 
such as: alcohol, animals, discrimination, education, gangs, housing, 
immigration, media, older persons, poverty, privacy, business, race, 
tax, unemployment and victims.
Fear of Crime
The majority of documents had only a brief mention of fear-of-crime (56%). These were 
documents that made only one reference to fear-of-crime (broadly conceived). Documents 
that had two to five references made up 38% of the total. There were very few documents 
that contained even a small discussion about fear-of-crime (n = 41, 6%).
Table 5.5: Number and Percentage of Documents by % of Discussion of Fear-of-Crime
< 1 0 % 10 - 2 5 % 2 6 - 5 0 % 5 1 - 7 5 % 7 5 - 1 0 0 %
# 404 275 27 6 8
% 56 38 4 1 1
This suggests that fear-of-crime is something that is considered important to mention but 
not necessarily important to discuss. The possible reasons for this result will be discussed in 
Chapter Eight.
In collecting the documents, the notion of fear-of-crime was kept as broad as possible. This 
meant that documents about perceptions of public safety as related to crime, perceptions of 
crime, security and so forth were all collected under the banner of fear-of-crime (Table 
5.6).
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Table 5.6: Type of Topics Collected Under “Fear-of-Crime”
T y p e  o f  F ea r % T y p e  o f  F ea r %
Fear of crime 27 Fear as a prisoner/criminal 0
Fear of street crime 23 Concern about terrorism 0
Concern about crime 9
Political use of fear 6 Other fears 4
General fears 6 - a n x ie ty  a b o u t c r im e 0
Fear for safety 5 - fe a r  a b o u t c r im e 1
Fear of terrorism 5 - f e a r  o f  h a ra ssm e n t 1
Fear as a witness 4 - fe a r  o f  o rg a n iz e d  c r im e 0
Fear of violence 4 - p e rc e p tio n  o f  c r im e 2
Fear of guns 1 - p e rc e p tio n  o f  fe a r 0
Altruistic fear 1 - sa fe ty  (g en era l) 0
Fear of white collar crime 1 - w o rry  a b o u t c r im e 0
T o ta l 100
The main type of fear that was discussed was fear-of-crime (27%), The fact that it is the 
most frequently used phrase is potentially artificially created through the search words 
used. A fear of street crime such as murder, rape, robbery, mugging etc was used in 23% of 
the documents. Hence together with fear-of-crime, a fear of street crime accounted for 50% 
of the types of fear mentioned. These results suggest that there is at least some consistency 
in what type of fear is mentioned under fear-of-crime. When the phrase itself is not used, 
fear of street crime and a concern about crime are the topics to which reference is most 
likely to be made. This does not elucidate what is meant by the phrase fear-of-crime itself 
but it is probable that the types of fears mentioned specifically (as outlined in Table 5.6) 
would be good guides.
The strongest conclusion that can be drawn is that topics which mention fear-of-crime are 
varied. Furthermore, within these topics fear-of-crime tends to be mentioned but rarely 
discussed as if it were assumed what is meant by ‘fear-of-crime’. It is evident from the
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types of crimes mentioned under the banner of fear-of-crime that street crime, general and 
specified crime and safety were the main meanings.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
Thus to summarize this chapter on the document demographics, it was shown that in the 
time period of 1983 to 2003, most documents mentioning fear-of-crime came from the 
federal, SA, NSW or QLD parliaments. All documents were sourced from an Australian 
parliament and disseminated by Hansard with the majority of the documents having an 
expected readership based in their respective state and were presented in the form of a 
serious speech directed at other politicians. There were 14 main topics that were discussed 
with only 2% of the documents discussing fear-of-crime as their main topic. When they did, 
it was evident that the fear related to street crime, crime in general or specified crimes and 
safety. Many of these results will be investigated in more detail in the case studies 
presented in later chapters.
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C h a p t e r  S i x  
“ T h e  F e a r  o f  c r i m e ”
ABSTRACT ENTITIES AND HUMAN AGENCY
Chapter Six Abstract Entities and Agency
This chapter presents the first of five case studies focusing on specific characteristics of 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. While undertaking the collection and general 
analysis of the data for this research, a strong duality was noticed. In 29% of the 
documents, a person’s feeling of fear in response to crime was referred to as “fear of 
crime”; in the other 30% that response was referred to as “the fear of crime” (41% did not 
use the specific phrase). This case study investigates three (micro or syntactic) features of 
language that were highlighted by this duality -  the use of the definite article, 
nominalization and passivity. Studying such features is intended to provide an indication of 
the influence that language can have on the understanding of the society depicted in debates 
about fear-of-crime. This will be contrasted, in later chapters, with the impact of macro or 
societal influences on language.
C as e  S t u d y  M e t h o d o l o g y  & S t r u c t u r e  
In order to examine the duality and its linguistic features, a specific dataset was isolated. 
For the purposes of this chapter, only those documents that referred to either the distinct 
phrase “fear of crime” or fear of an identified offence were included in the smaller data set. 
This was done to maintain the focus on the function of the linguistic characteristics being 
examined and the emotional response of fear emphasized by parliamentary discussions. 
Consequently, the final data set consisted of 363 documents (50% of the main corpus) from 
Australian parliamentary Hansards from 1982 to 2003.
The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I will demonstrate the simultaneous 
linguistic existence of the two concepts of fear of crime. The public’s concrete fear of street 
crimes such as robbery, home invasion or sexual assault exists along side an abstracted
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version of the generalized fear of crime. The evidence for this is drawn from the 
characteristics of the language used to talk about fear of crime by Australian 
parliamentarians. It is argued that the use of the definite article and the process of 
nominalization has allowed the abstract concept of fear of crime to become separated from 
the experience of, and emotional response to, crime.
The second section highlights one more linguistic characteristic of parliamentary debates 
on fear of crime -  passivity or the use of the passive voice. These are sentences beginning 
with by or where the agent is omitted altogether. The location of agency is an important 
distinguishing feature between the two conceptualizations being discussed. It will be argued 
that through these three features of language an abstracted concept of fear of crime is 
evident. The third section will detail the theory and consequences of transformations such 
as nominalization and passivity based on previous research.
In the fourth section, I will examine the consequences that the abstracted version has had on 
the location of agency. When using the term “agency” I refer to a human’s capacity for 
independent action where that action is independent in so far as it has been made based on a 
choice between alternatives. In effect, this concept of fear of crime has become an 
independent entity that can take on its own agency. Public agency is consequently denied 
by this entity. The political impact of the existence of the two concepts of fear of crime will 
be examined in section five. Here, I will outline the resulting contradicting messages that 
are delivered to the public about the location of agency. In the concrete concept, the public 
is seen as able to participate actively in reducing their fear; in the abstract concept, the 
public is denied that agency by the focus on another entity. It is argued that these
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contradicting messages may reduce the effectiveness of political and government effort to 
respond to community demands. I will conclude this chapter by recommending that greater 
awareness and clarification be given to the type of fear of crime being discussed.
T hree L i ngui sti c Features  of F ear of Crime 
Three linguistic features have been chosen to be examined in the parliamentary debates 
about fear-of-crime. These features have been chosen for two reasons. First, previous 
research especially has found them to be important characteristics of political discourse 
(Fairclough, 1992). Second, differences between the duality noticed in the debates are 
constructed using those features. Therefore, the use of the definite article, nominalization 
and passivity will be examined below before a discussion of the implications of the use of 
these linguistic features.
The Definite Article -  ‘the’
As stated above, there was a duality noticed in parliamentary debates on the public’s fearful 
response to crime: fear of crime versus the fear of crime. The most overt difference 
between these two phrases is the use of the definite article or the. For example, the 
following two quotes both discuss actions that are being taken by the Federal government 
to reduce both crime and public feelings of fear in response to crime1.
The aims of the forum are.... empowering and encouraging local groups to work 
in partnership with government agencies to reduce crime and the fear of 
crime. (Ellison, 2003)
1 Emphasis has been added in all quotes in this chapter.
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We have allocated $13 million to the National Campaign against Violence and 
Crime which aims to reduce crime and fear of crime across Australia. 
(Newman, 1996)
In both quotes, the phrase “to reduce crime and (the) fear of crime” is used. The only 
difference between them is the use of the definite article the. The definite article is a neutral 
type of demonstrative reference -  what Halliday calls a “form of verbal pointing” (Halliday 
& Hasan, 1976: 57). It usually indicates the location of a person or object in relation to the 
speaker. The is neutral because it does not differentiate between singular or plural, or place 
or time as do other demonstratives such as this, these, here, now and so on. It indicates that 
the proceeding item is specific and identifiable either from the information provided in the 
associated text or from the surrounding environment (Halliday & Hasan, 1976).
Thus one function of the is to indicate substance. By so doing, the definite article is 
restricted to use with words that denote objects or something containing substance - nouns, 
noun phrases and compound nouns. Verbs do not require the use of the definite article 
because they do not denote substance (Sorensen, 1959). However, in the parliamentary 
documents studied, the was placed with the phrase fear o f crime, or when trying to reduce 
repetition the speakers used the fear instead. The verb fear  had come to denote an object or 
something of substance -  a nominal.
Nominalization -  Verbs to Nouns
A verb is transformed to a noun through the process of nominalization (Fairclough, 1989). 
The general test for an instance of nominalization is to ask: can I put the ‘object’ (i.e. that
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which is denoted by the noun) in a wheelbarrow? The following are examples of 
nominalization using a restrictive clause (indicated by the brackets).
(a) the boy (who was tall) rode the bike
(b) the tall boy rode the bike
(c) the person (who loved cars) drove over the cat
(d) the car lover drove over the cat
In these examples, (b) and (d) involve nominalizations as shown by the italics. Each 
example demonstrates the transformation of a sentence containing a restrictive clause (e.g. 
who was tall, who loved cars) into a noun phrase (e.g. tall boy, car lover). It is possible to 
think of each resulting nominal being put into a wheelbarrow because the tall boy and the 
car lover are perceived as objects containing substance, in contrast to their original verbs of 
tall and love.
The phrase fear o f crime is derived from the verb fear. This is a verb indicating a 
psychological state experienced usually by the subject. For example:
(e) Oliver fears crime
(f) Oliver’s fear of crime
Fear of crime (f) is the nominalization of ‘fears crime’ (e) (see Spencer & Zaretskaya 
(2003) for further examples and discussion of the nominalization of Stative verbs). Fear of 
crime can be perceived as an abstracted object that can be possessed by Oliver or any other 
member of the public. It is a noun phrase that contains substance and can therefore take the 
definite article the.
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Passivity -  The Passive Voice
There is one other feature of language that impacts on the two uses of the phrase fear o f 
crime. This feature is passivity or the use of the passive voice. In the passive voice, the goal 
is the subject and the agent is either passive (a phrase beginning with ‘by’) or omitted 
entirely (Fairclough, 1992). While the type of voice used in a speech may alter during its 
course, each of the documents collected in this study was assessed on its overall voice type. 
It was found that the majority of documents (76%) were presented in the passive voice. For 
example:
(g) Fear generated by irresponsible sections of the media has forced the situation 
where pollsters put pressure on political parties and subsequently on members of 
Parliament to adopt very strong overreactions to questions relating to law and 
order. (Macdonald, 1995)
(h) Attempts have been made to dampen down that concern on the basis that it is 
not justified and that it is some sort of hysterical response to a false perception. 
(Nile, 1997)
In the first example (g), the agent is present but occurring within the sentence after by. This 
is in contrast to an active version of this sentence that might have been: “Irresponsible
sections of the media have generated fear..... ”, or “Members of Parliament have been
pressured into adopting very strong overreactions....”. In the second (h), the agent is 
omitted. It is not clear who has been making the attempts, although the context implies that 
it is other parliamentarians.
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In summary, the duality noticed in the concepts of fear-of-crime used in the parliamentary 
debates is differentiated by three linguistic features: the definite article, nominalization and 
passivity. The following section will begin to examine the effects of these features.
T he E f f e c t s  of  T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s
Two of the three linguistic features discussed in this chapter (nominalization and passivity) 
can be classed under the heading of transformations. The theory of transformations is 
generally regarded as Noam Chomsky’s major contribution to the study of language 
beginning with Syntactic Structures in 1957. In this chapter, a broader definition of 
transformations will be used that reflects the influence of critical linguistics: 
“transformations are a set of operations on basic forms, deleting, substituting, combining, 
or reordering a syntagm or its elements” (Hodge & Kress, 1993: 10) (the differences 
between this definition and the concept of transformations used by Chomsky is discussed in 
Hodge & Kress (1974)).
Hodge and Kress (1993) identify two underlying functions of transformations: economy 
and distortion. The speaker is able to transform one form of an utterance into another or 
collapse multiple models into one. This allows the speaker to economize on the number of 
variables to be included in each utterance. However, the audience is then required to 
reconstruct the transformed form to its original structure based on implicit meanings; and it 
is as a result of this that “transformations always involve suppression and/or distortion” 
(Hodge & Kress, 1993: 35). In order to reconstruct the original intended meaning, the 
audience has to interpret the code presented in the transformation, creating the impression 
(if not the requirement) of the existence of privileged knowledge.
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Nominalization and passivity are two types of syntactic transformations; and, as such, they 
also function to economize and distort language and meaning. To look at nominalization 
first, it simplifies an argument by reducing the number of variables (agents, actions, etc.) 
that need to be included in the statements (R. Hodge & Kress, 1993); thereby economizing 
on the details about who does what (Fowler et al., 1979). For example:
A: More street lighting is needed to reduce the public’s fear of being mugged 
by youths at train stations
B: More street lighting is needed to reduce the fear-of-crime at train stations
The argument presented in example B is a simplified version of that presented in example 
A. The details of agents and actions are deleted through the transformation of “public’s fear 
of being mugged by youths” into “the fear-of-crime”. The number of variables that needed 
to be included has been reduced through nominalization. In other words, nouns tend to be 
more manageable in general conversation (Vendler, 1968) because they use fewer words to 
describe the same thing (Kies, 1985).
A further function of nominalizations is to allow the deletion of participants or agents that 
are responsible for or are affected by the verb. In other words, there is no reference to the 
agent that effected the action described by the verb or the agent that was affected by that 
action. General categories of agents may be recoverable from the context but specific 
identities will not (Kress, 1983). The deletion of the agent and its implications will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter.
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Finally, this type of transformation removes the need to indicate tense (signifiers of time, 
past, present, future etc.) and modality (signifiers of truth value) (Fowler et al., 1979). This 
has the effect of removing the ‘action vitality’ from the verb. Verbs become static as a 
consequence of the loss of tense, modality and agent. The actions become timeless, 
sometimes to the extent of becoming new words separated from their origin 
(relexicalisation).
In effect, these functions enable verbs that tend to be about actions, to become nouns that 
tend to describe objects and abstract notions and concepts (Hodge & Kress, 1993). 
Nominalization creates an abstract world in which objects exist that can only be seen 
through language. A nominal represents “qualities and processes as ‘abstracted’ from things 
and time respectively” (Goatly, 1996). This process of turning a verb to a noun turns 
something that was concrete or based securely in reality into something that is abstract 
(Fairclough, 1992). This effect of nominalization will also be discussed in the following 
section specifically in regard to parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.
The second type of transformation discussed in this chapter was passivity or the use of the 
passive voice. Three (of five) effects of using the passive voice that were identified by 
Hodge and Kress (1993) will be examined here. First, one effect of using the passive voice 
is to change the order in which the content of the sentence is presented. The theme of a 
sentence indicates what it is about and is generally given in the first position (the rheme 
comprising the remainder). Such information is perceived as more prominent (Kress & 
Trew, 1978) and as a result gains greater emphasis than the remainder of the sentence. The 
passive voice rethematizes a sentence by inverting the order of the agent with the affected;
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and thereby changing the sentence from being about the agent to being about the affected 
(Hodge & Kress, 1993).
Rethematization may change the role that is taken on by the agent. For example, placing the 
agent in the rheme may give the impression that that agent is affected rather taking on an 
affectmg role. This connotation of agency (a role of action and potentially causality) is 
traditionally given to the agent (identified in the theme). Consequently, using the passive 
voice alters the role of the agent that is interpreted by the audience (Fowler et al., 1979).
Secondly, the agent is no longer directly linked with the verb. If the agent is given at all, the 
link between action and actor is given by the preposition by. The effect of this change is to 
weaken the syntactically given causal connection between who did what (Hodge & Kress, 
1993). Finally, passivity allows the agent to be omitted entirely. This may occur because it 
is obvious or unknown or because the author wishes to diffuse responsibility (Lamb, 1991). 
Irrespective of motive, the syntactic effect of deleting the agent is to remove reference to 
the cause of the action. Examples of these effects will be given in later sections of this 
chapter.
These types of transformations -  nominalization and passivity -  combine to create the 
impression of a “formal” and “impersonal” language (Fowler et al., 1979). The roles and 
the complexities of these relationships between agents and/or objects are simplified through 
deletion. Actions are objectified and abstracted, removed from time, location and cause. 
Most simply, such transformations allow the details of who did what, when and why to be
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presented at a level of transparency (or opacity) that most benefits the intentions of the 
author.
Transformations of Fear of Crime
When transformations of debates about fear-of-crime occur using these two linguistic 
characteristics, the common result is that the original agent is removed. This leaves the 
abstract object fear o f crime sitting alone in the wheelbarrow without an owner to link it 
back to a reality. The abstract concept consequently is perceived as an entity that is not tied 
to a particular time or space (termed a “third-order entity” by Goatly (1996)). This entity is 
an object of (abstract) substance that can take on its own goals and agency. It also makes it 
difficult for the audience to situate blame and responsibility, and can highlight or hide 
subjects at whim. By doing so, these features help to release the concept of fear of crime 
from the experiential reality while working to construct another. The purpose of the 
remainder of this chapter is to examine these particular social consequences of 
nominalization and passivity when combined with the definite article (i.e. the creation of an 
abstract entity) and its political consequences for the location of agency in debates about 
fear of crime.
I wish to argue that there exist simultaneously two concepts of fear of crime. The first is a 
concrete fear of street crimes such as robbery, murder and home invasion. The second is a 
generalized fear of crime that has been abstracted both conceptually and linguistically from 
the base emotional responses to specific criminal events. This process of abstraction has 
been assisted through nominalization, the use of the definite article and the passive voice. 
Based on the results of this study on parliamentary discourses, over half of the documents
134
Chapter Six Abstract Entities and Agency
(56%) that used the phrase fear o f crime or discussed a fear of street crime displayed the 
linguistic characteristics discussed above for the abstract entity. More specifically, the fear 
o f crime was discussed in 61% of the documents that used that particular nominal. 
Consequently, it is argued that in the time period examined, an independent entity termed 
the fear o f crime exists along side, though potentially with considerable overlap, with the 
public’s original fears about crime. The following section will examine the consequences of 
an abstracted fear of crime.
I n d e p e n d e n t  A g e n c y  of  T he F e ar  of  c r i m e  
This section will examine one particular social consequence of the abstract entity of the fear 
of crime -  the negotiation of the location of agency. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
“agency” as: “Action or instrumentality embodied or personified as concrete existence” 
(OED, 2001) In academia, there have been a number of explicit and implicit definitions of 
agency ranging from those focusing on constraint, to the un-structured component of social 
life, to individual choice, and to human action in general (see Hays (1994) for a discussion 
of the range of definitions). Across these definitions, (the capacity for) agency is generally 
seen to be a characteristic of or internal to human beings (Doty, 1997; Sewell Jr, 1992); 
where that characteristic is implied by the existence of social structures in a particular 
society.
Agency and social structure are generally agreed to be interconnected with neither able to 
exist independently of the other (Carlsnaes, 1992; Hays, 1994). Agency in sociology has 
“usually referred to the capacity of actors to operate “independently” of social structure” 
(Casper, 1994: 848). Both entities are relevant to the study of social behavior but scholars
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lack a way of conceptualizing these entities and their relationship (Wendt, 1987; Wight,
2
2003). Attempts to do so have become known as the agency-structure debate.
While the debate is now into its later generations, there are two assumptions that underlie 
all of the discussions. First, human beings undertake purposeful actions and these actions 
help to reproduce or transform their society. Second, society is constructed on social 
relationships: the structure of which also structures the interactions between humans 
(Wendt, 1987). Both of these assumptions see the relationship between agency and social 
structure as being variable, differential and reflexive.
In this chapter, the focus is on agency. It does not intend to contribute explicitly to the 
agency-structure debate but does draw on its treatment and understanding of the 
relationship between agency and social structure. Instead, I will be investigating the two 
locations of agency in parliamentary debates about fear of crime. I will define the capacity 
for agency as a human ’s capacity fo r  independent action where that action is independent 
in so far as it has been made based on a choice between alternatives. ‘Choice’ is being 
constrained in this definition in the three ways outlined by Hays (1994): it does not 
necessarily imply intentionality; it is socially shaped and can be collective; and is patterned 
and comprehensible (Hays, 1994). Consequently, I will talk about agency in terms of ‘a 
capacity for agency’ or ‘independent action’.
2 For further discussion of this debate a variety of views can be found in: (Archer, 1990; Bieler & Morton, 
2001; Carlsnaes, 1992; Clark, 1998; Doty, 1997, 1999; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1979; Hays, 
1994; Outhwaite, 1990; Sewell Jr, 1992; Suganami, 1999; Wendt, 1987; Wight, 1999, 2000, 2003)
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AGENCY OF AN ABSTRACT FEAR OF CRIME
On the basis of this brief overview of agency, I now wish to argue that the use of the 
abstract entity called ‘the fear of crime’ has allowed the public’s capacity for agency to be 
denied. Instead, that agency is placed in an abstract entity; and when this occurs, the public 
becomes a passive sufferer of the fear of crime, unable to take action against it. It needs to 
be emphasized here that the two concepts of fear of crime being discussed in this paper 
(concrete and abstract) exist simultaneously in parliamentary debates during the time period 
examined.
Also it is recognized that while the discussion of a concrete and abstract fear-of-crime has 
been set up as a distinct duality, there are elements of abstraction in the concrete fear-of- 
crime and vice versa. This overlap is unavoidable and inevitable given the nature of 
language as an arbitrary organization of symbols. In other words, language itself has 
elements of concreteness and abstraction in the concepts that it is used to symbolize. With 
this overlap duly acknowledged, the duality will be maintained because it serves to portray 
clearly the differences in the concepts of fear-of-crime identified in parliamentary debates.
In what follows, I will show the two different locations of agency that are evident in the 
concepts of fear of crime. To do this, I will begin with the concrete concept of fear of 
crime. A member of the public is afraid of a specific type or instance of crime. For 
example:
3 Documents were collected dating back to 1988 for the abstract entity and 1982 for the concrete concept o f  
fear o f crime. Given that there are only two documents that used the phrase at all before 1990 and that these 
are necessarily only federal documents, the difference o f six years is not considered indicative o f possible 
trends so has not been counted as significant.
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I support the motion also because some residents in affected areas of 
Wollongong are literally locked in their homes; they are too scared to go outside 
homes for fear of break and enter offences. (Campbell, 2002)
Even in Adelaide people are now afraid to walk the streets at night for fear of 
being mugged, raped or even murdered. (Foreman, 1982)
It is evident in these passages that the (concrete) fear of crime being discussed is linked to a 
locality, a type of crime and results in a specific behavioral response. More importantly for 
this discussion, it is the public who are afraid and it is the public that takes the action to 
avoid the potential victimization. The public are seen in these texts as containing the 
capacity for agency -  for active and independent action initiated by their own emotional 
response to crime. Agency in the concrete fear of crime is located in individual or collective 
members of the public.
However, there is a different location of agency in the abstract concept of fear of crime. 
This occurs partly as a result of nominalization where the process that is normally 
associated with a particular human agent is changed to a nominal that has no associated 
agent (Kies, 1985; Schleppegrell, 1997). Consequently in the abstract concept, feelings of 
fear felt by the public are not linked to any particular area, demographic or type of crime. In 
fact, those feelings are no longer linked to a person. It is simply an unbound emotional 
response to a nondescript crime.
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The fear of crime has a debilitating effect on the way a person views the place 
in which they live. It affects the way people conduct their lives. (Ede, 1993: 
7839)
Crime and the fear of crime impacts on everybody and more so on certain 
members of our community; for example, the elderly, many of whom are too 
scared to leave their houses at night. (Ravlich, 1998)
Each of these quotes refers to the consequences that may result from the fear of crime. The 
second quote even lists the demographic type of victim (the elderly) and resulting actions 
(not leaving the house at night). As such, it might appear that they are examples of the 
concrete concept of fear of crime. However, I argue that they are examples of the overlap 
acknowledged above. The difference is that in the concrete concept the capacity for agency 
lies in the individual member of the public who is feeling afraid. In the two quotes above, 
the abstract entity has taken on that capacity for agency. The elderly stay at home because 
that is the impact that the fear of crime has on them rather than staying at home because 
they are afraid of crime.
To say this in more general terms, in the abstract concept of fear of crime, the capacity for 
agency lies in the entity itself rather than in the community member. No longer is there a 
member of the public that is afraid of being attacked and consequently does not leave their 
home. That fear has instead become an entity that affects the general (unspecified) behavior 
of the person impacting on their quality of life. The public therefore becomes passive. In 
effect, their capacity for agency is denied. In this abstracted concept, the public suffers
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from the fear of crime like one suffers from the imposition of taxes. They do not feel afraid 
but are affected by the fear of crime.
Political Consequences of Abstract Entities
While there are general consequences of locating agency in an abstract notion of fear-of- 
crime such as increasing public fear because of their passivity (see for example research on 
fear felt during air raids in (Rachman, 1977, 2002)), given the focus of this research it is the 
consequences in the political arena that will be discussed in greater detail. There are two 
political consequences of this abstract entity of fear of crime that are of importance here. 
The first is that political rhetoric and government initiatives can focus on addressing that 
entity rather than the fear experienced by the public. It should be stressed here that just as 
the abstract and the concrete concepts of fear of crime exist side by side, so too do the 
political responses to these concepts. Therefore, there are some programs that are 
attempting to reduce (concrete) fear of crime.
Fear of crime is a major issue in the community. Statistics show that older 
people are the least victimized. However, older people fear for their safety. The 
government already provides resources through local councils as part of the 
Home Assist program, a HACC funded service, to undertake security work on 
people’s homes. (Wotton, 1994)
I refer to some of the initiatives raised in the Ministerial statement, such as 
safety and security information material that will provide practical advice aimed 
at reducing women's fear and victimisation. The introduction of this material
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will provide practical advice to women subjected to domestic violence. (Barker, 
1991:741)
At the same time, there are programs that are trying to reduce the fear of crime across 
Australia or across a particular state or territory.
The Carr Government is committed to trying innovative measures to reduce 
crime and the fear of crime in our society. (Whelan, 1995)
A record number of police are working hard across the State to reduce crime and 
the fear of crime in our community. (Watkins, 2003)
These last two passages show that government and political effort is being used to ‘sell’ 
policies addressing the fear of crime where the details of that fear are not identified. In 
contrast, the first two passages outlined government policies that were intended to address 
fears that stemmed from identified crimes or potential situations of criminal victimization. 
Therefore, just as the concept of fear of crime is split between a concrete and abstract base 
so too is the government and political response to it.
Fear of crime can either be addressed as directly proportional to crime rates or as linked to 
general unidentified fears and insecurities. These general fears may touch on issues such as 
community cohesion and homogeneity, perceptions of difference and even socio-economic 
status. In effect, political effort is directed towards either a public that feels afraid because 
of crime or towards an independent entity that puts fear into the public and is not
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specifically related to the occurrence of crime. Government and political direction must 
choose between two targets that are increasingly becoming two separate issues.
I would argue that this split is problematic because governments are at once trying to 
reduce people’s fears about specific crimes while also trying to reduce the prevalence of the 
fear of crime. In the first case, government effort is directed at a public that is considered to 
have the capacity to act independently. That public is expected to participate actively in 
fear-reduction programs mostly by taking responsibility for their own victimization 
prevention.
In the second case, government effort is directed at a public without agency and without the 
ability for active participation. The public in the abstract concept cannot be expected to 
participate actively in reducing their fear. Instead, that expectation falls on political and 
government leaders, community workers and police. The assimilation of fear of crime into 
parliamentary debates has thus recognized an abstract entity that denies public agency and 
active participation in their own response to crime.
Consequently, the public are exposed to two different arguments that both occur under the 
banner of fear of crime. When the concrete concept of fear of crime is used, the argument 
attempts to convince the public that they should act to reduce their fears and that they are in 
fact largely responsible for the opportunities they provide to potential offenders. When the 
abstract concept of fear of crime is used, such arguments are contradicted by the image of 
the public as unable to help themselves and dependent on government or political action. It
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is arguable that these contradicting arguments limit the effectiveness of any government or 
political effort to reduce either concept of fear of crime.
The second consequence of this abstract entity of fear of crime is the impact that 
discussions about such an entity may have on the public’s conception of their social reality. 
While the impact of language on perceptions of reality and identity will be discussed in 
greater detail in the case studies that follow, it is important to note at this point that 
discussion of a passive and agency-less public at risk from an abstract threat may increase 
the public’s level of fear and concern about crime.
Such an effect is suggestive of the “mean world syndrome” put forth by Gerbner and 
colleagues through the Cultural Indicators Project begun in 1967 (see for instance Gerbner 
& Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1977; Gerbner et al., 1978; Gerbner et al., 1980; Gerbner et 
al., 1979; Signonelli et al., 1995). Derived from research into the contribution that 
television viewing makes to perceptions of social reality, the mean world syndrome refers 
to the positive relationship between hours of viewing and perceptions of the world as a 
mean and dangerous place where people are “just looking out for themselves”, “cannot be 
trusted” and where individuals need greater protection (Gerbner, 1998: 124). The world 
becomes a place of increased mistrust and apprehension, a world of danger (Gerbner et al., 
1980).
Extrapolating from this research, parliamentary debates, responses and programs that are 
directed at an abstract conception of fear-of-crime where the public is passive and unable to 
act, may contribute to the perception of the world as a mean and dangerous place. The
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consequence of this may be a “heightened sense of risk and insecurity ... [that] is more
likely to increase acquiescence to and dependence upon established authority, and to 
legitimize its use of force...” (Gerbner & Gross, 1976: 93-94). The political attempts to 
address the abstract entity of fear of crime may not only create public demand for that 
action but also create the dependency and passivity that is characteristic of such an entity. 
Thus, the language that is used in parliamentary debates about fear of crime may create or 
at least assist in the maintenance of the seeming inevitability of feeling afraid -  of the 
adoption of a fearful identity and the creation of a common sense notion of fear (both of 
which shall be discussed in the next two chapters).
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the process of construction and the political 
consequence of an abstract entity of fear of crime. To do this, I examined the linguistic 
features of nominalization and the use of the definite article and passive voice. These 
features exposed a duality in parliamentary debates on fear of crime. There were two 
concepts of fear of crime that exist simultaneously in the time period studied. The first was 
a concrete concept that was based in specific times, places, people and crimes. The second 
concept was an abstracted and generalized fear that generally held no details about times, 
crimes and so on. The location of agency in each concept was discussed with the latter seen 
to deny public agency on fear of crime. Finally, I examined the political consequences of 
the dual concepts and the use of two contradicting arguments in parliamentary debates. 
These contradictions were argued to potentially lessen the effectiveness of efforts to reduce 
fear of crime and may indeed increase levels of fear in the community.
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In conclusion, it is hoped that politicians, academics, advocacy groups and all people who 
talk about fear of crime will take the time to consider both the definitional boundaries of 
what they are discussing and the impact of their use of language. It is clear from the 
confusion between the uses of the two versions of fear of crime that there is a lack of 
conceptual clarity about both. Through the adoption of fear of crime into parliamentary 
debates, a tension is evident in the location of agency. On the one hand, the public are seen 
as active and able participants in their level of fear and on the other, they are dependent on 
government action to reduce the fear that plagues them. This tension and contradiction is 
evident throughout parliamentary debates on fear of crime in Australia. I argue that this 
potentially lessens the effectiveness of government and political effort to reduce 
community fears about crime.
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This chapter seeks to examine data collected from parliamentary debates about fear-of-
crime from the perspective of a culturally-bound linguistic form and its impact on the 
depiction of social reality. In the previous chapter, purely linguistic forms were analyzed. 
This chapter will maintain that focus on linguistic forms but on a form that has greater 
overt influence from the society in which it is used. The use of non-literal language in the 
form of metaphors was chosen for this purpose because of its reliance on cultural 
knowledge to be understood (Musolff, 2004). Such language was frequently identified 
throughout the documents. Studying metaphoric language will provide an opportunity to 
assess the characteristics of the debates evident through the linguistic depiction of reality - 
the actors, identities and social relations.
I n t r o d u c i n g  M e t a p h o r i c  L a n g u a g e  a b o u t  F ear
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition of the impact that political debates 
may have on fear-of-crime in the community. Levels of public concern about crime have 
been shown to be positively correlated with the amount of attention given to issues of law 
and order by the political elite (Beckett, 1997). This reinforces an earlier statement that 
“(f)ear of crime may be responsive to the law and order posturings of politicians who find 
it convenient to paint a picture of society as being under threat from within” (Braithwaite 
et al., 1979). In addition, research has demonstrated that the public is more likely to 
respond to political depictions of the events rather than to the events themselves (Witko, 
2003). It is thus possible that the very process of shaping or distorting images of crime 
within law and order politics may generate fear-of-crime (Scheingold, 1984).
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The susceptibility of feelings of fear to political communication provides an opportunity
for studying the use of non-literal language. This type of language is a potential source of 
ambiguity in ordinary life (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983). Much of everyday communication 
involves instances of language usage that are interpreted literally. For example, there is 
little ambiguity in the sentence please sit down on the chair. In contrast, the sentence 
please take a seat, while meaning the same as the previous sentence, can be met with the 
confused response of take it where? The second sentence is an example of non-literal 
language. The literal interpretation of non-literal sentences may give only nonsense, a 
confused guesstimate of the speaker’s wishes or be interpreted as requesting something 
that is impossible (Ortony et al., 1978).
In previous research, it has been suggested that fear-of-crime is particularly susceptible to 
the influence of one type of non-literal language -  that of metaphors (Sparks et al., 2001). 
Figurative speech, like metaphor, enables the speaker to draw upon associations and 
images from numerous and eclectic discourses. These can then be applied to one specific 
discourse to assist in achieving the speakers’ goals. For example, metaphors of war signal 
the existence of a threatening if not lethal enemy; game metaphors indicate the need for 
deception and crafty moves; while accountancy metaphors suggest a utilitarian calculation 
of costs and balances (Archer & Cohen, 1998; Gozzi, 1998, 1999/2000; Lakoff, 1992, 
1995). Each metaphor evokes different emotional responses and actions from the audience.
Case Study Methodology and Structure
In what follows, I will examine metaphors that were identified in Australian parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime and their implications for the political representation of the
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public’s identity. This will be done in three sections. The first section will present a brief
discussion to define metaphor. Theories on the comprehension of metaphors have been 
excluded from this overview because the success of the instance of political 
communication is not under examination. It is primarily a discussion focusing on the use of 
language by Australian parliamentarians when talking about fear-of-crime.
This first section will also present the methodology of Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) 
which guided the examination of metaphors and the implications of their use. The research 
has been guided by the general approach of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CMA was 
developed partly from CDA and focuses specifically on analysing metaphors. The three 
stages of CMA -  identification, interpretation and exploration -  will be used to examine 
metaphoric language and its impact on political representations of the public’s identity.
In the second section and using CMA, metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors 
will be identified. Under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR 
(henceforth AACIW), the discursive function of these metaphors will be explored through 
an examination of their possible linguistic, conceptual and pragmatic roles and functions.
At this stage, it will be evident that the common thread between each metaphor being 
examined is the identity of a fearful public as defined by the identity of a threatening 
criminal. To explore this further, the third section will present an overview of the 
Copenhagen School’s concept of identity within their ‘securitization’ theory. Using this as 
a base, I will examine the influence that AACIW metaphors may have on the construction 
and use of a fearful public identity and the implied threat of the criminal.
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The purpose of these discussions is to highlight the impact of AACIW metaphors in
parliamentary representations of the public’s identity. I argue that an attempt is made to 
create a reality of a defensive society. In this society, the rhetoric of violence depicts the 
criminal as being an imminent and significant threat to a fearful public. However, in 
parliamentary representations of these identities, only that of the fearful public is expressly 
discussed (the threatening criminal is only implied). I argue that as a result, the identity of 
the fearful public becomes divorced from its defining cause (the criminal) and instead 
becomes dependent on political rhetoric for definition, guidance and sustenance. This 
presents the potentially dangerous opportunity for that identity to be used to gain political 
advantage.
M e t a p h o r  - T h e o r y  & M e t h o d o l o g y
Derived from the Greek metapherein meaning to carry from one place to another (Miller, 
1979), the basic characteristic of metaphor is transfer, whether that be of an understanding 
or experience from one thing to another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a) or of meaning (Ortony, 
1975). The Oxford English Dictionary defines a metaphor as a “figure of speech in which a 
name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object or action different from, but 
analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable” (OED, 2001). However, this definition 
can be criticized for not acknowledging the cognitive, pragmatic or rhetorical 
characteristics of the trope (Charteris-Black, 2004).
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To counter these shortfalls, Charteris-Black (2004) defines a metaphor as
A linguistic representation that results from the shift in the use of a word or 
phrase from the context or domain in which it is expected to occur to another 
context or domain where it is not expected to occur, thereby causing semantic 
tension (Charteris-Black, 2004: 21)
This definition characterizes metaphor as: 1) a linguistic phenomenon; 2) a relative concept 
where the meaning of words change over time; and 3) open, thereby allowing any word to 
be a metaphor providing it involves a change of use between the source and the target 
domains (normal to non-normal use) (Charteris-Black, 2005).
In Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis (2004) and Politicians and Rhetoric 
(2005), Charteris-Black outlined the development and stages of CMA. It is a form of 
analysis that utilizes the cognitive approach to metaphor. This approach originated in 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) work METAPHORS WE LIVE BY and treats metaphor as a 
cognitive phenomenon that is part of human conceptualisation and its use as more complex 
than the simple choice of a linguistic expression (Chilton, 2004) (further works taking a 
cognitive approach to political metaphors include: Chilton & Lakoff, 1995; Lakoff, 1992, 
2001, 2003; Musolff, 2004).
A key part of the cognitive approach to metaphor is the mapping of ideas and 
understanding from a source to a target domain. Image schemas (derived from bodily 
interaction with the physical environment) are the source of these mappings and can be 
discussed in terms such as containment, spatial orientation and motion. When forming the 
source of metaphorical mappings, these image schemas provide the materials of
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conceptualization: a metaphor allows something abstract to be conceptualized in terms of
knowledge of something that is concrete or something that is unknown in terms of 
something that is well known. Thus, the cognitive approach to metaphor is focused 
primarily on how concepts are formed rather than on the specific words and phrases that 
are used as a result of those concepts (Chilton, 1996).
Lakoff and Johnson argue that conceptual metaphors seek to explain the motivations for 
the systematic use of metaphoric expressions and that related conceptual metaphors may 
function as subcategories of each other (see (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b: 9)). In an effort to 
make explicit this hierarchy in which one conceptual metaphor may entail other conceptual 
metaphors, a distinction is made in CMA between conceptual metaphors and conceptual 
keys. A conceptual metaphor is defined as “a statement that resolves the semantic tension 
of a set of metaphors [metaphoric expressions] by showing them to be related” and a 
conceptual key is defined as “a statement that resolves the semantic tension of a set of 
conceptual metaphors by showing them to be related” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 21-22).
For example, it could be said that there are three levels of metaphor: first, metaphoric 
expressions that are explicitly stated in the text (e.g., Australia is standing along side its 
allies); second, conceptual metaphors explain the concept that links the systematic use of 
multiple metaphoric expressions (e.g., AUSTRALIA IS A PERSON); and third, 
conceptual keys explain the relationship between the use of multiple conceptual metaphors 
(e.g., A NATION IS A PERSON). These three levels will be used in this chapter as a 
means of examining the metaphoric language used by parliamentarians in discussing fear- 
of-crime.
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The Methodology of CMA
CMA incorporates three stages of analysis. The first stage is metaphor identification. As 
any word can be used metaphorically there is a need to identify metaphoric expressions 
based on a particular definition. The Charteris-Black (2004) definition of metaphor given 
above will be used in this case study.
This definition is based on a set of three criteria that outline the characteristics of metaphor 
(any or all of which may be present in one metaphor to differing degrees). The first is a 
linguistic criterion where a word or phrase creates semantic tension by reification, 
personification or depersonification. The second criterion is focused on the pragmatics of 
metaphor use or where the user seeks to influence opinions and judgments by persuasion. 
The final criterion that is argued to potentially characterize metaphor is the conceptual shift 
that underlies the use of metaphor to map partial aspects of the referent in a linguistic 
expression from the source to the target domain (Charteris-Black, 2004).
To identify metaphoric expressions, a sample of texts derived from the main corpus is read 
closely to identify candidate metaphoric expressions (by the definition presented above) 
where each use of the word or phrase is checked to determine if it is being used literally or 
metaphorically. However, the corpus constructed for this chapter comprises 61,511 words 
(see below). It was therefore feasible for all texts to be examined for metaphoric 
expressions rather than isolating a small sample of the texts.
The second stage is metaphor interpretation. This is the identification of conceptual 
metaphors and conceptual keys and will be done in this chapter by the manual 
identification of common themes between metaphoric expressions used. The final stage is
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metaphor explanation involving the identification of the social agency involved in the
production of a particular metaphor and their intention in the use of that metaphor (i.e., 
metaphor’s discursive function). This will be done by combining the results from the 
second stage with illustrations of the possible roles and functions that metaphors may play 
in debates about fear-of-crime. While such an explanation can be used to look at the 
ideological and rhetorical motivations behind metaphors in this chapter, the results of 
CMA will focus on a discussion of the impact of metaphoric language on parliamentary 
representations of the public’s identity.
M e t a p h o r s  in F e a r - o f - C r i m e  D e b a t e s
For the purposes of this chapter, documents were only included where there was at least 
one discussion of fear-of-crime. This excluded those that merely mentioned it in passing. 
For example, a parliamentarian may say: “this government is addressing crime and fear of 
crime” where the remainder of the speech discussed legislation giving police the power to 
use lethal force. In such cases, fear-of-crime was mentioned as if part of a headline 
statement and did not form the topic of debate. A discussion about fear-of-crime was 
operationalized as a speech containing five or more references to the public’s anxiety- 
related emotional response to crime, perceptions of safety from crime, and/or behavioural 
changes. Such a decision was made in order to maintain the focus on metaphors in debates 
about fear-of-crime rather than in debates about government spending or policy, a piece of 
legislation and so forth.
As a consequence of these parameters, the results presented in this chapter are based on 41 
documents (6% of the main corpus; the reasons for such a substantial number of
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documents being excluded is discussed in Chapter Eight). The data on which this chapter is
based, as opposed to the entire corpus of 720 documents, is held electronically. The 41 
documents examined in this chapter comprised 61,511 words. While the main corpus was 
drawn from two levels of parliament (state and federal) with potentially differing time 
periods, 99% of the texts examined for this chapter were drawn from state parliaments and 
were all produced between September 1991 and November 2003.
Metaphor Identification
Using the definition of metaphor given above, each document was read closely to identify 
candidate metaphoric expressions with computer-assisted word searches being used to 
check for occurrences of the identified candidate metaphoric expressions that may have 
been missed when read manually. 796 examples of word-forms or phrases were identified. 
The largest definitional criterion (40%) that these fulfilled was through the linguistic 
characteristics of:
■ reification (for example: “In the amount of time we spent on this subject, I spent 
some time on the issue” (Hidding, 1998) under the conceptual metaphor of TIME 
IS MONEY);
■ personification (for example: “get the state back on its feet” (Smith, 1995) -  
STATE IS A PERSON; “Rokeby is a suburb that is so tightly in the grip of crime” 
(Quick, 1994) -  CRIME IS A PERSON); and
■ depersonification (for example: “a strong inflow of women but they did not seem to 
be flowing up all that high” (Hidding, 1998) -  WOMEN ARE LIQUID).
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The cognitive criterion was the next most frequent means (31%) of identifying candidate
metaphors in the fear-of-crime corpus. These are metaphoric expressions that are involved 
in a shift in the conceptual system. For example, the dramaturgical expressions of play, 
part, performance, and role were frequently found in discussing job descriptions and 
accountability: “This is an important matter and one in which we all play a part” (Hidding, 
1998) or “local members of Parliament to play a leadership role” (Lavarch, 1997). Such 
metaphoric expressions assist the language user to depict the work of the government, for 
example, as clearly defined and part of a larger context. By doing so, metaphors can 
change the way in which the work of the government (and their success or failure) is 
conceived.
The final 29% of the candidate metaphors fulfilled, as their main characteristic, the 
pragmatic criterion. This means that metaphoric expressions were being used to influence 
opinions and persuade the hearer. For example: “to the snake oil salesman this is 
acceptable” (Macdonald, 1995) where the snake oil salesman is being used metaphorically 
to refer to (with negative connotations) a politician; or “The Minister has slashed the 
overtime budget” (Dunworth, 1991) with slashed being used to reflect (and convince 
others of) the opinion that the budget changes have involved drastic cuts, potentially ill- 
considered and reckless. These types of metaphoric expressions often reflect the speaker’s 
intentions and their opinions or emotive judgments about the subject matter. Each 
metaphoric expression identified, though classified under one particular criterion, may also 
display characteristics of the other criteria to varying degrees.
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121 conceptual metaphors were identified by manually searching for common themes 
between metaphoric expressions used and their context. Conceptual metaphors are 
overarching statements in the form A is B that seek to release some of the semantic tension 
by showing how particular metaphoric expressions are related. For example from the texts 
studied, under the conceptual metaphor of POLICY MAKING IS A JOURNEY, steps, 
paths, directions and courses are taken, governments progress down the track and 
occasionally they turn around or change tack. Alternatively, the conceptual metaphor of 
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS attempts to release some of the semantic tension surrounding 
descriptions of people as cowering, lurking, being afraid to venture out and feeling caged, 
scuttling around the streets, or even simply hanging about. These conceptual metaphors 
seek to identify the relationship between multiple metaphoric expressions and thereby 
elucidate possible reasons for their use.
While a conceptual metaphor may go some way in dispersing the semantic tension created 
by the systematic use of metaphoric expressions, conceptual keys seek to understand the 
relationship between multiple conceptual metaphors. Such keys have been identified by 
analysing the context in which conceptual metaphors occur and the common themes 
between these occurrences. The largest group of conceptual metaphors (n = 11, Table 7.1) 
fell under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR. This conceptual 
key was apparent as a common theme between conceptual metaphors realised in the texts 
as metaphoric expressions such as fighting, enemies, weapons, and targets', where the 
community, governments and politicians alike have declared and are engaged in a battle
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against crime and criminals. With 168 examples, this conceptual key covered 10% of the
metaphoric expressions identified (n = 28; Table 7.2).
Thus, based on the identification of metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors 
associated under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR, it is 
possible for parliamentarians to depict a reality in the following way: an army of soldiers 
(the public, police and government officers) armed with weapons (information and law) 
and guided by generals (politicians) and their strategies (public policy) are actively fighting 
a war to protect (home) territory against enemies (crime, social problems and fear) that 
target victims (of crime).
Given that the main focus of this research is on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime, 
further analysis was undertaken on the corpus for this case study to identify metaphors 
used in relation to fear. Using the same methodology as previously described, metaphoric 
expressions related to fear were identified based on 45 word-forms (Table 7.3). These 
surface metaphors were then grouped under six conceptual metaphors (Table 7.4). The 
conceptual metaphors in turn suggest the conceptual key of FEAR IS AN ENTITY. The 
importance of this conceptual key is that fear is not talked about in terms of an emotion felt 
by a person. It is something that is talked about as if it were external to that person; 
whether fear is abstract or concrete, an object, liquid or container, it is an entity that is 
separate from the person who feels afraid.
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Table 7.1: Conceptual Metaphors identified under the AACIW Conceptual Key
Conceptual M etaphor Example #





It had a brief to report to the government on ways and 
strategies to address crime ... (Elliott, 1995)
23
Crime is an enemy The police in Prahran continue to fig h t a losing battle 
against violent crime in that area (Hayward, 1991)
23
Law is a weapon The legislation is aimed at gangs of people ... (Schipp, 
1994)
17
The State is a supporter of 
the war effort
Support for victims of crime needs to be constant ... 
(Humphries, 1997)
12
The home is the front line The front door has become the enemy territory (Gash, 
2001)
10
Information is a weapon ... public statements and publications whose aim or 
outcome achieves little more than fuelling hate (Greig, 
2003)
7
Fear is an enemy There are no specific funds to combat fear of crime 
(Hidding, 1998)
5
The public are soldiers Blackshirt vigilantes marching to the home of a timid, shy 
person (Zollo, 2003)
4
The police are soldiers ... wonderful if the police had this as part of their 
armoury (Hidding, 1998)
4
Governments are soldiers My department has broadened the target group to include 
all older people ... (Gash, 2001)
3
Social problems are enemies We have always prided ourselves on finding other ways to 
combat problems ... (Gash, 2001)
2
Table 7.2: Metaphoric expressions identified under the AACIW Conceptual Key
M e ta p h o r ic
E x p ress io n *
N u m b e r  o f  
E x a m p le s
M eta p h o r ic
E x p ress io n
N u m b er  o f  
E x a m p les
Aim 10 Hit 1
Armour 1 March 1
Attack 45 Mark 2
Battle 1 Prison 3
Brace 1 Protect 2
Charge 11 Rocket 1
Combat 3 Serve 1
Enemy 2 Siege 2
Escape 5 Strategy 18
Fight 10 Strike 2
Flak 1 Struggle 2
Force 6 Support 12
Fortress 1 Tackle 8
Front 3 Target 13
*The metaphoric expressions included in this table have been grouped by lemma (e.g., attack) rather than 
word-form (e.g., attacked, attacks, attacker etc).
160
Chapter Seven____________________________________________________________Violence Metaphors
The implications of separating fear in this way and the creation of an abstract entity have
been discussed in depth in the previous chapter (Chapter Six): metaphoric expressions used 
in relation to fear, and under the conceptual key of FEAR IS AN ENTITY, support the 
findings presented in Chapter Six. Fear-of-crime is frequently conceptualized as an abstract 
entity that is able to take on independent agency -  attacking victims while the state battles 
against it in a war on crime.
So far in this chapter, I have outlined both a theoretical and associated methodological 
approach to metaphor. I then gave a brief overview of metaphors in the parliamentary 
debates identified using CMA. The main focus of the remainder of this chapter will be on 
war- and fight-related metaphors that can be grouped under the conceptual key of 
ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR1 (AACIW). The following sections will explore this 
conceptual key and its associated metaphors with the intention of discussing their 
discursive function(s). This will be done by combining the results just given with 
illustrations of AACIW metaphors within a discussion of their possible roles and functions 
in debates about fear-of-crime. Such an exploration will highlight the political 
representation, through the choice of metaphoric expressions, of the public’s identity as 
fearful and vulnerable.
1 For ease of expression, I will discuss AACIW metaphors for the remainder of the chapter. By AACIW 
metaphors I mean the metaphoric expressions and conceptual metaphors found under the conceptual key of
ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR.
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Table 7.3: Metaphoric Expressions in FEAR IS AN ENTITY
Violence Metaphors
M e ta p h o r ic
E x p r e s s io n *
N u m b e r  o f  
E x a m p le s
M e ta p h o r ic
E x p r e s s io n
N u m b e r  o f  
E x a m p le s
Address 3 Has 4
Area 1 High 1
Backdrop 1 Highlight 1
Base 2 In 5
Big 1 Level 1
Bring 1 Low 1
Build 1 Oppose 1
Cater 1 Overcome 1
Centre 2 Phrase 4
Compound 1 Play 1
Concede 1 Prey 1
Corrode 1 Put 1
Create 11 Revolved 1
Damp 1 Rise 2
Down 1 Spread 1
Emanate 1 Statistic 2
Evidence 2 Stir 1
Exaggerate 1 Symptom 1
Feed 1 Take 2
Focus 1 Talk 1
Grab 1 Top 1
Gulf 2 Wide 2
Handle 1
*The metaphoric expressions included in this table have been grouped by lemma (e.g., create) rather than 
word-form (e.g., created, creates etc).
Table 7.4: Conceptual Metaphors in FEAR IS AN ENTITY
C o n cep tu a l M e ta p h o r E x a m p le #
Fear is an object ... we handle the subject [fear-of-crime] intelligently and 
rationally ... (Sercombe, 1994)
30
Fear is created ... that fear has been created by the action of loiterers ... 
(Zollo, 2003a)
21
Fear is alive ... having helped to feed  the fear of crime, then to feed  off 
the fear of crime ... (Griffin, 1999a)
9
Fear is a liquid ... those fears are often, if anything, more corrosive than 
some of the realities of crime (Sercombe, 1994)
8
Fear is a container ... people in the western suburbs of Sydney who now live 
in genuine fear. (Hazzard, 2003)
6
Fear is a gas Even children sense the cloud o f anxiety emanating from 
their parents (Dunworth, 1991)
2
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Metaphor Exploration
AACIW metaphors seek to transfer the language and associated imagery of overt violence 
and militarized action into another domain. Such war metaphors have become common in 
many areas of public life such as law and order politics, marketing, management, 
medicine, social work and psychology, sports, public relations, and risk management (for 
examples of some of these see Boyd, 2003; Gustavsson, 1991; Heng, 2002; McMichael, 
2002; Scrimger & Richards, 2003; Whysall, 2001). In this case, the target domain was 
crime.
AACIW metaphors involving the target domain of crime will be explored by presenting 
illustrations of the use of these metaphoric expressions within a discussion of the roles and 
functions that AACIW metaphors may play in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. 
These roles and functions will be examined from three perspectives (linguistic, cognitive 
and pragmatic) though in each case, the focus will be maintained on the discursive function 
of metaphors.
It should be noted at the outset that the mapping of metaphors of violence, fights and wars 
onto the domain of crime may be partly topic-triggered because of the semantic blurring 
between the domains. War and crime both contain elements of violence. For example, the 
crime of assault does (by definition) involve the use of violence where one person could be 
described as literally attacking the victim. Therefore, the subject matter of the debates as 
well as the speaker’s persuasive intentions may determine the choice of metaphoric 
expression. While the influence of the topic itself is acknowledged, it is argued not to 
diminish the importance of the results presented in this chapter because through the
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methodology of CMA, literal uses of word-forms are excluded during the second stage of
analysis (metaphor identification). Instances of using attack, for example, as a means of 
describing one particular instance of criminal victimization have been excluded because 
they represent a literal use of the word-form rather than a metaphoric expression. 
Consequently, it is the use of metaphoric expressions and their implications that are the 
subject of this chapter.
Roles of AA CIW Metaphors
Possible linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic roles will be used to structure the following 
discussion about the discursive function of AACIW metaphors. I will argue that AACIW 
metaphors, when used by parliamentarians, fulfil the role of ensuring consistent language, 
of helping the community to understand crime as a negative aspect to society requiring 
urgent attention and of providing persuasive rhetorical evidence based on strategically 
constructed representations. Through these roles, AACIW metaphors function to help 
depict an image of a threatened society and fearful public.
To begin with the first possible role of AACIW metaphors, the language used in the 
examples given above consisted of a set of terms grouped to an underlying conceptual 
metaphor (and conceptual key). Such systematicity between all levels of metaphor is noted 
as a standard characteristic of this trope (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b: 7-9). In effect, 
metaphors come with a series of preset terms that match the topic and tone of the 
headlining term. For example, Whysall lists a number of elements or images that are 
associated with war-related metaphors such as “revenge, suffering, casualties, ‘collateral 
damage’, war crimes, prisoners, and necessary adverse impacts on non-combatants”
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(Whysall, 2001). Such terms are to be found among metaphoric expressions given in
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 above. These associated images and terms can be used for structuring 
discourse, for providing innovative language within the bounds of a conceptual metaphor 
and for creating a consistent depiction of all actors involved.
AACIW metaphors are also useful for the populist politician when conceptualizing crime, 
fear-of-crime and law and order in general (Steinert, 2003). The texts studied showed that 
the use of such metaphoric expressions were intended to help the audience to understand 
the concept of crime as something that is bad, distasteful or detrimental to society and that 
action is urgently required. The negativity with which war and fighting is regarded was 
transferred to crime. For example:
(1) However, we do think that a great deal needs to be said about the war 
against organized crime which is being fought in this country, or which we 
believe should be fought in this country, and the war against ordinary crime, 
traditional crime, which affects the entire spectrum of Australian society 
because society as a whole is under threat ... What of the second priority -  the 
fight against organized crime? It is not a fight we are concerned about; it is a 
war for the survival of a decent society, for the protection of the young, for the 
security of our families and homes, for freedom from fear in the streets and for 
the integrity of the very institutions on which the criminal justice system is 
based (Spender, 1986).
This example (1) shows that while metaphoric mappings are partial, it is the urgency, 
magnitude, severity and even actions associated with wars, fights and violent behaviour in 
general, that are transferred to discussions of crime through these metaphors (Boyd, 2003;
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Yanow, 1992). In cases where there is overlap between the source (war) and target (crime)
domains such as the use of violence, war-related metaphoric expressions helped to 
emphasize (or even escalate) the urgency of the action proposed. As a result, AACIW 
metaphors provided a means by which politicians could signal their determination to 
address the problem of fear-of-crime. In this way, the use of these metaphors reflects the 
way in which the speaker understands and wants others to understand crime. The 
implications of this will be discussed below in the section on the functions of AACIW 
metaphors.
Following on from the changes effected in the conceptualization of crime, AACIW 
metaphors also have a pragmatic role in providing rhetorical evidence with the intention of 
persuading. In the texts studied, the interaction between members of the public is 
represented as constrained by (through the public’s fears of) criminal behaviour. For 
example, the elderly were often depicted as living with a fortress mentality of having bars 
on their windows, locks on their doors and restricting their lifestyle because they dare not 
leave the house after 4 p.m. Consequently, the community and government must conduct a 
fight against or war on criminal behaviour in order to maintain and even liberate social 
interaction, to free the captives. The pragmatic role of AACIW metaphors enables the 
speaker to justify their proposals based on their own representation of the public’s 
experience of crime and fear-of-crime.
So far I have argued that AACIW metaphors have the role of providing consistency in the 
language used; of helping the community to understand that crime is a negative (urgent and 
sizeable) aspect of society; and finally of using a parliamentarian’s own representation of 
the public’s experience of crime to achieve the speaker’s persuasive goals. In simple terms,
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the use of AACIW metaphors emphasizes the argument that crime is detrimental to
society, restricts or reduces the public’s quality of life and requires urgent attention. It is 
how these roles function in Australian parliamentary debates that highlight less allegedly 
self-evident consequences.
Functions of A A CIW metaphors
One function of metaphor can be to help soften the discomfort with which social change or 
the unfamiliar is often regarded. Metaphors can function as a bridge from the known to the 
unknown through the process of mapping -  a process discussed earlier in regard to 
cognitive approaches to metaphor. In this case, the known or more clearly delineated 
concept is the popular images of war -  of being under siege, of restricting lifestyles to stay 
at home to protect belongings and people. These (partial) images of war are mapped onto 
crime. In this latter unknown or less clearly delineated concept, the threat comes from 
within the state; and the criminal and victim are more difficult to identify. For example:
(2) The women say that not only do they fear for their own safety but also for 
the safety of their children. They consider it is not sufficiently safe to allow 
their children even to visit the local shop to buy milk. ... I put to the House that 
the police in Prahran continue to fight a losing battle against violent crime in 
that area because of inadequate personnel and resources. (Hayward, 1991)
This example (2) shows that these AACIW metaphors enable the public to understand that 
they should respond to the unknown as they would to the known domain -  they should 
respond to crime as one would to a war. In conjunction with the roles discussed earlier, the 
rhetoric advises them to stay inside in fortress-like homes to fight off the marauding forces.
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Another function of AACIW metaphors is to allow the complex problem of crime to be
simplified to criminals and non-criminals. Metaphorical mappings can be used to polarize 
the social identities involved in a discourse. Consequently, discussions of a problem tend 
to be focused on what can be done about the threat that is facing us because of them, the 
‘other’, the criminal. It allows the speaker to focus discussions on the savageness of the 
enemy rather than the weakness of the target (Boyd, 2003). Enemies are identified, created 
or assumed. Differences within the group are ignored. At the same time, a General is 
identified that will lead the side to victory through effective strategy, use of weapons, 
training of soldiers and funding (Gustavsson, 1991). For example:
(3) ... the outbreak of violence which has manifested itself in the past 12 to 18 
months has been tackled in a more professional way by the Victoria Police. ... 
The crimes being targeted are not robberies; they are vicious acts without a 
motive. ... Nonetheless, motiveless crimes occur with innocent people being 
the victims. (Smith, 1995)
In this example (3), the identities presented are homogenous groups where the Victoria 
Police act as soldiers controlling an outbreak of violence; criminals act viciously and 
without motive; and victims are innocent people. The speaker is able to use these identities 
to argue for urgent action against the savage enemy facing the innocent victim.
The simplification that can occur through AACIW metaphors may help the public to 
understand crime and it may help politicians to convey the need for certain actions to be 
taken. However, it also hides the complexity of the problem which, if not also addressed, 
reduces the potential for success that any state effort may have. Instead of encompassing 
all the issues that may cause criminal behaviour or fear-of-crime, responses to such issues
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are simplified to the political party promising the toughest laws or the most resources to
police. The complexity of the answer is hidden by the function of metaphor to simplify the 
problem to its polar extremes.
Finally, AACIW metaphors can function to help present the social reality that is desired by 
the speaker. In the texts studied, criminals are portrayed as being external to society. The 
threat is outside. This assists in both the creation of a collective public identity and the 
description of society as a complete homogenous entity. Society as a whole is under threat 
from criminals in the same way that an invading force would threaten a nation. 
Consequently, AACIW metaphors help parliamentarians to attempt to unify society by 
focusing on an external threat. The menacing ‘other’ has been used many times in politics 
(see for example: Coser, 1972; Edelman, 1988) such as focusing a fear of the ‘other’ on 
witches (Erikson, 1966) and sorcerers (Kuhn, 1990) (The literature on ‘othcring’ will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Twelve). In this case, it is the criminal ‘other’ that is 
highlighted by AACIW metaphors in political attempts to represent a particular social 
reality. For example:
(4) At present many people live in fear. Their homes are like fortresses with 
bars on the windows, extra security and locks on doors. Worse still, many are 
frightened to leave their homes. The older citizens in our society should not 
have to live in that atmosphere. (Nile, 1997)
(5) In watching the way people walk and talk in their local communities, I have 
noticed a change, especially in the older people who now clutch their purses, 
wallets and bags of shopping for dear life. They spend a lot of time looking 
behind them, crossing the street if there are strangers on the footpath and so on.
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Even when they stop for a cup of tea with a friend at a cafe, they hang onto all
their stuff, and rather than look at one another as they speak ... The front door 
has become the enemy territoiy. They say that it is just better to leave it locked 
as then nothing can happen. (Gash, 2001)
These ((4) & (5)) are examples of the use of metaphoric expressions related to fights and 
wars to help present a reality containing a threatened society where this society is 
delineated by the savage criminals depicted in political rhetoric.
The culmination of these three possible functions of AACIW metaphors leads to the 
linguistic representation of a society where criminals are excluded based upon their 
transgression of boundaries of behaviour. Crime and criminals are kept out through the 
castle walls of rhetoric about tough legislation and well resourced police. Ultimately, it is a 
reality where the safety of innocent people is threatened and society is on the defensive 
reacting to the criminal force that has laid a violent siege.
A A C I W  M e t a p h o r s  and  I d e n t i t y  
The common theme throughout all metaphors discussed here is the political representation 
of a public identity that is characterized by feelings of fear, insecurity, innocence and 
vulnerability; and that this fearful identity is defined by the identity of the threatening 
criminal. The following section argues that the use of AACIW metaphors serves to 
reinforce and elevate to prominence the identities of a fearful public and threatening 
criminal. This argument will be made by first presenting the general theory on identity and 
then a more specific framework developed by the Copenhagen School. On the basis of that
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framework, the identities emphasized by AACIW metaphors in parliamentary debates
about fear-of-crime will be examined. It is argued that the identities involved are becoming 
separated from each other in parliamentary discussions about crime and fear-of-crime.
Personal and Social Identity-  the theory
Identity is most simply described in metaphorical terms as a “place in the social world” 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001). This place represents characteristics such as gender, age 
and ethnicity. Identity functions to allow distinctions to be made between “us” and “them” 
or “s/he” and “me” (Kaelberer, 2004; Waever et al., 1993) -  a socio-psychological 
distinction that occurs in all human interaction (Ottosen, 1995). It is a dynamic conception 
(McSweeney, 1998) that changes in both number and focus throughout one’s lifetime 
(Sturmer & Simon, 2004).
There are a number of different scholarly definitions of identity depending on the author’s 
theoretical perspective. For instance in Identity Theory, identity is the self-categorization 
of oneself into a role and the consequent assumption of the values, meanings and 
expectations that are associated with that role (Stets & Burke, 2000). The focus is on 
individual differences that distinguish one person from another (Turner & Onorato, 1999). 
In Social Identity Theory, identity is generated through the knowledge that one belongs to 
or shares certain characteristics with a particular social group or category (Stets & Burke, 
2000). It is a more inclusive form (we or us) of self-definition compared to individual 
identity (I or me) (Sturmer & Simon, 2004). Social identity is focused on a ‘shared sense of 
“we”’ (Futrell & Simi, 2004), where one’s place in the world is shared with others.
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The formulation of identity that will be used in this chapter is that used by scholars such as
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and their colleagues (known as the “Copenhagen School” 
(Williams, 1998)) when discussing “securitization” (Waever et al., 1993). Discussions of 
security have been gradually extended from the military security of states and nations to 
how objects in the economy, environment and so on become the subject of security 
debates. The Copenhagen School termed this latter process as ‘securitization’. Williams 
(1998) describes this as “the socially and politically successful 'speech act' of labeling an 
issue a 'security issue' [which] removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics, 
casting it as an 'existential threat' calling for and justifying extreme measures” (Williams, 
1998:435).
In the process of securitization, identity is featured in two ways. First, it is the means by 
which societies are classified. Identity in this case becomes the focus of the threat that 
initiated the discussions about security. This is societal security or where the actions of the 
state are generated by perceptions that a society’s identity is under threat (Waever et al., 
1993). Such behaviour is evident in the actions called for by the parliamentarians quoted 
above.
An identity is also created by the process of securitization. Specific boundaries are drawn 
between “us” and “them”. In seeking to oppose an enemy, the state must define what or 
who that enemy is. The created (enemy) identity is homogenous, monolithic and denies the 
reality of a multiplicity of identity. Discussions about security issues are, by definition, 
exclusionary and require clear boundaries about the identity that must be excluded from 
society (Williams, 2003). The persecution of created or real enemies is a means by which 
the state can renew and reaffirm social identities (Bergesen, 1984; Luostarinen, 1989;
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Ottosen, 1995). It is this second feature of the creation of identity that will be drawn upon
below.
Identity, AACIW metaphors and Fear-of-Crime
The participation in the creation and/or maintenance of a fearful public identity and the 
implied threat of the criminal was the common thread through all of the metaphoric 
language discussed here. In the texts, the identity that was most frequently and overtly 
mentioned was that of the fearful member of the public. This was especially evident in 
discussions about fear-of-crime amongst the elderly.
(6) The elderly people said they felt as if they were under siege and they should 
keep all their money in the bank. Some of them said they should have some 
means of self-defence at hand and that they did not go out after 4.00pm. They 
kept their doors and windows locked and often did not answer the door if they 
were not expecting a visitor (Elliott, 1995: 777).
(7) The point I was making is that often when I knock on the door of a home I 
see a little old lady open a window at the other end of the house because she is 
too frightened to open her front door (Lester, 1995: 12569).
In the examples (6) and (7) the elderly person is depicted as vulnerable, fearful, weak and 
defenceless. Similar descriptions are also given of women, children and victims (especially 
when discussing crimes such as stalking or domestic violence). Men are discussed as either 
fearful for their own lives or that of their family. In each case, there is at least one member 
of the public that is afraid.
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The identity of the fearful public is almost certainly generated through many factors.
However, the use of AACIW metaphors in discussions about crime and fear-of-crime 
transfers not only the language of strategies and attacks but also the fear and urgency 
associated with violent and warlike behaviour. Through talk of a war on crime or a fight 
against fear-of-crime, criminal behaviour becomes a frequent and imminent threat of 
substantial magnitude that will have severe consequences for any victim. This makes 
criminal behaviour appear pervasive, high-risk and likely -  factors that tend to increase 
feelings of fear. Therefore, political discussions about reducing fear-of-crime by 
conducting a war on crime may increase the level of fear felt in the community.
It is interesting to note that the identity of the threatening criminal is mostly implied rather 
than expressly discussed. The threat that makes people afraid was frequently maintained as 
an abstract concept that did not take the form of a person or type of person. This supports 
the argument made by some scholars that crime is increasingly being depicted as a danger 
that comes from anywhere at any time (Valier, 2002). The whole of society is represented 
as under a universal yet undefined threat known only as the ‘criminal’.
For example, in the passage (8) below, the focus is on the need of people to feel safe (an 
element of fear-of-crime). The reason for them not feeling safe because a person may 
cause them injury or such like is not mentioned. It is only implied.
(8) Every South Australian has the right to feel safe in their homes, in their 
streets and in their communities. Parents must be confident in the knowledge 
that, when their children go to school, they are not at risk. They need to feel 
confident that, when their teenagers are visiting the city, they are safe. The
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elderly need to be confident of living in their homes without fear of invasion.
(Brokenshire, 2001)
Some of this lack of overt discussion that locates the threat in the criminal may be a result 
of the study’s focus on fear-of-crime. Texts that discussed crime (and perhaps offenders) 
were excluded if they did not also contain a discussion of fear-of-crime. It is possible that 
such exclusion may have artificially inflated the level to which the identity of the fearful 
public was raised above that of the criminal.
However, it remains noteworthy that there should be such isolation of the two identities in 
parliamentary discussions that lay the boundaries between “us” and “them”. Through 
AACIW metaphors and especially those relating to war, there is an attempt to set up the 
offender as the enemy. Yet in discussions w'here the definition of “us”-  the fearful public -  
is being espoused, there is no mention of the opposite that is required to clarify who “we” 
are. As a result, that identity relies on the rhetoric of political debate for its definition. This 
may in part account for the level of fear-of-crime reported in the community being found 
to be influenced by political posturing. Political rhetoric involving metaphoric expressions 
of wars, fights and violent behaviour enhances the ability for appeals to the identity of the 
fearful public to be made with greater potential effect. This ability is extended by the 
fearful identity of the public being divorced from a criminal other. Consequently, there 
may be the temptation to manipulate the ‘fearful public’ for political ends such as to gain 
support for policies, changes in legislation and ultimately, win re-election.
175
Chapter Seven Violence Metaphors
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
In this chapter, I began with a brief examination of the theory surrounding metaphors -  
definitions, approaches and the methodology of Critical Metaphor Analysis. Through roles 
in language, cognition and social interaction, metaphor has the potential to function 
effectively to soften the perceived threat or discomfort generated by social change, 
simplify complex issues and to construct a particular reality. These roles and functions 
were used to structure the discussion about metaphoric expressions and conceptual 
metaphors grouped under the conceptual key of ACTION AGAINST CRIME IS WAR.
It was shown that these AACIW metaphors assisted parliamentarians by providing a 
consistent body of language. Parliamentarians were able to argue, or more often state but 
not argue, that crime was detrimental to society, restricted quality-of-life and required 
urgent attention. Furthermore, AACIW metaphors were shown to function as a means of 
defining the actors involved in crime (e.g. criminals and victims) as well as attempting to 
establish roles and locations of engagement. The use of such metaphors simplified the 
debates to their polar extremes and provided rhetorical evidence in support of the exclusion 
of the threatening criminal based on their transgression of state defined boundaries of 
behaviour. It was argued that the effect of using AACIW metaphors was to present a 
reality where the safety of innocent persons is threatened in a society that is struggling to 
assert its dominance over the criminal forces. The common thread throughout all AACIW 
metaphors was the use of the identities of the fearful public and the threatening criminal. 
Metaphoric language increased the usefulness of these identities in Australian 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.
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In concluding, I emphasized the dangers in regard to fear-of-crime that may result from the
political manipulation of such identities. In parliamentary debates, one danger lies in the 
potential increase in fear-of-crime that may result from the framing of crime in terms of 
AACIW metaphors. Urgency and severity was transferred or emphasized through the use 
of these metaphors. The imagery that is used escalates the perception of that threat and 
potentially the community’s fear-of-crime.
A further danger was identified by the apparent separation of the fearful public identity 
from that of the criminal. It was argued that without anchorage to that which contained the 
threat or the stimulus for fear, the characteristics fear-of-crime would become dependent 
for definition on political rhetoric such as that containing metaphors of violence, wars and 
fights. Such a situation demands great restraint from politicians not to use the increasingly 
rhetoric dependent identity of the fearful public for political advantage.
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Chapter Eight Common Sense
This chapter will examine a particular feature of the parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime that reflect as equitable an influence as possible between linguistic and societal forces 
-  common sense. Instead of being a linguistic form specifically, common sense is a body of 
knowledge that represents through language what is assumed to be ‘understood by 
everyone’ in a particular society. Appeals to common sense knowledge about fear-of-crime 
were frequently used in the documents collected; at times such appeals seemed to entirely 
dominate the debates as politicians replaced arguments based on objective evidence for 
arguments relying on common sense. Such appeals to common sense provide an 
opportunity to examine both the way in which images of reality are embodied in language 
and the way that these images are contested through language.
C as e  S t u d y  M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  S t r u c t u r e
During a Joint Standing Committee on Migration meeting regarding the deportation of 
criminals, a witness remarked “of course we must fear crime” (Johnston, 1997: 121) 
Furthermore, it was evident very early in the data collection that while fear-of-crime was a 
favorite issue for politicians to mention when discussing crime and criminal victimization, 
it was not a favorite issue to discuss. Only 41 (6%) of the 720 documents from the past 21 
years contained a discussion of fear-of-crime (operationalized as more than five mentions). 
This chapter seeks to examine the reason(s) behind why there are so few political 
discussions about fear-of-crime when it is an issue that is frequently mentioned. It will be 
argued that fearing crime is perceived as common sense by politicians and therefore, its 
existence does not need argumentative justification.
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To make this argument, I will first examine the notion of common sense -  its definition, 
characteristics and functions. I will then outline the common sense statements that have 
been made about crime and fear-of-crime by researchers internally and in Australia. After 
adding further statements that I argue are perceived as common sense by politicians based 
on the analysis of the debates collected, I will focus on three main statements to which 
appeals were frequently made. These are that it is common sense that: the streets are 
dangerous because of crime; the public is afraid of crime; and the level of fear-of-crime is 
positively correlated with the rate of crime. I will then demonstrate that such statements are 
used as if they are common sense and will suggest possible resulting functions of such 
statements. At this point, it will hopefully be evident that fear-of-crime is not widely 
discussed in Australian politics because fearing crime is perceived as common sense.
In the final section, I wish to discuss one effect of the use of these common sense 
statements in Australian politics. It is argued that they provide politicians with fuel to create 
enough political noise to drown out alternative arguments. Debate over issues is restricted 
or even silenced altogether. Instead, public policy is presented as common sense with its 
associated authority, legitimacy and power. The course of action proposed thus becomes 
the only course that any ‘sensible’ person would take.
W h a t  is C o m m o n  S e n s e ?
To begin the argument that fearing crime is common sense, it is important to understand 
what common sense is. It is related to thought processes such as judgment, truth and 
knowledge. However, it tends to be less well defined than these (van Holthoon & Olson, 
1987). Below, I will outline the academic knowledge of common sense and its relationship
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to human interaction, understanding and social realities. The analysis presented by Geertz 
(1975) will be used as a means of characterizing ‘common sense’ as opposed to other forms 
of knowledge. Finally, three general functions of common sense will be examined. The 
theoretical arguments made in this section will be used as a structural basis for the 
remaining discussions in this chapter.
Knowledge of Common Sense
In general, common sense is defined as a body of knowledge that is transmitted to all within 
a group where that knowledge relates to practical action, human nature and experience 
(Lindenberg, 1987; Luckmann, 1987). To use common sense is to use a quality of judgment 
based in simple or self-evident truths (Joseph, 1994; van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). To not 
use common sense does not mean that the person is stupid or intellectually retarded; rather 
it means that they are not able deal well with everyday practical problems (Geertz, 1992 
[1975]).
Common sense is a basic belief within a society. It forms fundamental presuppositions of 
knowledge (van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). However, where some forms of knowledge tend 
towards abstraction, common sense is a general body of knowledge that focuses on 
practical life, the ordinary reality, and the way to deal with life pragmatically (Luckmann, 
1987). It is sourced directly from experience rather than a reflection or contemplation on 
that experience (Geertz, 1992 [1975]).
Consequently, common sense is based in the familiar reality where every person has the 
same ability to use that knowledge (Geertz, 1992 [1975]). It is common precisely because
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the knowledge is shared between others who participate in the normal routines of day-to- 
day life (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This egalitarian or objective basis allows it to be used 
by and applied to all humans of sound mind. The very existence of common sense relies on 
the uniformity of human nature and experiences (Lindenberg, 1987). Common sense helps 
people to understand the reality of everyday life by providing a practical guide for action 
(Black, 1979).
Common sense has an advantage over other forms of knowledge in that it is held to be 
inherently ‘legitimate’, ‘real’, ‘proper’, ‘taken-for-granted’ and generally ‘good sense’ 
(Brewer, 1984). Common sense gains much of its authority from its basis in everyday 
experience -  of presenting life as it is, neat and in total. In effect, the world and its events 
makes common sense ‘right’ (Geertz, 1992 [1975]).
The Characteristics of Common Sense
Intuitively, common sense is characterized mainly through its practicality (Beyea & Nicoll, 
1999). However given the fragmented theoretical history of common sense as a concept 
(Brewer, 1984), it is difficult to determine what specifically makes a piece of knowledge 
common sense. The most in-depth analysis of common sense was given in 1975 by Clifford 
Geertz. A brief explanation of the six characteristics identified will be given in this section.
Geertz begins with “naturalness” or the atmosphere of ‘of course’-ness that surrounds 
common sense. It is the representation of certain matters in their simplest form with the 
statement appearing intrinsic to the reality. The second characteristic is “practicalness”. As 
necessitated by the definition given above, common sense applies to actions that can be
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taken by people in real world situations. Accusing someone of lacking common sense is 
synonymous with accusing them of being impractical.
The third characteristic identified by Geertz was that of “thinness”. This can also be termed 
“simpleness” or “literalness”. This characteristic relates to the tendency of common sense 
towards brevity and depicting issues solely as they are with nothing more or less. Geertz 
admits that this characteristic is difficult to define in more explicit terms than simply 
appealing to the reader’s own experience of common sense.
The name of the fourth characteristic is also tenuous -  “immethodicalness”. Where ‘facts’ 
drawn from science are required to be based in strict accepted methodology, common sense 
delights in inconsistency. In the body/ies of knowledge that form common sense, there are 
many statements of fact that contradict each other. In effect common sense is (at least) 
dilemmatic. There is always an opposing argument to that given and both are seen as 
common sense (Billig, 1991). This may be reflective of the general inconsistency and 
contradictions through which people experience social reality (Leurdijk, 1997). 
Alternatively, Gramsci argues that common sense is inherently eclectic and disjointed with 
its stock of knowledge being drawn from many ideologies across time. This allows 
contradictions to exist in common sense knowledge without tension (Hall et al., 1977).
Perhaps the love of inconsistency also stems from the fifth characteristic of common sense. 
It is ad hoc -  drawn from jokes, stories, gossip and rumour. There are no formal theories or 
evaluations conducted to construct statements of common sense. It is drawn upon and 
transmitted as required by the practical situation faced.
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The final characteristic of common sense is “accessibleness”. This has been implied 
through the previous discussions. By definition, common sense needs to be accessible to all 
of sound mind. Geertz goes so far as to say that statements of common sense will not only 
be understood by that person but that that person will then embrace the argument in their 
own situation (Geertz, 1992 [1975]). These six characteristics of common sense will be 
used below to demonstrate the nature of statements made about fear-of-crime in Australian 
parliaments.
The Functions of Common Sense
Lindenberg (1987) argues that there are three functions through which common sense 
becomes an important element of civilization. First, common sense functions as a baseline 
for human interaction. When interacting with other people, we presuppose that they share a 
“network of interconnected beliefs about the world and our own relation to it” (Beyea & 
Nicoll, 1999: 3). These beliefs guide our actions, provide support for our assertions and 
explain our behavior. Therefore, common sense is generally considered to function as a 
guide for action (Black, 1979; Luckmann, 1987).
Second, common sense provides a reference or benchmark against which other knowledge 
can be judged. Findings from academic research as well as from friends’ stories and 
anecdotes are checked by the audience against their own common sense. Does it ‘sound’ 
right? In effect, people use the body of knowledge generated by common sense to judge if 
new information is plausible based on a society’s collective experience.
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Finally, rhetorical appeals can be made to common sense (Lindenberg, 1987). Such appeals 
are like an act of faith. Commonsense relies on assumed similarities and reasonableness 
between human beings (van Holthoon & Olson, 1987). In arguments, common sense can be 
appealed to as a means of closing the argument. If a person has accepted a piece of 
common sense knowledge which forms the premise for the argument, they are forced to 
accept the conclusion. The argument is (hopefully) closed without further debate (Aden, 
1994; Billig, 1996). The implications of this ability of common sense to restrict debate will 
be discussed further below.
To summarize this section about the theory of common sense, I have shown that it is 
generally understood as a body of practical knowledge transmitted within a group. This 
knowledge provides a guide for human action and helps people to understand the reality of 
everyday life. I then outlined Geertz’s six characteristics of common sense knowledge that 
distinguish it from other forms of knowledge. Finally, I presented three general functions 
that common sense plays in social interaction. The theoretical arguments examined in this 
section will be used as a structural basis for arguing that fearing crime is perceived as 
common sense by Australian politicians.
F e ar  C r i m e ! I t is c o m m o n  s e n s e .
In the criminological literature, a number of authors have made statements on what is 
common sense when it comes to crime. Tilley and Laycock (2000) list some common sense 
statements about crime that they believe are held by people in the United States. For 
example, they state that it is common sense that: (1) offenders are uncommon and 
substantially different from the rest of us; (2) if a particular crime is prevented in one place
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it will pop up elsewhere, or in some other form; (3) an increase in numbers of police 
officers will produce a commensurate reduction in crime levels; (4) the more severe the 
punishment the lower the crime levels; (5) there was less crime in the 'good old days'; and 
so on (Tilley & Laycock, 2000).
Similarly in 1998, Hogg and Brown listed a number of common sense statements about 
people’s preconceptions of crime in Australia. These were arguing that it is common sense 
that: (1) crime rates are soaring, (2) the level of crime is worse than ever, (3) New York and 
Los Angeles are our future, (4) the criminal justice system is soft on crime (5) there is a 
need for increased police numbers with more power, (6) we need tougher penalties; and (7) 
victims should be able to get revenge through the courts (Hogg & Brown, 1998).
Based on the analysis of parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime in Australia, I can reiterate 
some of those listed above and add some further statements. For example, parliamentarians 
used the statements that it is common sense that: (1) women should (not have to) fear being 
raped; (2) elderly people and women are vulnerable to criminal victimization; (3) victims 
are afraid of re-victimization by the same offender; (4) victims’ fear of offenders increases 
positively with the perception that that offender is armed; (5) mothers fear that their 
children will use drugs and believe that they should chaperone their children for protection 
against crime; (6) people should fear crime on public transport; and the list could continue. 
These statements are examples of appeals made to common sense as perceived by 
Australian parliamentarians when talking about fear-of-crime.
For the purposes of the remainder of this chapter, I wish to focus on three main common 
sense statements (CSS) referring to crime and criminal behavior. These are:
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CSS (Streets): It is common sense that the streets are dangerous because of crime1;
CSS (Public): It is common sense that the public is afraid of crime; and
CSS (Crime): It is common sense that fear-of-crime increases with the crime rate.
In the following section, I will demonstrate the commonsensical nature of these statements
by discussing the six characteristics of common sense described by Geertz (1975). A 
number of characteristics are evident in identical fashion through all three CSSs. To avoid 
repetition, the six characteristics will only be discussed individually in regard to CSS 
(streets) with only isolated characteristics being examined for CSS (public) and CSS 
(crime).
CSS (STREETS)
(a) Law-abiding citizens are afraid to walk the streets in many areas 
(Lynn, 1996)
It is common sense that the streets are dangerous. A watcher of an evening news report 
stating that an elderly woman had been mugged in the park could say “Ah yes, the streets 
are dangerous.” Such a statement has an aura of naturalness to it. Of course! It is obvious. 
Whether it be from parental advice or stories from friends, CSS (streets) has accumulated 
that feeling of something that is expected -  it is ‘natural’.
Attached to that common sense knowledge is the practical advice to stay off the street.
1 For the convenience o f brevity and partially dictated by the context o f the data from which this statement is 
drawn, I will refer to the danger in CSS (streets) as coming from crime. In doing so, I am not excluding or 
denying that the street may be dangerous for many other reasons.
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(b) Others have suggested that the next step will be a curfew. An artificial 
curfew exists now, because people are too scared to walk on the streets after 
dark, and even in daylight hours in many cases. (Schipp, 1994)
The general implication of this quote is the practical advice of “stay off the streets”. The 
speaker is arguing that if you are afraid of crime, avoid the criminal threat that is (of 
course) found on the street and stay indoors.
Such advice is widely adopted because of the “thinness” character of the common sense 
statement. It can be understood in a literal form that is pithy and direct. Politicians could 
advise the public to take action to reduce their fear-of-crime. However, this statement lacks 
both the practical nature just described. It is consequently difficult to take literally and as a 
guide for action. Instead, the appeals to common sense are simple to understand -  do not 
walk on the street, especially not alone at night.
However, typical to common sense, there is also the opposing view that that the streets are 
not dangerous. Rather it is indoors that the danger lies. This is what Geertz termed 
“immethodicalness” or the adoption of both sides of a contradiction. The other side of a 
perception of dangerous streets has been given prominence through awareness campaigns 
on domestic violence, elderly abuse and more recently sexual violence. I would still argue 
that the notion that the streets are safer than indoors has not managed to overcome the 
image of the home as a place of safety or become an equal to the common sense statement 
that the streets are dangerous.
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Geertz also argued that common sense was ad hoc. Statements or pieces of knowledge are 
developed and disseminated as needed by circumstance and experience. The belief that the 
streets are dangerous is passed from mother or father to their children when they warn them 
to be careful walking home after school; or by work colleagues who offer to walk each 
other to their cars if leaving work at night; or by safety awareness campaigns and so forth. 
The message that the streets are dangerous gets passed on and reinforced by such behavior.
(c) We know of the aura of violence that surrounds some streets and parts of 
cities and makes them unsafe, in the view of many citizens, for them to enjoy 
recreation and even just go to work or go about their normal business without 
fear or anxiety. (Tate, 1988)
Everyone can understand the statement that the street is dangerous. As the speaker in (c) 
said, “we know...”. Everyone walks on the streets and common sense says that such public 
areas are dangerous for reasons such as strangers, the unknown, and the uncontrollable. 
That the streets are dangerous becomes a piece of knowledge that is accessible to all.
Therefore, I would argue that the statement within political discourses on fear-of-crime that 
the streets are dangerous because o f crime has become common sense. The statement 
appears obvious, contains practical advice, is simple and direct, disseminated by need and 
is accessible to all. The six characteristics identified by Geertz as indicating common sense 
are fulfilled. It is common sense that the streets are dangerous because of crime.
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CSS (PUBLIC)
(d) No doubt people are very much afraid. (Kirkby, 1994)
(e) The truth is that Queenslanders are scared. (Borbidge, 1995)
Based on the political rhetoric analyzed, it could be stated that of course people are afraid 
of crime! There is no doubt that this is the case and no question that it should be that way. 
CSS (public) implies that people will change their behavior because of their fear-of-crime. 
One possible behavioral change is avoidance such as staying off the streets as described by 
CSS (streets). Again the advice is widespread and practical because it is simple, direct and 
pithy. This allows it to be adopted when needed and disseminated across many groups. The 
very statement itself seeks to encourage all to understand that they are afraid of crime. 
Consequently, it is a statement that is accessible to all and political rhetoric argues that it is 
increasingly being embraced by members of the population. It is common sense that the 
public is afraid of crime.
CSS (CRIME)
(f) Fear has escalated through the community as more and more people become 
aware of an increase in crime in this State. (Gallacher, 2000)
(g) Statistics supplied by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics show 
that last year in this State one person was murdered every three days; 12,000 
people were robbed; 150,000 people were either assaulted or threatened with 
assault; 131,000 homes were broken into and 46,000 vehicles were stolen. This,
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plus the daily saturation in the news of stories about crime, makes it not 
difficult to understand why the fear of crime is so pervasive in our society. 
(Mark, 1998)
An allegedly very simple link between crime and fear-of-crime is posited by CSS (crime). 
If the rate of crime increases, the level of fear-of-crime will also increase. Ultimately, fear- 
of-crime is generated by crime. As the speaker in (g) states, this is not difficult to 
understand. Therefore, if you want to lower the level of fear-of-crime, lower the crime rate. 
Simple, direct and short. Something that everyone should be able to understand because it 
is common sense (Taylor & Jamieson, 1998).
In summary, I have sought to show that the three statements that are appealed to as 
common sense in political discourses about fear-of-crime are indeed common sense. I have 
done this by showing that each fulfills the six characteristics identified by Geertz (1975). 
Therefore, it is spoken of by Australian parliamentarians as if it were common sense that: 
the streets are dangerous because of crime; the public is afraid of crime; and that increases 
in fear-of-crime are caused by the similar increases in the rate of crime.
Common Sense: Fact or Fiction?
It is worthwhile at this point to briefly compare these three common sense statements with 
statistical reports and research conclusions. The first CSS was that the streets are dangerous 
because of crime. The resultant implication is that people are afraid of the (criminal) threats 
that exist on the street. There is support for those implications: with fear being linked with 
the ‘unpredictable stranger’ that creates a reputation of a particular place as being risky
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(Lupton, 1999); or similarly that cultural diversity and neighborhood heterogeneity and the 
associated racial and cultural misunderstandings serve as key factors in predicting fear-of- 
crime (Lane & Meeker, 2000); or that the community’s level of control over the streets will 
influence their level of fear-of-crime (see for various theories: Gibson et al., 2002; Sampson 
& Groves, 1989; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Ward, 1986). Though less influential than 
personal characteristics, research evidence does support the conclusion that the 
characteristics of the environment have the potential to increase a person’s fear-of-crime.
This leads to questioning the actual statement itself: the streets are dangerous because of 
crime. It is important to remember here that this statement is drawn partly from the context 
in which parliamentarians described people as being afraid of crime. As a result, it is more 
appropriate to question CSS (streets) by asking what location has the highest incidence of 
crime than whether it is crime that makes the streets dangerous. In order to answer this 
initial question, the following table gives the proportion of crime by their (selected) 
location as reported most recently by the ABS (ABS, 2002, 2004).
Table 8.1: Proportion of Offenses by Location
% M u r d e r A s s a u lt S e x u a l  A s s a u lt R o b b ery
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3
Dwelling 58.5 54.6 36.7 38.4 62.2 64.7 6.1 6.4
Total Residential 65 58.3 40.7 42.1 64.4 66.6 6.7 7
Street/Footpath 13.1 17.2 22.8 21.7 8.2 6.7 38.2 41.7
Total Community 22.2 29.5 36.8 35.9 20.9 19.9 55.2 58.6
Retail 3.9 - 8.9 9.3 2.9 2.9 25.8 23.4
Total Other 10.5 9.3 19.8 20.3 9.8 9.7 35.2 32.4
Unspecified 2.3 - 2.7 1.8 4.8 3.9 2.8 2.0
Total Offences 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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It is evident from this table that in all crimes except robbery, a residential building or land 
is the location of the largest percentage of each crime. For example, women’s fear-of-crime 
is often said to be largely a fear-of-rape (e.g., Carmody, 1984; Lupton, 1999; Pain, 1991; 
Warr, 1984) and that sexual assault is a ‘shadow’ that falls over all other crimes for the 
female victim (Ferraro, 1995). With the majority of sexual assaults occurring in the 
residential dwelling (62.2%), this would suggest that the appeal to CSS (streets) is 
erroneous. The streets are not the place where a woman should be most fearful of being 
raped. However, this is not the case for robbery which does often occur in the community 
(55.2%) or more specifically on the street or footpath (38.2%). Such statistics do support 
the statement that the streets are dangerous because of crime. However, this dependency on 
the type of crime in determining the correctness of the CSS means that the research 
evidence and statistics can only partly support a parliamentarian’s appeal that the streets are 
dangerous because of crime.
The second appeal to common sense stated that the public is afraid of crime. CSS (public) 
can be checked against ‘fact’ in two ways. First, is it true that the majority of people are 
afraid of crime? In 2000, the National Campaign against Violence and Crime (NCAVAC) 
reported that 41% of Australians were afraid of crime. While national research on 
Australian’s fear-of-crime is scarce (see Chapter Three), this figure is supported by 
Australian state-based research and those conducted overseas that reported an average of 
35% of the population being afraid of crime (a range of 17%-50% -  see Bonta, 2001; 
Carcach et al., 1995; Hartnagel, 1979; Semmens et al., 2002; Warr, 2000). Despite being a 
substantial proportion, 41% does not provide a factual basis on which to base the blanket 
statement that the public is afraid of crime: a statement that is used to imply that all 
members of the public are afraid.
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CSS (public) can also be checked against research studying the emotional response to 
crime. As discussed in Chapter Three, there are a number of problems with scholarly 
understandings of fear-of-crime, the most crucial of which are the lack of a universal 
definition and the wide variety of instruments used to measure the phenomenon. This has 
meant that fear-of-crime is often used as shorthand for the wide range of emotions that may 
be generated by the general category of crime (Hough, 1995). Moreover, recent studies 
have shown that anger, and not fear, is the most common emotional response to crime 
(Clark, 2003, 2004; Ditton et al., 1999). This again challenges the validity of the statement 
that the public is afraid of crime because while a small number may be fearful it is likely 
that a larger number will be anxious, worried, irritated or angry. As a result, CSS (public) 
or claims that the public is afraid of crime is not supported by research evidence.
The third CSS argues that increases in fear-of-crime are caused by increases in rates of 
crime. This statement is not directly supported by research evidence. In fact, fear and crime 
are only loosely related with high crime areas not necessarily equaling high fear areas 
(Lupton, 2000). Location and socio-demographic variables are better predictors of fear than 
official statistics of crime rates (Garofalo & Laub, 1978). However, there is some support 
for disorder increasing a person’s fear-of-crime (whether that be physical disorder of poorly 
maintained buildings and yards or social disorder such as youths hanging around an area or 
drunken adults staggering home) (Alvi et al., 2001; Kelley & Evans, 1992; Perkins & 
Taylor, 1996; R. B. Taylor & Hale, 1986).
There are three problems or qualifications to the finding that disorder may increase a 
person’s fear-of-crime: (a) that disorder has only been determined to influence an 
individual’s fear-of-crime rather than a neighborhoods’ level of fear because (b) disorder
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only affects fear-of-crime when that individual is sensitive to the cues of disorder held in 
the environment; and finally (c) it is not yet clear what role perception of crime risk may 
play in the relationship between disorder and fear-of-crime (LaGrange et al., 1992). These 
problems mean that disorder may only increase a person’s fear-of-crime in a limited 
number of cases.
The third problem is also the reason why (at least) a loose connection between fear and 
crime is still acknowledged amongst researchers despite only a weak causal relationship 
being identified between the two variables. Perception of the crime rate as being either high 
or low (and the subsequent perceived risk of criminal victimization) does influence a person 
or community’s fear-of-crime. This conclusion has come from attempts to explain the 
different levels of fear in urban and rural areas. Urban areas tend to be stereotyped as being 
filled with fearful people hiding from vicious criminals while rural residents are seen as a 
close community dealing only with mild deviance.
The most basic explanation for the different levels of fear is that cities are perceived as high 
crime areas with an associated high risk of victimization (both of which cause residents’ 
fear-of-crime to be higher) (Chilvers, 1999). City dwellers perceive a higher rate of crime 
and believe that that rate is increasing. Researchers argue that it is these perceptions that 
cause them to fear for their safety (Conklin, 1971), with the absence of such perceptions 
explaining the lower levels of fear in rural areas. Such an explanation strongly links fear-of- 
crime with crime through a resident’s perception of the crime rate: people who live in a 
high crime area and perceive the rate to be high will have their level of fear influenced 
more by the crimes they are aware of than those who live in a low crime rate area (Carcach 
et al., 1995; Conklin, 1971; Maxfield, 1984). Therefore, the CSS (crime) (fear-of-crime
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increases with the crime rate) is not directly supported by the research evidence because the 
important qualifying detail of a resident’s perception of crime is generally omitted.
In this section, I have sought to verify the accuracy of the three common sense statements 
that are appealed to by parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. It has been shown 
that there is only partial support from research evidence and statistics for CSS (streets) and 
CSS (crime) and no support for CSS (public). In other words, the streets are sometimes 
dangerous because of crime and the level of fear-of-crime does sometimes increase because 
the (perception of the) rate of crime but that the majority of the public are not afraid of 
crime.
Overall then, it can be argued that politicians speak of fear-of-crime as if the concept itself 
is common sense. Given that only 6% of the documents collected contain a discussion of 
fear-of-crime, there appear to be few who feel that such a concept needs argumentative 
justification. Fear-of-crime is frequently mentioned yet rarely discussed because it is 
common sense. However, these common sense statements themselves are not consistently 
supported by the facts provided by research evidence and statistics. This raises the question 
of why such inaccuracies have been sustained and become widely used in the parliamentary 
debates studied. As a means of answering this, the following section will examine the uses 
that these particular common sense statements about fear-of-crime may serve in Australian 
politics.
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W hat use is common sense about fear-of-crime?
In the section above that asked what is common sense?, I outlined three functions that 
common sense fulfilled as given by Lindenberg (1987). These were: a baseline for human 
interaction, a reference for judging knowledge, and as evidence against which to appeal 
during an argument. In what follows, I wish to again examine these functions but this time 
in the context of the three common sense statements made by Australian parliamentarians 
when discussing fear-of-crime. These are intended as mere suggestions about the possible 
outcomes of such functions, with the underlying usefulness for gaining power to be 
discussed in the following section.
First, it was said that pieces of common sense knowledge function as a baseline for human 
interaction. If the three common sense statements (streets, public and crime) function in this 
way, what are the possible resultants of human interaction? It is possible to say that people 
would abandon using the streets without accompaniment or use them only when driven by 
necessity. Their fear of potential victimization would promote such avoidance behavior. 
Fear-of-crime itself would be increased at any upward movement of the crime rate. In this 
way, the three CSSs may act as a guide for individual and group behavior.
In addition, common sense also forms a benchmark against which to judge other forms of 
knowledge. This has already been noted with regard to CSS (streets) where contradictory 
ideas struggled to be heard. Thus any attempt to argue that the streets are safe, that the 
public should not be afraid of crime and that fear-of-crime is not positively correlated to 
crime rates will remain overshadowed and possibly never reach the status of common
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sense. This is because such statements are compared by the public against their common 
sense and it ‘just doesn’t sound right’.
Finally, common sense can provide evidence to be used in support of a particular argument. 
This is probably the most common function of the three common sense statements 
discussed by parliamentarians in relation to fear-of-crime. For example, arguments were 
found for: providing extra lighting on the street; giving funds to elderly people to improve 
the security of their homes; more resources (staff and funds) to police and greater legal 
powers; setting up national and state bound government projects; tougher penalties for 
offenders including reintroduction of the death penalty; and so on. All of these arguments 
were based on evidence provided by the three common sense statements discussed in this 
chapter about fear-of-crime.
T he P o w e r  of  C o m m o n  S e n s e
Underlying these three functions is the authority of common sense and its ability to 
generate power through control of those set lines of knowledge. In this final section, I wish 
to emphasize the political power or utility that is contained in common sense and the 
consequent dangers that may arise in the political manipulation of that knowledge. To do 
this, I will first explain the utility of common sense in argumentation and general rhetoric. I 
will then show that the power of common sense lies in it being a naturalized discourse. This 
allows common sense to hide alternative arguments, situations, social relations and so on 
that differ from the dominant depiction of reality. Such ability contains both the political 
power and danger of common sense. If, as some would argue, common sense is generated
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by the elite but adopted by all (Hayden, 1991), the political manipulation of it is a powerful 
weapon.
Before beginning this argument it is important to note that not every piece of knowledge, 
colloquialism, story or anecdote becomes common sense. There are a couple of necessary 
prior steps. First, language needs commonality to function. Without common mental 
systems and shared linguistic mechanisms, language would not fulfill its role in human 
interaction (Turner, 1987). Without some assumed uniformity of human nature and 
experience, language could not find the commonality through which to function. This is the 
same commonality that is required for the existence of common sense knowledge and 
understanding.
Second, language allows issues to be discussed in certain ways. Common sense arises when 
that method of discussion become ‘natural’. Naturalization occurs when words, phrases, 
knowledge, beliefs, social practices and so on lose their connection with a particular 
ideology (Fairclough, 1989). They become embedded in practical knowledge about action 
rather than prescriptive belief (Joseph, 1994) and consequently become regarded as the 
knowledge that we call ‘common sense’. In effect, common sense could be described as a 
naturalized discourse. It is from this naturalization that common sense gains the ‘of course’- 
ness and other characteristics described by Geertz (1975).
Silence! Argumentation and Common Sense
The naturalness of common sense provides the source of its utility in argumentation. 
Common sense is useful in arguments because it is able to stand in the place of actual
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substantive evidence. As described above, common sense gains authority because of the 
perception that it is ‘legitimate’, ‘real’, and ‘proper’, (Brewer, 1984). It is based in the 
everyday events that all people have potentially experienced directly or indirectly. The 
world and its events become evidence for the ‘truth’, ‘rightness’ and authority of common 
sense (Geertz, 1992 [1975]). By appealing to common sense in an argument, the speaker is 
appealing to a “local cultural logic of the nature of things [that] seems likely to have 
inherent believability without need of substantiation” (Hayden, 1991: 105). The authority of 
common sense makes it a strong opponent to all other forms of reason, logic and research 
findings.
As a result, common sense can be used to not only provide evidence for a particular 
argument; but also restrict or silence counter arguments. Common sense may silence any 
temptation to even consider data that would contradict its maxims (Hayden, 1991). The 
ability of common sense to make something appear correct because that is just ‘the way 
things are,’ means that an alternative explanation has to argue against the weight of worldly 
experience - against the weight of the known reality. Understanding life in a different way 
would require a powerful imagination, a new ‘gut response’, new emotional reactions and 
ultimately a new psyche (Cintron, 2000). Resistance to such change thus stems from the 
assumption that everyone already knows how the world works. They know it because it is 
common sense!
Common Sense Images of Reality
So far, I have argued that common sense draws its power from its existence as a naturalized 
discourse that silences alternative ways of talk and thought. I now wish to argue that this
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power has deeper political significance (Hayden, 1991). For the purposes of this discussion 
I will use Smith’s (1997) definition of power as an all encompassing term that describes the 
ability of one individual to change the behavior or disposition of another (Smith, 1997).
The argument can be simply stated as those who control common sense are in a powerful 
position to control the dominant image of reality. Language is generally accepted as a 
means of creating a perception of what is real in the world of human interaction. For 
example, it can assign names to issues and thereby characterize or define them (Larson, 
1992). Language is a means of providing an interpretation of events; and control over that 
interpretation is a source of power by which individual’s behavior or disposition can be 
changed. When a way of talking about things becomes naturalized it becomes common 
sense -  the way it is. Therefore those who can cause their linguistic maxims to be perceived 
as common sense (i.e. a naturalized discourse) are in a powerful position to control the 
dominant image of reality.
Hayden (1991) argues that common sense is ultimately generated by political elites. This is 
despite it thriving among the ‘common’ people. Shared cultural themes are invoked in 
political argument. If accepted, those themes can become common sense. The details of 
common sense are dynamic and change through constant restatement. Political elites have 
the advantage over others in participating in this restatement because of their access to mass 
communication and their image as authority figures. Consequently argues Hayden, they are 
better positioned to structure the development of common sense toward their own particular 
agenda.
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Shared cultural themes may be used in many arguments for many ends but Hayden argues 
that once a course of action has been established (through its assimilation into the practical 
knowledge of common sense) it becomes perceived as the only course of action available. 
For example, the treatment of undocumented asylum seekers as criminals has been argued 
as common sense to many Australians (Pickering, 2001), as have the pejorative maxims and 
beliefs for the treatment of African Americans that fall under ‘common sense racism’ 
(Brewer, 1984). Therefore, political argument can selectively use certain cultural themes 
(and exclude others) with the aim of altering common sense and gaining control of its 
associated power to define reality (Hayden, 1991).
The Power of Common Sense about Fear-of-Crime
To conclude this chapter, I will return now to the three common sense statements that were 
identified as frequently used in Australian political arguments about fear-of-crime. These 
stated that it is common sense that: streets are dangerous because of crime, the public is 
afraid of crime and the level of fear-of-crime is positively correlated with the crime rate. I 
argue that these common sense statements are reiterated in political rhetoric on crime 
because of their ability to generate power in the hands of politicians.
As described above, Australian politicians have used an appeal to these common sense 
statements in order to argue for a number of different activities such as providing extra 
lighting on the street; giving funds to elderly people to improve the security of their homes; 
more resources to police and greater legal powers; tougher penalties for offenders; and so 
on. Appeals to common sense are generally made when there is an absence of conclusive 
evidence or when the speaker wants to tap into the passions of the audience (Hayden,
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1991). Both reasons ultimately seek to end debate on an issue by appealing to what is 
already accepted by the audience.
I argue that in the case of fear-of-crime, Australian parliamentarians have sought to use 
these common sense statements because of their associated power to control the dominant 
image of reality. The political noise devoted to exclaiming that the streets are dangerous 
and that the public is afraid of crime drowns out alternative discourses. Arguments are 
presented as immutable that there should be more police to reduce crime, or that penalties 
for criminal behavior should be increased and thereby reduce fear-of-crime. Other 
alternatives struggle to be heard in what has become known as the “law and order auction”.
Arguments such as these are presented as common sense with all its associated authority, 
legitimacy and power. The course of action proposed thus becomes the only course that any 
‘sensible’ person would take. Yet it is a common sense that is arguably at the mercy of 
political rhetoric and manipulation. The danger is that the rhetoric may become the reality -  
one where the streets are dangerous because of crime, the public is afraid of crime and do 
become more afraid if the crime rate increases.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
I began this chapter by questioning why fear-of-crime was a topic that was frequently 
mentioned by politicians but /^frequently discussed. The answer was captured in a 
comment by a committee witness -  of course we must fear crime. It was argued that fearing 
crime is perceived as common sense by politicians and therefore, its existence does not 
need argumentative justification. This argument was made by first defining common sense
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generally as a cultural body of knowledge and more specifically as knowledge that is 
characterized by naturalness, practicalness, thinness, contradictions, an ad hoc nature and 
being accessible to all. Common sense functions as a baseline for human interaction, a 
reference by which to judge knowledge and a source of evidence against which to appeal. I 
then demonstrated these characteristics and functions of common sense as found in the 
political debates about fear-of-crime.
In discussing appeals to common sense about fear-of-crime, I highlighted the power that is 
inherent in such appeals. This power stems from the perceived legitimacy and authority of 
common sense which then acts to silence alternative arguments. In effect, those who control 
the body of knowledge that is considered to be common sense, also control the dominant 
image of reality. As a consequence of their position, political elites have an opportunity to 
manipulate common sense to serve their own agenda. In the case of debates about fear-of- 
crime, it was argued that appeals to common sense have prevented consideration of 






This chapter is the first of two case studies that examine the data of political debates about 
fear-of-crime from the perspective of societal influences on the use of language. In doing 
so, these chapters seek to first determine one or more particular social relation(s) and 
investigate how the speakers use language in order to bring about those relations. In this 
chapter, attributions of responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime are analysed. Theoretical 
research and applicable empirical results suggest that politicians are attempting to shift the 
burden of responsibility for these issues onto the community. While the research presented 
in this chapter supports that suggestion for causal responsibility, it is argued that politicians 
are keen to maintain the perception that they are responsible for “treating” the problem. 
Attributions of responsibility provide an opportunity by which to examine how attempts to 
change social relations are made and embodied in language use.
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f or  C ri me  a n d  F e a r - o f - C ri me  
Over at least the last decade, it has been argued by scholars that responsibility for crime, 
crime prevention and community safety is increasingly shifting from the government to 
individual members of the community. Crime control is argued to have surpassed the sole 
ability of government-run law enforcement agencies and must be shared between these and 
the community (Garland, 2001). Responsibility for maintaining social order increasingly 
lies on citizens as well as government agencies of criminal justice.
Such a shift has been made by encouraging citizens to accept their role in preventing and 
coping with crime by: political rhetoric and public relations campaigns (Zedner, 1995); by 
supporting informal and voluntary efforts of crime prevention; and ultimately by 
encouraging individuals to accept personal responsibility for their own protection (Lacey &
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Zedner, 1995; Stanko, 1995). Such encouragement is often framed in terms of public 
empowerment (O'Malley, 1997) or active citizenship (Zedner, 1995). Collective action to 
help those in need is rejected in favour of individual responsibility for crime prevention 
(Laster & Erez, 2000).
Within this shift, fear-of-crime has been treated as a concept akin to crime -  something that 
needs to be reduced. This assumed similarity is reflected in the strategies proposed to solve 
the problem of fear-of-crime. These include: increased street lighting, precautionary or 
restricted citizen behaviour, more police or changed police practices and tougher penalties 
for offenders. Such focus on increasing levels of intensive and intrusive policing, the 
meting out heavier sentences and decreasing the level of discretion available to judges has 
been described as characteristic of modern law and order responses (Sarre, 2002). They are 
not responses specifically dedicated to reduce fear-of-crime. This lack of a dedicated 
response is potentially the result of the common sense view of fear-of-crime that it is, 
literally, a fear of crime (Taylor & Jamieson (1998) see also Chapters Six and Seven).
Consequently, it can be argued that individual members of the community are increasingly 
being asked to be responsible for their own fear-of-crime. Precautionary and restrictive 
behaviour is encouraged under the guise of awareness campaigns. Community initiatives 
such as Neighbourhood Watch schemes seek to reduce the public’s fear. Residents are 
instructed to improve the security of their home to make it a less attractive target for 
prospective criminals (Fleming, 2005). These actions and encouragements have been 
interpreted as indicating that the government is sharing (or shedding) its own responsibility
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for reducing crime and fear-of-crime. Individual members of the community must now be 
responsible for the protection of their own property and person.
The key concept throughout these debates has been the attribution of responsibility. Most of 
the studies investigating such attributions have focused on those that are made by citizens 
to each other or to public figures. For example, the public evaluation of political agents and 
their subsequent voting behaviour, particularly in the area of economic well-being, has been 
a favourite of political scientists (Abramowitz et al., 1988; Iyengar, 1989, 1996). In this 
chapter, I am primarily interested in the opposite perspective of attributions of 
responsibility -  those that are made by politicians.
To examine the attribution of responsibility from this perspective, I use the case study of 
Australian parliamentary debates mentioning fear-of-crime. For the purposes of this 
chapter, documents referring to terrorism were excluded in an attempt to maintain the focus 
on a fear of domestic crimes. The resulting corpus of 621 documents spaned a period 21 
years from 1982 to the end of 2003. Each speech was analysed for the type of responsibility 
attributed, by whom and for what. Techniques of blame avoidance and control are also 
identified. From this analysis, I provide supportive evidence for the theories of Weaver 
(1986) and Iyengar (1989): politicians do try to avoid blame and do prefer to hold treatment 
responsibility over causal responsibility.
However I also show that in the majority of cases, it is the government that is held 
responsible for fear-of-crime. The community was held responsible in only 9% of the 
documents. This finding raises possible challenges to the argument that the government is
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attempting to shift responsibility from themselves to the public. It also questions the role of 
political rhetoric in establishing the location of responsibility -  do actions speak louder than 
words?
A t t r i b u t i o n s  of  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  -  T he T h e o r y  
In many academic discussions about responsibility for law and order, ‘responsibility’ is 
considered as one homogenous concept. This section and indeed the entire chapter, seeks to 
show that there are at least two types of responsibility that should be considered -  causal 
and treatment responsibility. Each type has different implications for blame and control and 
for the timing of the events themselves. I argue that sensitivity to these differences would 
enhance the academic discussions about the attempts to shift responsibility for crime 
control.
Individuals automatically attribute responsibility for events, situations and behaviours. 
Such attribution is a powerful influence on the individual’s attitudes and opinions (Iyengar, 
1996). Traditionally, responsibility is defined in terms of morality, accountability and 
causality in which people are liable for either praise or blame (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; 
Sagarin & Kelly, 1985; Shaver, 1985). This type of responsibility is known as causal 
responsibility. A person is held causally responsible for an event when they are perceived 
to be part of the reason for the event or problem occurring. This type of responsibility is 
retrospective: it is concerned with events that occurred in the past and cannot be attributed 
for events occurring in the future.
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Causal responsibility is matched with a second type called treatment responsibility
(Brickman et al., 1982; Iyengar, 1989, 1996). In treatment responsibility, the focus shifts 
from the cause of events to “who or what has the power either to alleviate or to forestall 
alleviation of the problem” (Iyengar, 1989: 879). In this case, a person is held responsible 
for finding the solution to a problem and not for causing the problem (Brickman et al., 
1982). The events for which someone can hold treatment responsibility can only occur in 
the future.
In addition to these distinctions of causal and treatment responsibility and the temporal 
positioning of the events, Brickman (1982) argues that when responsibility is assigned to a 
person so too is blame or control. “We assign blame to people when we hold them 
responsible for having created problems. We assign control to people when we hold them 
responsible for influencing or changing events” (Brickman et al., 1982: 369). Therefore, a 
person who holds causal responsibility will be blamed for unwanted or negative events and 
praised for positive events. Someone who holds treatment responsibility will be perceived 
to hold the power to control or influence the events: to mitigate the consequences and 
attempt to prevent its reoccurrence. This is why treatment responsibility can only be 
assigned for events occurring in the future. It is illogical to speak of having the power to 
control an event that has already happened.
As a result of the different connotations between these types of responsibility, politicians 
want to emphasise the appearance of treatment responsibility and avoid causal 
responsibility (Iyengar, 1989). By avoiding the latter, a politician is also avoiding blame. 
Weaver (1986) argues that politicians are primarily motivated by the desire to avoid blame.
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The desire to take credit for popular actions is secondary to avoiding blame for unpopular 
ones. He argues that this desire is primary because voters tend to remember or be more 
sensitive to actions that have been done to them rather than those that have been done for 
them (Weaver, 1986). Consequently, the politician will want to take responsibility for 
future events and show that they wield control.
In summary, I have described two types of responsibility. The first was causal 
responsibility where a person is perceived to hold responsibility for causing a past event to 
occur and incurs blame or praise depending on the social valence of the event. The second 
was treatment responsibility where a person holds responsibility for controlling the 
resources that may change future events. This person is given the image of control. The 
different connotations of these types of responsibility impact on the behaviour of 
politicians. They want to emphasise their ability to control events (i.e. treatment 
responsibility). At the same time, politicians want to avoid being blamed for events that 
have already happened (i.e. causal responsibility). In what follows, I wish to show that 
sensitivity to these different types enhances the academic analysis of the location of 
responsibility for crime control and prevention.
A t t r i b u t i o n  of  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  -  T he P r a c t i c e
Each of the documents was analysed for four pieces of data: the existence of an attribution 
of responsibility; the identity of the person who was seen as responsible; the type of 
responsibility (treatment or causal); and the technique used in response to that attribution. It 
was found that the majority of documents (85%) attributed responsibility for something to 
someone. Despite the talk of rights and responsibilities being a general indicator of locating
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a party on the right or left of the political spectrum (Saul, 1995), there was no difference 
found when dividing the attributions by the politician’s associated political party or by the 
holding of office (i.e. the politician being in the role of government or opposition). The 
results of these four pieces of data will be examined in the following before investigating 
the implication for the location of responsibility for fear-of-crime and crime control.
Treatment Responsibility -  solutions and control
The most common form of responsibility attributed was treatment responsibility (74%). 
This is where a person is seen as holding the responsibility for solving a problem rather 
than for specifically having caused it or both. It is about events that may occur in the future 
and not about events that have already happened. For example:
(a) Juvenile crime does occur. Crimes are committed by young people, and it is 
the responsibility of the Government generally to do something about it. 
Government, of whatever persuasion, must provide the programs which will 
work towards preventing crime and breaking the cycle of repeat offenders. 
(Woodgate, 1996:44-45)
In this passage, Woodgate is attributing responsibility to the government to prevent juvenile 
crime. The government is not blamed for causing the events but is seen as being capable of 
preventing and controlling future events. As described earlier, this is characteristic of 
treatment responsibility.
In the majority of cases (63%), it was the government that was held responsible for the 
problems relating to fear-of-crime:
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(b) People living in fear and uncertainty in their homes do not care where the 
solution comes from -  local, state or federal government -  they just want a 
solution. All levels of government have a responsibility for community 
security. (Latham, 2002)
Mark Latham, then a federal MP in opposition, is attributing responsibility for community 
security to the government; he is arguing that all levels of government have the ability, 
resources and obligation to act to reduce the public’s fear-of-crime. Again, the government 
is not being blamed for generating that fear in the first place but is being held responsible 
for providing the solution to the problem.
Of the 63% where the government was held responsible, 55% of those attributions were 
made by the government themselves:
(c) However, that concern spreads in a broader way today because of 
organisation crime and because of the growth and expansion of illegal drugs. 
There is a fear there and there is no capacity within the States to address this 
problem. So it comes back to a national responsibility, a responsibility that is 
clearly being taken up by this Government, the Hawke Government. (Wright, 
1988)
In this passage, the author is eager to attribute treatment responsibility for addressing the 
fear created by drug-related crimes to their own political party. Such behaviour indicates 
that governments do not mind holding this type of responsibility.
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The authors of the remainder of the documents attributed responsibility for reducing fear- 
of-crime to variety of agencies. The police were cited in 15% of the documents. The 
community was only held responsible in 9%. The implication of this finding will be 
discussed in depth in the following section.
In these documents, treatment responsibility was mostly directed at solving the problem of 
fear-of-crime (59%). It is likely that this result is falsely generated by the methodology 
employed to select the original corpus of documents. Only debates that mentioned fear-of- 
crime were included. Hence it is not surprising that most of the responsibility identified was 
for fear-of-crime. It is still important to note the other topics that were mentioned as a 
government responsibility to solve despite their lower frequencies. For example: crime 
prevention (21%), crime rates (11%), crime in general (4%) and community safety (5%). 
These topics all intersected with fear-of-crime in some way and shared with it the 
attribution of treatment responsibility.
The most common technique proposed to control these problems was the use of or the 
creation of legislation (24%):
(d) Elderly Australians are the pioneers of this country; they developed it, 
protected it, and gave us the wealth, peace and prosperity that we enjoy today. 
Every night in their homes they are forced to live in fear ... We have a 
responsibility to ensure that elderly people who live in fear are given every 
protection the law has to offer. (Lynn, 1998)
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In this passage, Lynn argues that the government is upholding their responsibility to reduce 
fear-of-crime by increasing the penalties for home invasion involving elderly victims, by 
using legislation. Other techniques included increasing penalties (16%), government 
programs (10%), using the police (resources, powers or practices - 8%) and public relations 
campaigns (4%). There were a number of other solutions that were proposed only 
infrequently such as government conferences, rehabilitation of offenders, changing public 
services, restricting citizen behaviour and encouraging community initiatives.
When these results were combined with the listing of topics of responsibility, it was found 
that different techniques were proposed for different topics. In general discussions about 
crime, no solution tended to be given (64%). The focus instead was on the need for an 
(undefined) action:
(e) Mr Deputy Speaker, the community’s fear of becoming a victim to crime is 
no longer based on perceptions. It is firmly rooted in reality and the people are 
demanding action. They are rightly asking, ‘Will I be next?’ The government 
must act as a matter of urgency and not just knee-jerk ‘hang ‘em high’ reactive 
policies. The causes of crime must also be addressed as well, and urgently. 
(Gard, 1997)
This passage emphasises the need for action to address crime, to reduce the public’s fear- 
of-crime. The focus of the speech is on the responsibility to respond to that need rather than 
on the techniques to be implemented to fix any identifiable problems.
217
Chapter Nine Responsibility
However, for other topics, there were typical techniques that were frequently suggested. In 
crime prevention, legislation (31%) and community initiatives (12%) were most often 
proposed as a means of upholding this responsibility. Crime rates were to be solved by 
increasing penalties (30%) or using the police (practices, resources, or powers -  28%). In 
discussions about safety, politicians tended not to give a strategy for this responsibility and 
talked in general terms of action (44%) or alternatively, the proposed strategy employed 
legislation (28%). Fear-of-crime was to be reduced by legislation (24%), increased 
penalties (20%), or the police (26%). The differences in the strategies highlighted the 
variation in political perceptions of the problems and the feasibility of strategies to address 
them.
In sum, it was found that treatment responsibility was most often attributed in the 
documents examined. Politicians saw each other as responsible for solving problems 
relating to fear-of-crime such as crime, crime prevention, community safety and for 
reducing the level of fear itself. The government was mostly held responsible for solving 
these problems, followed by the police. Politicians used legislation and arguments for 
increased penalties as a means of addressing these problems. The lack of a dramatic 
difference demonstrates the dominance of the typical law and order response discussed in 
the introduction to this chapter (Sarre, 2002).
These results support previous research in two ways. First, they show that in response to 
fear-of-crime, politicians tend to rely on typical punitive responses to law and order issues 
such as creating new legislation, increased penalties or using the police. The results also
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show that politicians do not attempt to reject treatment responsibility and are in fact the 
sources of the majority of documents attributing responsibility to them.
Causal Responsibility -  situation and blame
Causal responsibility was attributed in far fewer documents (26%). As with treatment 
responsibility, the vast majority of attributions were found for causing fear-of-crime (95%). 
The other topics of crime prevention, crime and community safety were also similar to 
those mentioned above in regard to treatment responsibility.
Politicians were named most frequently as being responsible for causing fear-of-crime 
(51%). This group can be divided into the government (28% - example f), the opposition 
(9% - example g) or politicians in general (usually described as “we” -  14% - example h).
(f) At the outset, I make the point that these statistics leave egg on the faces of a 
number of members opposite who have been attempting to whip up a frenzy of 
fear in the community about crime. ... Let us have a quick look at some of 
those results. On the Sunshine Coast, where the local coalition members have 
been trying to create fear among their constituents, the rate of reported crime 
has fallen by a very significant 6.7%, including a very impressive 7.3% drop in 
property crime. (Barton, 2000: 4283)
(g) In fact, there is no doubt that the scare tactics employed by members 
opposite, when in Opposition, worked to the extent that many people, 
particularly older people, became fearful and isolated in their own homes. If the
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then Opposition was to be believed, the situation in Queensland was alarming, 
with crime rates escalating and spiralling out of control. (Bird, 1996: 1931)
(h) Although it appears that we are not learning from what is happening across 
the nation, as I said, the debates that we are having seem to be about fostering 
fear and promoting fear instead of working to alleviate that fear and actually 
reduce crime (Dundas, 2003: 4837)
The prevalence of the attribution of causal responsibility to politicians with its connotations 
of blame, indicates that such an attribution may be used as an accusation that the public’s 
fear-of-crime is used for political advantage (discussed in detail in Chapter 9).
After politicians, the media were named in 23% of the documents. Criminals were only 
identified as causing fear-of-crime in 19% of the dataset. This is despite the dominance of 
the commonsense view of fear-of-crime that it is an emotional response to criminal 
behaviours. The remaining documents identified poverty, academia, the criminal justice 
system and the community as bearing some blame for causing fear-of-crime (all below 4% 
each).
Most of the documents attributing causal responsibility assigned blame on another person 
with no indication of the technique used by the other person to avoid that blame (84%). It is 
not possible to identify the other person’s response to the accusation because of the analysis 
of the documents as individuals rather than as entire discourses on a particular issue. In 
addition, parliamentary protocols may not provide opportunities for rebuttals of the
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accusations. The techniques of blame avoidance in debates about fear-of-crime would 
consequently benefit from further research.
As an indication only, there were some blame avoidance techniques that were evident. For 
example: circling the wagons (i.e. spreading the blame over as many politicians as possible 
(10% - example i)); diffusing the issue (2% - example j); and agenda limiting, denial of a 
problem, passing the buck and finding a scapegoat (1% each).
(i) I have sought to urge everybody who talks about this sort of issue, and crime 
in general, to act with a sense of responsibility to the way in which they 
promote a particular issue or set of circumstances, so that we do not 
unnecessarily beat up crime to the extent where ordinary citizens, who are only 
exposed to the facts or what they believe to be the facts through the media, 
suffer heightened fear as a result of that hype. (Griffin, 1999c)
(j) There can be little doubt that there are many older citizens, particularly 
women, who are genuinely afraid that they may become victims of ‘home 
invasion’ even though, in reality, that is unlikely to occur. Now is not the time 
and place to debate the very real problem of fear of crime. ... The core of the 
problem is that there is no one, or any, simple solution. ... All of this has had 
the quite appalling effect of raising the fear of crime in those who have the least 
reason to fear it, and taking the debate about how to deal effectively with crime 
back over 20 years. (Griffin, 1999b)
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It is possible that blaming the media (23% (reported above)) is actually a method of blame 
avoidance by politicians to deny their own responsibility for causing fear-of-crime. The 
data in this study cannot support nor disprove this possibility. As discussed above, these 
techniques can only be treated as indicative of those used by politicians to avoid blame for 
creating fear-of-crime.
Unlike treatment responsibility, all but one attribution of causal responsibility were made 
by the opposing party:
(k) The government continues to mouth off about crime. It seeks to run a 
criminal justice system based on a political agenda. The government seeks to 
engage in whipping up community hysteria and fear, but it does not provide 
appropriate resources that measure up to the community’s requirements. 
(Sercombe, 1993: 349)
In the one document that did hold an attribution against the speaker’s party, it was one of 
the few examples of blame avoidance where the speaker was reporting the accusation made 
by another politician so that they could avoid the blame by ‘passing the buck’ to the 
community. That the vast majority attributed responsibility to someone else, supports 
Iyengar’s (1989) theory that politicians attempt to avoid causal responsibility in preference 
to accepting treatment responsibility.
In summary, the results for the attributions of causal responsibility were highly 
homogenous. The majority of documents identified the problem of fear-of-crime as that for 
which a person may be held responsible. Politicians were named in the majority of
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documents as the cause of this fear. The attribution of causal responsibility may function as 
an accusation or political weapon to criticise the opposing party. This was evident in the 
nearly complete lack of attributions of causal responsibility onto the speaker and in the 
indications of attempts to avoid any accusations of blame launched by another politician.
W ho is R e s p o n s i b l e ?
To recap, I have discussed two different types of responsibility that are assigned for events 
in the future or in the past. When treatment responsibility is attributed, the person assigns 
control over or the power to solve events that may occur in the future. When causal 
responsibility is attributed, the person attaches blame for those (negative) events that had 
already occurred for which they hold the target as responsible for causing. Blame is to be 
avoided by politicians whereas the image of holding control and power is to be desired.
The results of the case study show that politicians wish to be seen as someone that did not 
cause the problems relating to fear-of-crime (blame avoidance) but are ready and willing to 
help solve the problem (treatment responsibility). An image of being seen to respond to a 
problem is a political necessity even in situations such as natural disasters when no causal 
responsibility can be attributed. The results of this and previous research show that when 
the cause of a situation can be attributed to someone, politicians take care to avoid that type 
of responsibility and the associated blame.
Such solutions may involve the creation of new legislation or increasing the penalties in 
existing legislation. Police practices, resources and powers were used more sparingly and 
mostly in relation to reducing the level of fear-of-crime. These solutions, proposed by both
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sides of the political spectrum, indicate the growing trend towards right-wing policies that 
emphasize the individual, challenge civil liberties and freedoms and privatise means of 
social control and security. Such strategies are typical in modem responses to problems of 
law and order.
At the beginning of this chapter, I gave an overview of the argument that the community is 
increasingly being given responsibility for their own safety and protection from crime. 
Evidence for this argument has generally been given through abstracted studies of 
modernity, or through studies of privatisation of security services and the consequent 
citizen perception of the withdrawal of the state (e.g. Crawford, 1998; Crawford & Lister, 
2003; Garland, 2001; Zedner, 2000). It was argued by these and other scholars, that crime 
prevention, victimization prevention and the management of fear-of-crime is increasingly 
the job of the community and individuals. In other words, politicians and state bureaucrats 
were attempting to attribute treatment responsibility to the community.
However, through the results of this study, I have shown that in parliamentary debates 
about fear-of-crime, the government is the agent most frequently given treatment 
responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime. The community was only attributed 
responsibility in 9% of the documents. Thus, when responsibility is analysed from the 
opposite direction (government to citizen versus citizen to government), there is a different 




Implications of Attributions of Responsibility
To conclude, I wish to explore two possible paths that could be followed to examine the 
implications of this result. The first is to challenge the accuracy of previous research that 
found responsibility for crime was being shifted from the state to its citizens. It could be 
said that previous research has been largely one-way, taken from the perspective of the 
citizen’s perception of the failure of government to fulfil their responsibility for public 
safety. This has hidden the government’s perspective of where they believe responsibility 
for crime control lies. Consequently, the push to shift responsibility from government to 
citizen may not be as pronounced as previously argued.
Alternatively, I could take the second path and argue that political rhetoric is belied by 
political action. The actions of politicians and government agencies speak louder about the 
location of responsibility than do their words. This argument can be made because the data 
for this study were parliamentary debates such as second-reading speeches on bills before 
the parliament, responses to questions without notice during question time, or committee 
reports and transcripts. Such debates, when mentioning fear-of-crime, tended to be as much 
about attacking the opposing political party (point-scoring) as about the proposed solution 
to crime, crime prevention or community safety. Attributing treatment responsibility may 
be a preparatory measure for later political gain. If the government holds treatment 
responsibility for crime rates and the rates rise, the opposition may be able to blame such 
rises on poor management (i.e. they attribute causal responsibility). Said loudly and 
frequently enough at election times, it may tap into people’s fears and grant a change in 
government. Therefore, attributions of responsibility for fear-of-crime in political debates
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may be a tactical (and rhetorical) measure. ‘Real’ attributions may only be found or implied 
by government actions.
In truth, I would argue that neither of these arguments about the implications of the study 
findings is entirely right, or entirely wrong. The actions of the government departments 
through programs like the National Campaign against Violence and Crime, and the efforts 
of police around Australia to encourage community involvement in crime control, do 
indicate the government’s belief that the community can and should contribute to their own 
safety. The government wants the community to take on treatment responsibility for crime.
At the same time, political rhetoric argues that the government holds the majority of 
treatment responsibility for issues relating to crime and fear-of-crime. They accept that 
responsibility and are actively implementing a variety of (currently right-wing) strategies 
intended to fulfil that responsibility. The results from this study and previous research show 
that what politicians do not want is causal responsibility. This is where I argue that the two 
paths cross.
In encouraging community members to take on treatment responsibility, the government 
has also covertly attempted to pass on causal responsibility. Individuals are responsible for 
their ensuring their own safety. When crime occurs, as it inevitably will, the government is 
then able to locate blame on the victim for not taking the necessary precautions. As the 
once NSW Minister for Police and Emergency Services said:
(1) In many ways that fear is sensible. The community should be encouraged to 
be sensibly responsible with regard to unnecessary exposure to activities which
226
Chapter Nine Responsibility
might lead to adverse effects from crime. For example, people should be 
actively encouraged to be concerned about wandering down the back streets of 
the city at night. That activity should not be encouraged, because clearly it 
raises the potential of mugging or other adverse behaviour. The normal 
precautions that people take -  where they walk at night and how they lock up 
their homes -  are all sensible precautions, are taken generally because of a fear 
of crime. The fact that the level of that fear is much higher than the actual rate 
of crime is in many ways not deleterious but beneficial to the community as a 
whole (Pickering, 1992: 354)
Edward Pickering is arguing that the community should take responsibility for the 
opportunities they present to offenders. Fear-of-crime is a useful tool by which to ensure 
that the community does accept that responsibility. However, the searching questions that 
are often asked after criminal victimisation such as “why didn’t you do something to 
prevent this from happening?” are directed at the community or the individual and not at 
the politician. The community becomes akin to another government department that the 
politician directs to implement its policies. Failure to do so negates any causal 
responsibility and blame that can be lain against the policy-maker. The very existence of 
crime and fear-of-crime is evidence of that failure and therefore the blameworthiness of the 
community.
It is sensitivity to these issues that I argue has been missed by scholarly constructions of 
responsibility as a homogenous entity. By taking a simple binary model, I have shown 
differing locations of responsibility and strategies that are used in response to those
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attributions. While agreeing with previous research that highlights the shift in responsibility 
for crime control from government to citizen, I have also shown that politicians are very 
keen to keep one type of responsibility. Increasingly, politicians are holders of a disarmed 
form of treatment responsibility for issues surrounding fear-of-crime, crime and law and 
order in general. The findings from this study suggest that the community are holders of a 
far more volatile form of treatment responsibility -  one that easily translates into causal 
responsibility and blame.
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Chapter Ten Balancing Expediency and Ideology
This chapter presents the last of the case studies examining the interaction between 
language and society. The case study seeks to analyze the data from the perspective of 
certain “sets” of images of society and their attempted realization through the use of 
language. More simply and generally, the case study is intended to investigate how images 
of society are reflected in language. In this chapter, the political ideologies of the major 
Australian parties are used as examples of the sets of images about society that may be held 
by Australian parliamentarians. However, parliamentarians typically see a need to balance 
their ideological principles with their desire to reap short-term political advantage such as 
in electoral or policy success. The tensions between ideologically driven and politically 
expedient behavior are key elements in the strategies employed in party competition. This 
chapter seeks to examine how this tension and resultant strategies influence the language 
that is used in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.
To do this, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section details the theory that 
exists on political party competition; it will begin with the work of Downs in 1957 and then 
will outline the contributions of other authors to explaining how and why political parties 
behave in certain ways. Using that outline as a base, the example of law and order politics 
will be used as a case study for examining the balance between ideologically and 
expediently driven party behavior. The literature reviewed in this first section will provide 
the foundation on which to examine the balancing of the same types of behavior 
specifically when discussing fear-of-crime. The second section will present three types of 
politically expedient uses of fear-of-crime that are identified by Australian 
parliamentarians. The third section will look to the other side of the scale by detailing the
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potential impact that political ideology may have on crime policies and discussions about 
fear-of-crime.
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it aims to highlight attempts to balance 
ideologically and expediency driven political behavior when debating fear-of-crime. It does 
not attempt to place a numerical figure on this balance or to treat these two types of 
behavior as dichotomous variables. There will always be some overlap between behavior 
that gains advantage in winning elections for example or advantage in reinforcing a 
particular image of society. Instead, the chapter seeks to highlight the co-influence of these 
types of behaviors on parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. This leads to the second 
purpose of this chapter -  to examine the impact that such behaviors (and implied 
motivations) may have on the way in which parliamentarians talk about public fears. More 
simply, it provides a case study on how society impacts on language use.
P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  C o m p e t i t i o n
In 1957, Downs presented an argument that has remained central to the study of party 
strategy in dominant party political systems (Greene, 2002). His argument was that the 
primary motivation for a competitive political party is to maximize their electoral support. 
These vote-seeking parties formulate their policies and political strategies with the intention 
of maximizing their vote in order to control government (Downs, 1957). In effect, Downs 
saw political parties functioning in competition as vote-maximizers (Strom, 1990).
Following on from this, Strom (1990) discussed two additional typologies of political 
parties: office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. The office-seeking party also tries to
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maximize their electoral support. However they do so for the purpose of gaining access to 
the benefits of political office such as political or governmental appointments (Muller & 
Strom, 1999). In a two party dominant system like that existing in Australia, it is not 
possible to tell the difference between vote-seeking and office-seeking parties because 
maximizing the vote also grants the benefits of office (Harmel & Janda, 1994). The final 
typology discussed by Strom is the policy-seeking party. This type of party wants to 
maximize its influence on public policy. Such a party may not need to gain office in order 
to achieve this goal (Budge & Laver, 1986). However, being in office does have 
instrumental value in heightening policy influence (Strom, 1990). These preferences for 
votes, office or policy will be identifiable in all parties and each may become dominant in 
different situations within the same party (Kitschelt, 1994).
B a l a n c i n g  E x p e d i e n c y  and  I d e o l o g y  
Within his model of competitive party behavior, Downs examined the balancing of self- 
interest and ideology by competing political parties. From the basis of rational choice 
theory where actors are assumed to adopt the most cost-efficient means towards their 
desired ends, Downs argued that these means would be directed towards self-interested 
ends (the self-interest axiom). Actors are seen as rational and selfish, choosing strategies 
that will lead to the largest payoff identified (Riker, 1962). Downs argued that politicians 
will act "solely in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in 
office" (Downs, 1957: 28). This perspective understands self-interest to drive the 
development of policy and political strategy in competition.
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Downs also argued that not only is policy and strategy beholden to self-interest, each 
party's ideology is developed in order to assist in maximizing their share of the vote. Parties 
attempt to maximize their votes by positioning their ideas around the opinions of the 
greatest number of voters. Under this theory, the content of a party's ideology is determined 
by its utility in gaining electoral support. Consequently, a candidate’s platform and their 
motivating ideas and beliefs, are designed to match that of the electorate (Sullivan & 
Minns, 1976). "Party members choose an ideology which will win votes, not one they 
believe in, since their objective is the acquisition of office, not the creation of a better 
society" (Downs, 1957: 111). Downs argued that while maintaining an ideology may 
become a subsidiary end in itself and at times conflict with the self-interested goal of 
maximizing votes, winning elections and the power this confers would ensure that the latter 
took precedence over ideology.
There remains some debate about the dominance of self-interest over ideological principles 
in directing party behavior in competition. For example, some argue that it would be 
erroneous to simplify the desires of party members to the gaining of office (Schlesinger, 
1991); and that parties infrequently pursue strategies directed purely at short-term vote 
maximization (Kitschelt, 1994). Instead, parliamentarians will have policy goals that 
require gaining office in order to achieve them and would be unlikely to directly oppose 
these goals for the sake of winning office on a different election platform (Budge & 
Keman, 1990). While this chapter does not seek to contribute to the debate over whether 
self-interest or ideology has a greater or lesser impact on party behavior per se, these 
criticisms highlight the tension that exists in attempting to balance these two influences.
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This debate does draw attention to the fact that balancing ideology with the goal of winning 
office presents a constant difficulty for political parties. To win office requires a broad-base 
of electoral support; and to gain this base may necessitate some pragmatic decisions being 
made about election promises and policy that deviate from ideological principles. However, 
should the party move too far from the ideology of its core constituency for electoral gain, 
that broad-base will again be threatened (Singleton et al., 2003). The case study presented 
herein represents an example of that struggle to balance ideology and expedient behavior.
Expediency and Ideology in Law and Order
Based on previous research, it is evident that political parties are balancing ideology and 
self-interest in political debates about law and order issues. For instance, it can be argued 
that debating law and order issues grants political advantage to the parliamentarian. It 
makes good political sense (Schwartz & Israel, 2000). Addressing crime provides 
opportunities for symbolic policy initiatives that enhance popularity and electability 
(Fairchild & Webb, 1985; Goldsmith, 1999); and that address emotional needs rather than 
practical ends (Freiberg, 2001). Politicians are able to respond to public demands for 
protection with short-term and highly visible initiatives such as the reinvigoration of crime 
legislation and policy (Castellano & McGarrell, 1991; Sheley, 1985). Debating law and 
order issues may deflect attention from more pressing and tenacious problems (Body- 
Gendrot, 2001; Weatherbum, 2004) and change the way in which these problems are 
perceived by the general public (Chevigny, 2003; Glassner, 1999). From such benefits, 
some researchers argue that parliamentarians gain (and make use of) short-term political 
advantage by discussing law and order issues.
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There is also the argument that law and order debates follow the dictates of ideology rather 
than self-interested agendas. For example, a claim has been made that the politics of law 
and order are the politics of the right (Dahrendorf, 1985); and the widespread adoption of 
the associated punitive and legalistic policies around the world is part of a broader 
international swing to more conservative politics (Ratner & McMullan, 1983). These 
policies tend to be characterized by increased publicity and public concern about “street 
crime” and widening criminalization (i.e. more actions being classed as criminal) (Horton, 
1981). In effect, these authors argue that the political response to crime has been to 
reinforce a definition of appropriate citizen behavior rather than to protect the public from 
crime (Rosch, 1985). The politicization of crime has allowed parliamentarians to follow 
and implement their ideological worldview. In effect, parliamentarians are able to reinforce 
their concept of an ideal society and how to achieve it (King, 1989).
To summarize previous research examining the self-interested or ideological motivation for 
law and order debates, it can be said that there are two groups. The first argue that self- 
interested motivations have dominance in influencing the ‘use’ of such debates; the second 
argue that ideology has the dominant influence over characteristics of law and order 
politics. In effect, researchers from both groups are arguing over the amount of influence 
that self-interested and ideological motivations have on law and order politics.
R e s e a r c h i n g  E x p e d i e n c y  a n d  I d e o l o g y
On the basis of this review of the research literature on the political balancing of self- 
interested strategies for short-term advantage with ideological principles, I seek to provide 
evidence towards the following question:
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What is the balance between ideology and expediency in day-to-day 
parliamentary debates that focus on fear-of-crime?
By asking this question I seek to a) clarity previous research arguing for differing balances 
of expedient or ideological motivations for the use of law and order issues and fear-of- 
crime more specifically; and b) to use the findings as a case study indicating the possible 
influence that images of society as well as societal structures have on the way in which 
parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime.
I will use the term ‘expediency’ to cover actions that can be perceived as directed towards 
self-interested ends that grant short-term political advantage. This advantage is not 
necessarily limited to electoral gains and consequently, covers advantages that may benefit 
immediate policy goals.
The term ‘ideology’ will be used in this chapter to describe a coherent and interrelated set 
of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior (Carlsnaes, 1981; Hinich & 
Munger, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Singleton et al., 2003). Political ideas form ‘semantic 
constraints’ that guide the actions, interpretations and thoughts of actors in politics 
(Kitschelt, 1994). As a worldview, an ideology contains an intrinsic definition of what is 
good and what is bad; a definition of a good society and the means by which to achieve it 
(Downs, 1957; Hinich & Munger, 1994). Therefore, discussions and policies about crime 
may reflect the politician’s beliefs about society and the changes that should be made in 
order to bring about this society.
236
Chapter Ten Balancing Expediency and Ideology
With these definitions in mind, I will provide evidence for the question above in the 
following way. I will first outline the methodology that was used to isolate data specific to 
this chapter from that collected from parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime in Australia. A 
brief overview of the results relating to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal 
Party of Australia and National Party Coalition (the Coalition) will then be given. From 
there, I will present the claims of political self-interest that are made by parliamentarians 
against other parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. To contrast these claims, I 
will describe the ideologies of the two parties. This will then be narrowed down to the 
political parties’ responses to crime. Based on these descriptions, I will attempt to find 
evidence of a rationale within the ideologies of the ALP and the Coalition for discussing 
fear-of-crime. The final section will discuss the balance of ideology and self-interest that 
was found in parliamentary debates about crime and fear-of-crime.
The examinations presented in this chapter will show that there are three main claims of 
political expediency that are charged against parliamentarians: the increase of fear to 
generate support for a party; the use of fear as a political tactic to generate support for a 
policy; and the creation of fear to set the agenda and generate political noise. Out of this 
analysis, I argue first that differences along party lines suggest an ideological influence on 
the use of fear-of-crime; and secondly, that differences identified based on the role of the 
political party as being either in opposition or in government indicate a functional aspect 
(i.e., self-interested) to the use of fear-of-crime. On the basis of an analysis of the 
ideological influences that may affect the way in which parliamentarians discuss fear-of- 
crime, I find that this type of fear forms rhetorical evidence for the ‘truth’ of the politician’s 
ideology. I argue that this balancing of ideology and expediency highlights the utility of
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fear-of-crime in political debates about law and order; and that with that utility comes the 
danger that such debates will increase the level of fear in the community.
Before beginning I wish to clarify that by making these arguments, I do not wish to deny 
that some members of the public are rightly afraid of crime. My comments relate solely to 
the realm of political rhetoric. It is through this rhetoric that parliamentarians attempt to 
depict (and make dominant) their image of reality. Parliamentarians rarely argue the “truth” 
of something. They argue that that something should be supported (Manning & Robinson, 
1985). It is the use of fear-of-crime within these arguments that I will investigate in this 
chapter.
In addition, I will discuss political discussions about community concerns and fears based 
on crime under the short-hand phrase “use of fear-of-crime”. This is done for ease of 
expression and should not be confused with politician’s own fears about crime or even a 
measurable level of fear felt by members of the public. In this chapter, “the use of fear-of- 
crime” refers solely to the role that political discussions about this type of fear play in 
Australian politics.
Methodology
In order to answer the question posed in this chapter, a smaller dataset was isolated using 
two criteria (see Figure 10.1). The first was that only documents dated between 1 January 
1990 and 31 December 2003 were included. This was done to ensure the social context in 
which the documents were authored was the same (as far as possible) for all states,
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territories and levels of parliament. Therefore, earlier documents from the federal 
parliament were excluded (4%).
The second criterion was that only documents authored by parliamentarians associated with 
the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal Party of Australia or the National Party were to be 
included. This criterion reduced the number of documents to 586 (81% of the total). The 
decision to limit the discussion to only these parties was made because of two concerns. 
First, it would not be feasible in a single chapter to examine in detail the ideology and 
political policies of all 12 parties contributing to fear-of-crime debates over a time span of 
13 years.
Second, the Coalition and the ALP dominate the Australian (two-party) political system. 
These political parties have long acted as a rural and urban wing, or formalized factions of 
the same conservative party with similar ideologies (Cook, 2004; Siaroff, 2003). While 
National Party members were only responsible for 8% of the documents collected, they 
were included to ensure complete representation of the Australian political scene.
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Figure 10.1: Selection Criteria for the Ideology Case Study
All Political Debates about 
Fear-of-Crime
n=720
Criterion 1: documents dated 
between 01/01/1990 and 31/12/2003
-21
▼
Criterion 2: documents authored by ALP, 
Liberal or National Party politicians
-113
y
Dataset for Chapter 10: n=586
G e n e r a l  R e s u l t s
Based on the exclusion criteria specific to this chapter, 586 documents were identified that 
had at least one mention of fear-of-crime. The documents were authored by 336 
parliamentarians, 182 associated with the ALP (54%) and 154 with the Coalition (126 from 
the Liberal Party (38%) and 28 from the National Party (8%)). The majority of these 
documents were sourced from state parliaments (n = 477, 81%). This section will present 
general quantitative results that begin to describe the documents involved in this case study 
-  their topics, number, as well as political party affiliations and that party’s role in 
parliament.
While the methodology of the study was designed to specifically identify instances of 
discourse on fear-of-crime, it was found that in most cases (94%), parliamentarians 
mentioned but did not discuss fear-of-crime (the reasons behind this have been discussed in
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detail in Chapter Eight). As a result, the mentions become dependent on the host discourse 
for their contextual definition.
As discussed in Chapter Five, there were a variety of topics in which these mentions of 
fear-of-crime were found. These covered some 30 different individual topics ranging from 
crime, government policy, legislation, police, politics, safety, and security to poverty, 
education, racism, housing and even nuclear waste disposal processes. The following table, 
based on the specific data set used in this chapter, provides the percentage of aggregated 
topics in which fear-of-crime was mentioned or discussed:
Table 10.1: Percentage of Aggregated Topics Mentioning Fear-of-Crime
T opic # o f  D ocs % T opic # o f  D ocs %
Crime Policy1 128 22 Safety & Security 32 5
Crime 94 16 Social Policy3 32 5
Crime Legislation 80 14 Crime Prevention 29 5
Police 68 12 Fear-of-C rim e 13 2
Government“ & Politics 66 11 Miscellaneous 5 1
Government Budgets 39 7
1. These policies focused on crime, women, police and emergency services, law and order, juvenile crime and
domestic violence.
2. These policies cover education, housing, health, immigration, poverty, race, and unemployment
3. These focused on government performance against measures such as election promises.
The main topic in which fear-of-crime was mentioned was crime-related policies such as 
those for police and emergency services, law and order, juvenile crime and domestic 
violence (22%). Public fear was also mentioned in regard to criminal acts of behavior 
(16%), legislation in response to crime (14%) and police practices, powers and performance 
(12%). Only 2% of the documents had fear-of-crime as their main topic.
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Overall, there has been an increase in the number of documents produced each year that 
mention fear-of-crime. In the four year period between 1990 and the end of 1993 there was 
an average of 19 documents produced each year that had at least one mention of fear-of- 
crime. In the same time period a decade later, there was an average of 58 documents per 
year mentioning fear-of-crime. It should be noted that some of this increase may be falsely 
generated by the databases of the Australian Capital Territory (begun in 1995) and Western 
Australia (begun in 1997) not covering the initial time period. However, in general, the 
slope of the trend-line presented on the figure below indicates that the number of 
documents mentioning fear-of-crime increased by approximately 14 documents each year.
Figure 10.2: Total Number of Fear-of-Crime Documents from 1990 to 2003
Total Number of Documents per Year
71
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Furthermore, no one particular political party was found to be responsible for the increased 
discussion of fear-of-crime. On average, the ALP was the source of 54% of the documents 
each year with a standard deviation of 15%. Liberal Party members were responsible for 
producing 39% of the documents each year (standard deviation of 13%). However, the
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variability in the total number of documents being produced each year that mentioned fear- 
of-crime, from this data, cannot be said to be a result of particular political party 
fluctuations in debate content. The proportions authored by each party remain largely 
constant despite the total number of documents increasing each year.
Figure 10.3: Number of Fear-of-Crime Documents by Political Party
Number of Documents by Political Party
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
At some stage over the 13 years investigated, there has been a change of government in 
each state and territory parliament as well as the federal parliament. This provides an 
opportunity to study the potential for differing uses of fear-of-crime when each political 
party is in government or in opposition. The table below shows the changes in government 
and proportion of governments held by each political party per year.
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Figure 10.4: Changes in Government by State, Year and Political Party
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From the research conducted for this thesis, it was found that both parties mentioned fear- 
of-crime less when they were in opposition than when in government. The difference in 
frequency of mentioning fear-of-crime was most pronounced for Coalition members with a 
36% drop in the number of documents produced when in opposition.
Table 10.2: Fear-of-Crime Documents by Role in Parliament and Political Party
Government Opposition % Change
ALP 162 141 -15%
Coalition 163 120 -36%
This finding that both parties mention fear-of-crime less when in opposition suggests that 
the mentioning of this type of fear is partly a consequence of the party’s role in parliament. 
The role of an opposition party is to scrutinize the performance of the governing party and 
to provide an alternative government to the electorate (Henderson, 1988; Punnett, 1973). A 
good opposition will ensure good government by controlling the government’s legislation,
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providing a means for minority views to be expressed and for the government to be 
removed by an organized opposition appealing for votes against it (Ionescu & de 
Madariaga (1968) see also Dahl (1966)). While the relationship between the use of fear-of- 
crime for political advantage and a party’s role in parliament will be discussed in greater 
length in the next section, it can be argued from these descriptive results that fear-of-crime 
is potentially considered to be less beneficial to a parliamentarian in fulfilling the role of an 
opposition party than a government party.
The final descriptive result to be given here is the combination of those discussed above. 
The following figure depicts the changes in the number of documents mentioning fear-of- 
crime produced each year by government and opposition parties:
Figure 10.5: Fear-of-Crime Documents by Role of Party in Parliament and Year




This figure demonstrates three main points. First, that while (in total) fear-of-crime is 
mentioned more by government members there has been greater variability in the number 
produced by government parliamentarians. Second, it also shows that since approximately
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1997 the number of documents produced by parties in either role has been increasingly 
similar. Third, the figure indicates that it was government parliamentarians who were 
largely responsible for the drop in the number of documents produced in 1996.
These points are supported by Figure 10.6 below that divides the data this time by political 
party: government parliamentarians have the strongest influence over the trends in political 
debates about fear-of-crime. In addition, the figure shows that government and opposition 
parties remain closely aligned irrespective of which particular party is fulfilling either role. 
The trends of an ALP government and Coalition opposition are similar to each other as are 
the trends of a Coalition government and ALP opposition. However, the trends between 
these groups at times vary markedly. Again these findings highlight the potential influence 
that a party’s role in parliament may have on their treatment of fear-of-crime -  one party 
may be responding to another’s treatment of the public’s fear.
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Figure 10.6: Fear-of-Crime Documents by Political Party, Role and Year
Number of Documents Produced per Year 
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From these general results, it is possible to say that ALP parliamentarians have mentioned 
fear-of-crime more than Coalition parliamentarians (54% v’s 46% respectively); the 
number of mentions from both parties has been increasing steadily having now reached an 
average of 58 documents per year; both parties mention fear-of-crime more when in 
government than in opposition; and finally, the number of documents mentioning fear-of- 
crime produced by government and opposition parties remains similar regardless of which 
particular party is fulfilling each role.
These descriptive quantitative results suggest that the volume of documents containing a 
mention of public fear is influenced by political party dictates. However, they also suggest 
that the frequency with which fear-of-crime is mentioned in Australian parliaments is
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influenced by institutional factors such as the fulfillment of a government or oppositional 
role. The following section will detail how fear-of-crime is used in Australian parliaments.
P o l i t i c a l  U ses  f or  F e a r - o f - C ri me
This section will examine the way in which fear-of-crime is ‘used’ in Australian 
parliaments as identified by parliamentarians themselves. To do this, passages were 
identified in which parliamentarians commented on the use of fear-of-crime by other 
parliamentarians (8% of total). These passages were seen as conceptually distinct from 
political responses to fear-of-crime or from government programs to address fear in the 
community. By focusing on these passages, the intention was to isolate commentaries on 
how fear-of-crime was used by parliamentarians (as judged by other parliamentarians). 
Determining how parliamentarians perceive fear-of-crime to be used is intended to function 
as a proxy against which comparisons can be made with the literature reviewed earlier and 
the ideological motivations to be discussed in a later section of this chapter.
Given the adversarial nature of Australian politics, it is not surprising that these passages 
criticized the other party for their use of fear-of-crime. At such times, claims of political 
expediency were made: parliamentarians argued that other parliamentarians were using 
debates about fear-of-crime as a means of gaining short-term political advantage. In effect, 
they argued that motivations for using fear-of-crime were dominated by self-interest. The 
following section will give examples of the three main groups of critical claims that are 
made about the use of fear-of-crime for political advantage:
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■ Criticism 1: the increase of fear to generate support for a party;
■ Criticism 2: the use of fear as a political tactic to generate support for a policy;
■ Criticism 3: the creation of fear to set the agenda and generate political noise.
Criticisms of the Uses of Fear-of-Crime
Criticism 1
Parliamentarians try to increase fear-of-crime in the community 
with the intention of generating support for their party.
The most frequent criticism of the political use of fear-of-crime (38%), made by one side of 
politics against the other, referred to attempts to increase the level of fear in the community. 
This was described as ‘beating up’, ‘whipping up’, ‘playing on’ or simply increasing fear- 
of-crime. It was argued that parliamentarians used fear-of-crime in this way to generate 
support for their party.
here is any way of telling whether we are in an election year, it is the 
increasing hysteria that comes from an Opposition bereft of talent, ideas and 
policies. Recently we have all witnessed and heard some of the thoughtless and 
hysterical efforts on the part of the Opposition to beat up the law and order 
issue. ... In closing, I urge the Opposition not to beat up fear in the community 
unreasonably for the sake of short-term political gain. (Redford, 1997)
In this quote (a), it is assumed that there is already a level of fear in the Australian 
community about crime. The political rhetoric is charged with increasing that level in order 
to generate a public demand for the policies of the opposition. Such a use of fear-of-crime 
is politically expedient because it has the potential to gain public support for the party
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promising to reduce that fear. In effect, the criticism is made that parliamentarians are 
generating a false public demand for their policies, through their rhetoric on fear-of-crime.
Criticism 2
Parliamentarians use fear-of-crime as a political tactic to 
generate support for a particular policy
Another criticism was to argue that fear was part of an arsenal of political tactics (31%). 
This included using fear-of-crime as a tool: for political ‘point-scoring’ during debates and 
question times; in a political campaign; and as part of a strategy to win the support of the 
electorate for particular policies.
(b) The previous Government and this Government have cynically used the 
fears within the community to drive an agenda of getting tough on crime 
(Watson, 2001: 5489).
(c) In fact, there is no doubt that the scare tactics employed by members 
opposite, when in Opposition, worked to the extent that many people, 
particularly older people, became fearful and isolated in their own homes. If the 
then Opposition was to be believed, the situation in Queensland was alarming, 
with crime rates escalating and spiraling out of control (Bird, 1996: 1931).
These quotes (b) and (c) indicate that discussions about fear-of-crime can be criticized as a 
tactic for political gain. Like the first criticism, this is based on the assumption that at least 
some members of the public such as elderly people and women are afraid of crime; and that 
political rhetoric can increase that fear. However, this criticism goes further. It links up 
political rhetoric and increased levels of fear with attempts to generate support for (or
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against) particular policies. For example, these policies included proposals for safe 
injecting facilities for illicit drug users, mandatory sentencing and public awareness 
campaigns on issues such as handbag thefts, knife attacks and rising crime rates. Such use 
indicates the perception that a fearful public is more dependent on and malleable to the 
wishes of the government. The criticism thus lies in the use of the political rhetoric of fear 
to encourage the public to support policies that may otherwise have been considered with 
skepticism in a less fearful atmosphere.
Criticism 3
Parliamentarians try to create fear-of-crime in the community in- 
order to control the agenda and generate political noise.
The first two criticisms of the political uses of fear-of-crime each relied on that fear already 
being present in the community. The final group criticized a politician for generating and 
creating fear-of-crime (25%).
(e) I have noticed that some members of the Liberal Party have gone around 
that area trying to create an image of fear and saying that crime is out of 
control.... (Haermeyer, 2003: 447)
(f) The pattern of this government is clear: strike fear into the hearts of 
Australians and tell them there is a problem... (Faulkner, 2003)
This final criticism accuses the target of not only using fear for political advantage but also 
creating the fear in the first place. There is no assumption here that the public is afraid of 
crime prior to exposure to political rhetoric. Instead, the understanding of crime as
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something to be feared is, in effect, taught by the parliamentarian. The insinuation of this 
criticism is that the parliamentarian is attempting to set the agenda and thereby create 
enough political noise to drown out discussions of other problems. While priming and 
agenda setting are commonly used in politics as discussed in Chapter One (see for example 
Cook et al., 1983; Iyengar & Simon, 2000; Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000), this claim of political 
expediency criticizes the inclusion of fear in this process.
The final 6% of passages that criticized the way in which parliamentarians discussed fear- 
of-crime, focused on fear as a reason to respond in a certain way. These were not included 
as political responses to fear-of-crime because the focus was on the use itself rather than on 
the fear. The remaining passages criticized parliamentarians for developing legislation that 
was based on an unnecessary fear that had been created by the political discussion itself. 
The perceived inability of legislation to reduce or address community fears was a common 
theme throughout these passages. The main criticism here was that the government was 
responding to the wants of the majority while that want was generated out of fear -  a fear 
that has been increased or created by the government. This criticism has not been included 
in further discussions as its elements are subsumed under the three main claims described 
above.
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The Demographics of the Use of Fear-of-Crime
As the purpose of this chapter is, in part, to investigate the influence of self-interest on the 
use of fear-of-crime, it is important to examine the details of the authors who make these 
criticisms. There was little significant change in the proportion of the type of criticisms 
made when divided by political party:
■ Criticism 1 comprised over 40%;
■ Criticism 2 comprised over 30%; and
■ Criticism 3 comprised approximately 20% of all critical documents.
In general, all parliamentarians criticize each other for the same uses of fear-of-crime for 
the same amount of time.
However, a difference was found in relation to the number of documents produced by each 
political party that criticized another for their use of public fear. On average, the ALP 
accounted for 69% of the passages that criticized others for the expedient use of fear-of- 
crime. The 31% sourced from the Coalition was divided with the Liberal Party producing 
24% and the National Party producing the remaining 7% of passages. This dominance of 
the ALP for criticizing the political use of fear-of-crime is disproportionate to the number 
of documents collected per political party (54% for ALP; 46% for the Coalition).
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Figure 10.7: Comparison of % of Critical Documents by Political Party
Comparison of Percentage of Critical Documents 
to Percentage of All Documents by Political Party
69%
Coalition
Such a result suggests that the ALP not only spends more time talking about fear-of-crime 
but also spends more time (disproportionately) criticizing others for the expedient use of 
fear-of-crime than do the Coalition. When divided into the percentage of documents 
produced by the parties when in government or opposition roles, it was found that the ALP 
does not change its behavior between each role; and the Coalition dedicate less of their time 
criticizing the political use of fear-of-crime when in opposition than in government.
Figure 10.8: % of Critical Documents by Political Party and Role in Parliament
Percentage of Critical Documents 
Produced by Political Parties 
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This finding suggests that the use of fear-of-crime is dictated at least in part by the ideology 
of the member’s political party. The judgment of what is considered acceptable use largely 
depends on the member’s ideology -  their principles and values -  rather than institutional 
factors such as a party’s role in parliament. This findings supports the general result 
presented earlier that argued the political party dictated the volume of documents but not 
the frequency of documents mentioning fear-of-crime. Therefore, in the following section, 
the ideology of each political party will be examined in search of directives for the use of 
fear-of-crime.
In summary, these discussions have outlined three main criticisms of political discussions 
about fear-of-crime: the increase of fear to generate support for a party; the use of fear as a 
political tactic to generate support for a policy; and the creation of fear to set the agenda 
and generate political noise. The results on the demographics of parliamentarians show that 
the frequency with which the criticisms are made are not reliant on the political party 
making the criticism. Instead, differences were found in the number of documents (i.e., 
volume) produced by each party and proportion of time spent criticizing others. Therefore it 
can be argued based on the results presented above that parliamentarians (like many 
researchers) consider fear-of-crime to be used mostly for self-interested ends, to be 
motivated by political expediency. However, that which is overtly stated may differ from 
the implicit (ideological) motivations for discussing fear-of-crime in certain ways. The 
following section will examine the ideological impact on parliamentary debates about fear- 
of-crime.
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P o l i t i c a l  I d e o l o g y  of  the  ALP and  t he  C o a l i t i o n
As a comparison to the claims of political expediency, I now wish to examine the influence 
that the ideological stances of the ALP and the Coalition may have on political discussions 
about fear-of-crime. In this section, I will give an overview of the broad ideology of each 
party. The section following will describe their individual policies on law and order and the 
way in which these policies reflect the ideology of the ALP and the Coalition partners.
The discussion of ideology will be done within two restrictions. First, as defined in the 
introduction to this chapter, the term ‘ideology’ will be used to describe a coherent and 
interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior. Secondly, the 
distinctions between the parties are made recognizing that each party’s ideological stance is 
influenced by that of other parties within the Australian political system; and that there are 
factions and tendencies within each party that follow their own ideological variation. These 
restrictions (the reasons for which will be discussed in detail in the Conclusion of this 
thesis) unfortunately necessitate a certain level of abstraction and generality.
Ideology of the ALP
To begin, the ALP, with its affiliated trade unions, holds a broad ideology that is a 
combination of labourism that strives for the economic improvement of workers and the 
social democratic mix of socialism and liberalism that seeks equality through parliamentary 
process, power and incremental progress. The party is required to balance the sometimes 
competing demands of union political activity with electioneering and the demands of 
winning votes and/or office (Taylor, 1993) -  a feature that is an example of the constantly
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shifting dynamics of party preferences for vote, office or policy seeking behavior discussed 
at the beginning of this chapter.
Since the 1970s the ALP, along with social democratic parties around the world, has faced 
growing pressure to adapt to postindustrial societal order and an international economy 
where the location of value and power has shifted from labor to capital (Piven, 1992). 
Pressure to change has also been created through the diversification of voter salient issues 
from the traditional social democratic concerns of income equality and protection of the 
worker’s social security to individual’s privacy, environmental protection and identity 
politics. In response to these pressures, the Australian Labor government of the 1980s and 
1990s pursued policies directed towards economic asceticism such as that displayed in the 
reform of health and environmental policies and the vigorous support that was given to 
affirmative action programs for women (Kitschelt, 1994) -  policies traditionally espoused 
by right-wing parties.
This change in Labor policy is indicative of the influence that neo-liberal thought has had 
on the overall ideology of the party in recent decades. The ALP is now pursuing more 
conservative policies than previously (Piazza, 2001). Globally, left parties have integrated, 
to an unprecedented degree, opinions traditionally trumpeted by the right such as 
deregulation, liberal laissez-faire governance, privatization and the free market (Schwartz, 
1994). More specifically, this swing to the right is evident in changes made by left parties 
in their law and order policies towards more legalistic responses to crime (Kelsey, 1993; 
Ratner & McMullan, 1983); and is evident in the ALP crime policies discussed below.
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Thus, while the ALP remains on the left of the political spectrum, its strands of social 
democratic thought are showing clear signs of neo-liberal influence.
Ideology of the Liberal Party
The dilution of socialist influence within the ALP has seen the anti-socialist/anti-labor 
stand on which the Liberal Party of Australia was founded, lose its unifying effect. 
Historically, the Liberal Party developed as a response to Labor’s perceived socialism and 
as an attempt to prevent undue class interests from dominating parliament (Jaensch, 1994). 
Consequently, the party was originally built on a strongly anti-socialist (i.e. anti-labor) 
platform that saw these doctrines as a threat to capitalist growth and economic prosperity 
(Simms, 1982).
Today, the ideology of the Liberal Party is a combination of economic liberalism 
(concerned with the economic rights of the individual), social liberalism (emphasis on 
providing opportunities for individuals to develop their full potential), and conservativism 
(emphasis on traditional family values and minimalist government) (see for example 
Liberal Party of Australia, 2004a, 2004b). Over the years, there has been a shifting dynamic 
between these types of liberalism and their interaction with conservative thought. Economic 
liberalism has been dominant since approximately 1980 (Brett, 2002).
Ultimately, liberalism is inseparable from individualism. This is a belief in the creative 
talents and responsibilities of the individual. Where the ALP focuses on the collective 
community, the Liberal Party believes in “the innate worth of the individual, in the right to 
be independent, to own property and to achieve, and in the need to encourage initiative and
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personal responsibility” (Liberal Party of Australia, 2004a: 3). Liberals want a society 
where as many people as possible are working to take care of themselves; a society where 
they can enjoy the resources and act to be ‘independent, self-reliant and responsible’ (Emy, 
1994).
In the resulting combination of beliefs in Liberal ideology, freedom is valued more highly 
than equality; and more specifically, there is an emphasis on an individual’s freedom to 
choose. The focus on the free market is an example of this emphasis on freedom of 
economic choice (Fraser, 1978). As a result of this emphasis, there is generally support for 
only limited government intervention to address inequality because these inequalities are 
accepted as a natural result of differing levels of individual potential. Instead, government 
action is directed at encouraging individuals to develop that potential by rewarding 
initiative and innovation.
However, these liberal ideas exist in tension with conservative ideas within the party. For 
example, where Labor tends to trust people to regulate their own behavior and places blame 
for transgressions on a poorly functioning society, conservative members in the Liberal 
Party seek the imposition of rules, conventions and laws in society as a means of creating 
order (Singleton et al., 2003). The shifting tensions between liberalism, individualism and 
conservativism are a key characteristic of Liberal Party ideology and are intensified by the 
close coalition partnership with the National Party.
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Ideology of the National Party
The National Party is generally considered to be the most conservative party in Australian 
politics (Woodward, 1985, 2002). Like the Liberal Party, the Nationals posit the principles 
of economic rationalism and laissez-faire governance where individuals are seen to have 
economic freedom to participate in the free market and where government services are 
provided only in areas in which private enterprise fails. However following their 
conservative trends, it is a party that has a strong emphasis on upholding traditional values 
such as the role of the family and “the spirit of national pride” in a strong and sustainable 
society (The Nationals Victoria (2005) see also The National Party of Australia, 2004; The 
Nationals Queensland, 2005). It is by unashamedly positing the sectional manifesto of 
representing the people of rural Australia (Woodward, 2002) and representing the 
distinctive economic base and political culture held in these areas (Jaensch, 1989) that the 
National Party function as the rural wing of the Coalition.
However, these sectional interests do at times bring the National Party into conflict with its 
coalition partner the Liberal Party. While their social polices have tended to remain largely 
similar, tension has been especially evident in each party’s proposed economic policies. 
The National Party has always been able to exert more influence in the Coalition than their 
limited number of seats in parliament would suggest (Woodward, 2002). Consequently, the 
National Party has been the leader in setting coalition policy to serve the interests of rural 
Australia in many portfolios (take for example, the debate over the privatization of Telstra 
from 2000 to 2005 where the National Party sought to protect the interests of rural 
Australians). In part, it is this ability of representing the interests of rural Australia that has 
maintained the longevity of the Coalition during the time period studied.
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Comparing Ideologies
While there are many differences, similarities and cross-influences that could be drawn out 
between the parties’ ideologies, one particular point will be emphasized here in preparation 
for later discussion. The conception of the role of the government differs between the ALP 
and the Coalition. The Coalition has spearheaded a strong push towards the privatization of 
public services. It is a party that desires a minimalist role for the government -  a reflection 
of conservative strands of opinion (Batavia, 1997). In contrast, the ALP believes in a more 
interventionist role. It is the government that helps the individual to realize their full 
potential, the economy to grow and the Australian society to flourish. A Labor government 
thus seeks to be the guardian of the common good (although this aim is showing signs of 
weakening under neo-liberal influence). This is based on the belief that the government 
must have the power to effectively deal with private interests that challenge equality and 
freedom (Singleton et al., 2003). The differing expectations of the role of the government 
will become evident in the crime policies proposed by each party.
In summary, the ALP and the Coalition are generally considered to be representative of left 
and right ideologies respectively. The ALP posits a largely social democratic platform that 
provides a mix of socialism and liberalism; the Coalition’s combination of liberalism and 
conservativism serve to produce beliefs positive towards minimalist government, individual 
rewards as well as supporting the traditional formulation of the nuclear family and 
nationalism. The changing political and societal environments in which these parties 
operate have led to a swing to the right in ALP ideology with the adoption of many liberal 
opinions. It is the influence of these ideologies on parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime that will be the focus of the remaining sections of this chapter.
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P o l i t i c a l  I d e o l o g i e s  and  C ri me
On the basis of the ALP and Coalition ideologies discussed above, I will now give a brief 
overview of each individual party’s crime policies. It is within these policies that evidence 
may be found of a relationship between a party’s ideology and the political use of fear-of- 
crime. To do this, I will first outline the general trends in crime-related policy direction that 
have been taken by each party. Secondly, I will demonstrate how each of these policies 
reflects the beliefs and opinions about society that have been discussed above. Finally, I 
will examine how fear-of-crime is discussed in these policies and attempt to identify any 
ideological rationale for how fear-of-crime is debated in the political ideology of the ALP 
and the Coalition.
For the purposes of this chapter, each party will be treated as if it followed a single 
homogenous set of beliefs and values. Individual tendencies, factions and state differences 
will be ignored. By doing so, I do not wish to downgrade their importance; rather it is 
hoped that this will simplify the comparisons that need to occur. This simplification is a 
heuristic devise to allow the proposed analysis. The general conclusions drawn in this 
chapter are intended as guides for focal points of later research as they would benefit 
greatly from more detailed examinations by state and factorial/tendency differences to fully 
highlight the complexity of the issues involved.
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Ideology, Crime and the ALP
To begin, the ALP approaches crime under the banner of ‘tough on crime, tough on the 
causes of crime’. Members seek to “provide greater security for all Australians and their 
families” through the provision of adequate funds and other resources to law enforcement 
agencies; the support of law reform in order to provide those agencies with greater powers 
of investigation; and the development of uniform national criminal laws.
The ALP is also committed to ensuring that all persons accused of an offence have a right 
not to incriminate themselves, have access to legal representation and for evidence that is 
improperly or illegal obtained to be generally inadmissible. The principles of restorative 
justice are used by the ALP to attempt to instill responsibility in the offender and restore a 
sense of security in the victim and their community (ALP, 2004).
These national policies and intentions are reflected at a state level with virtually all Labor 
governments developing policies that explicitly reflect the intention to be tough on both 
crime and the causes of crime. Common actions include: increased numbers of police; 
increased support for victims of crime; use of the principles of restorative justice to 
rehabilitate offenders; and crime prevention and community safety projects (for examples 
see state websites listed at www.alp.org.au). There are also some state-specific actions such 
as: building new prisons and putting more resources into prisoner rehabilitation (ALP VIC, 
2004); self-defense laws in response to home invasion and biker-gang related crimes (ALP 
SA, 2004); mandatory sentencing (ALP NT, 2004); and the incorporation of research on 
crime and justice into policy decisions (ALP ACT, 2001).
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The policies of the ALP on crime show the influence of their social democratic ideology. 
Underlying their approach to crime and social justice generally is a sense of collective 
responsibility for the well-being of the community (Howe, 1992). The role of the 
community (as against the individual) is emphasized through the use of crime prevention 
and community safety initiatives. Communal responsibility for crime is also demonstrated 
through the use of programs designed to rehabilitate offenders; and victims are 
acknowledged through the principles of restorative justice. At the same time, the promises 
of more police and tougher penalties show the trend towards the right (Kelsey, 1993; 
Ratner & McMullan, 1983) that was discussed above and the greater adoption of legalistic 
response to crime. Indeed, it has been argued by some that the ALP slogan of “tough on 
crime, tough on the causes of crime” is reflective of the adoption of punitive policies by the 
Left that are traditionally those posed by the right (Zedner, 1995).
Ideology, Crime and the Liberal Party
The Liberal Party’s response to crime has reflected the beliefs, values and opinions held in 
social/economic liberalism, individualism and conservatism. The policies developed by 
Liberals around Australia show the influence of this position. At a federal level, the Liberal 
Party has promised greater funding for agencies and departments so that they can provide 
‘stronger law enforcement’ and be ‘tough’ on crime (Liberal Party of Australia, 1998). At a 
state level, greater police powers are promised in Victoria (Liberal Victoria, 2003). The 
State Liberals in Tasmania propose “tougher measures” against crime (The State Liberals, 
2003). The Liberal Party in Western Australia has called for mandatory sentencing and 
“tougher penalties” for offenders (Black & Phillips, 2001). Finally, there is a strong
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emphasis in the platform of The Liberals in the ACT on the introduction of harsher 
penalties for law breakers (Canberra Liberals, 2004).
Overall, Liberal policy has been directed towards tightening laws, increasing police powers 
and encouraging individual responsibility for the prevention of victimization. The 
individual is understood as the mechanism through which the decision to commit a crime is 
made and the opportunities that are afforded criminal behavior are given. This placement of 
the individual as central to policy and to crime reflects a similar placement in the ideology 
of the Liberals. The policies also demonstrate the expansion of state- and law-based means 
of social control that characterize the beliefs and actions of the right.
Ideology, Crime and the National Party
At a federal level, National Party crime-related policies are those of the Coalition 
Government rather than each partner of the Coalition presenting separate policies. 
Consequently, the Nationals discussed increased funding to the National Crime Prevention 
Programme and the National Community Crime Prevention Programme (e.g., The 
Coalition Government, 2004). The ideology reflected in these federally funded and 
implemented policies is thus a combination of the liberal/conservative mix of the Coalition 
and not solely that of the National Party.
A similar problem is faced in analyzing the ideology reflected in state policies of the 
National Party. However, at this level the crime policies of the National Party reflect their 
sectional support base of rural Australia. There are calls for greater funding to attract and 
keep more police officers in country areas. Legislation is tightened to address a perceived
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leniency towards re-offenders especially. These measures include the implementation of 
mandatory sentencing, harsher parole measures and changing police practices. Finally, the 
use of firearms as part of rural community life is recognized. The National Party seeks to 
protect the community from irresponsible and/or criminal use rather than prohibit the use of 
all firearms (see The Nationals Victoria (2005) and The Nationals WA (2005) as 
examples). Thus in general, the crime-related policies of the National Party mirror those of 
their coalition partner but are tempered by a particular focus on the problems facing rural 
Australia.
As a result of these problems, the remaining discussions will address Coalition ideology 
and fear-of-crime without distinguishing between the Coalition partners. This decision has 
been made for two reasons. First, the strong similarity and co-influence between the crime- 
related policies of each party restrict the possibility of determining the ideological source of 
each policy. Second, as discussed above, there is the general perception that the two parties 
function as rural and urban wings of the same conservative party especially concerning 
social policies. This again reduces the distinctions that can be made between the policies on 
crime of each of the parties. Consequently, the remaining discussions will analyze the 
relationship between parliamentary discussions of fear-of-crime and the ideologies of the 
parties in Australia’s two-party system -  the ALP and the Liberal/National Coalition.
Summary of Ideology, Crime and Political Parties
In this section, I have discussed the crime policies of each political party. Key differences 
between the parties were the collective versus individual responsibility for crime and the 
rehabilitation versus the punishment of offenders. The Coalition calls for stronger laws and
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penalties was not explicitly matched by ALP policies and debates; and following their 
strains of individualism and liberalism, the Coalition did not consistently follow ALP 
demands for crime prevention or community safety projects. However, both parties did call 
for (more) money and resources to be given to police and law enforcement agencies.
Those policies reflected the general beliefs, values and opinions of each political party; and 
as such, demonstrated their ideal society and means of achieving it. For example, the 
Coalition’s desire for a society of independent individuals working to achieve their full 
potential in a free economic market is to be achieved in part by individual responsibility for 
crime. When individuals fail this responsibility, it is the various arms of the law that will 
punish them. The law is thus an essential reactive mechanism to maintain the society as 
imagined by members of the Coalition.
In contrast, the ALP desires a society of communities that are sensitive, but not subservient, 
to the needs of the individual. This society is to be achieved in part by communal action 
against and responsibility for crime. Individuals, who forgo that responsibility, are 
rehabilitated into the community rather than punished by exclusion. In effect, communal 
action is placed above individual responsibility1. Law and order for the ALP is a means of 
achieving a society focused on the common good rather than individual gain. From these 
highly simplified examples, it is possible to see the interaction between crime policy and 
ideology in their struggle to achieve the parliamentarians’ image of an ideal society. In the 
following section, I wish to attempt to determine the influence that that interaction has had 
on the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.
1 The very recent trend towards the use o f restorative justice initiatives (that emphasize individual 
responsibility) is threatening the traditional direction o f Labor platforms.
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Political Ideology, Crime Policies and Fear-of-Crime
To find the extent to which political ideologies influenced discussions about fear-of-crime, 
the 586 documents that formed the dataset for this chapter were re-examined. This time, the 
focus was not on the criticisms of the political use of fear but on the way in which each 
political party discussed fear-of-crime. It was hoped that an analysis of the beliefs about 
fear-of-crime would yield information on how the use of such fear fits in with the general 
beliefs of each party.
It was found that both the ALP and the Coalition discussed fear-of-crime in largely the 
same way: it was used as evidence or support for the need for specific pieces of legislation; 
women, children and the frail aged were considered most vulnerable both to crime and to 
feelings of fear; parliamentarians of both persuasions argued for the right of people to be 
free from fear and to feel safe; and the media was overwhelmingly seen as something that 
increases fear-of-crime. In these passages, there was little overt evidence to distinguish the 
different ideologies of each party.
However, there were contrasts found in three areas. First, there was a different emphasis 
placed on the type of crime that were discussed in regard to fear. For example, the ALP was 
responsible for all discussions about feelings of fear in the community because of anti­
social behavior. They were also responsible for the majority of the discussions about fear 
from graffiti (71%), drug-related crimes (70%) and domestic violence (67%). In contrast, 
Coalition members focused on home invasion (75%), multiple violent crimes (75%),
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organized crime (75%), specified violent crime (75%), stalking (83%) and gun related 
crimes (90%)2.
The second area of contrast was the debates about tougher sentencing for offenders 
(including mandatory sentencing and truth in sentencing). The Coalition was responsible 
for 73% of the arguments for tougher sentencing based on fear-of-crime. These policies 
were intended to reduce the public’s fear-of-crime by: offenders being placed in prison for 
longer periods; reducing the discretion afforded judges in individual cases; and eliminating 
the presumption of parole.
The third area of contrast between the parties was in their depiction of the role of the police 
in fear-of-crime. Both parties called for, in the debates studied, more police with more 
resources to reduce fear. More specifically, the ALP spoke the most (72%) about using the 
police or of police practices (e.g. high-visibility policing, community policing, and police 
beats/shop-fronts). The presence of police was intended to reduce fear-of-crime. However, 
the Coalition wished for the police to have greater powers based on the argument that 
police currently do not have sufficient legislative power to protect the public and make 
them feel safe. For the ALP, it was the presence of police to prevent crime that was to 
reduce fear. For Coalition members, that fear would be reduced by greater police power to 
investigate crime.
2 The Coalition was responsible for 100% of the passages on computer crime and unspecified violent crimes. 
However, these groups consisted of only one or two passages each and consequently were not included in the 
final analysis.
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As with the crime policies discussed above, these propositions to address fear-of-crime 
demonstrated the influence of different elements of each political party’s ideology. The 
division in time spent discussing particular crimes could be explained by a differing 
emphasis that is placed on the individual and the community in each party’s beliefs. The 
contrasting arguments for and against tougher penalties for offenders may demonstrate the 
different political desires to punish versus rehabilitate offenders and the implications of 
such desires for individual or collective responsibility for criminal victimization. Finally, 
the differing conceptions of the role of the police may highlight the interventionist versus 
minimalist concept of government and the prevention versus prosecution focus of the ALP 
and the Coalition respectively. It would thus be possible to argue that the ideological stance 
of the political party does have an influence on the crime policies in which fear-of-crime is 
discussed.
However, there is one important aspect of the role of fear-of-crime in these discussions. In 
these contrasting areas, fear was used as rhetorical evidence for the argument presented as 
one would use crime statistics or victimization survey data. The presence of fear-of-crime 
in the community was used as evidence of a perceived need for government action, as 
support for proposed legislation or government initiatives, and as an indicator of the 
success (or failure) of legislation and other government activities. The ideology of each 
party was reflected in the crime and social justice policies. Fear-of-crime itself was not the 
focus of the discussions. In effect, that fear formed rhetorical evidence for the ‘truth’ of the 
politician’s beliefs, values and opinions about the world.
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B a l a n c i n g  F e a r - o f - C r i m e , E x p e d i e n c y  and  I d e o l o g y
In this chapter, I have sought to examine the balance between expediency and ideology that 
is sought by Australian parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. To do this, I began 
with the claims of political expediency that were made by parliamentarians against other 
parliamentarians in Australia. These claims were grouped into three main areas: increasing 
fear to gain support for the party; the tactical use of fear to gain support for a particular 
piece of policy; and the generation or creation of fear as a means of setting the agenda for 
discussion. These criticisms highlight methods of using fear-of-crime that parliamentarians 
considered to be motivated by self-interest.
It was also argued that the use of fear-of-crime may be (implicitly) motivated by 
ideological principles. Consequently, I then attempted to examine the influence that the 
ideology of each political party has on the policies developed and presented by 
parliamentarians. It was found that the beliefs of the party are reflected in the crime policies 
presented. Fear-of-crime is found within these arguments but not as arguments themselves. 
Fear functioned as evidence for the proposed success of a particular policy on crime. In 
other words, the presence of fear-of-crime in the community is used as evidence for the 
need for a particular policy on crime. These policies reflect the political party’s ideology. 
Fear-of-crime is used as evidence for the truth of the party’s beliefs and opinions about the 
world, for the ‘truth’ of the image of society and the mechanisms (i.e. crime policies) to 
make that image a reality .
1 The use of crime in this way has been suggested by King (1989).
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In this chapter, I have sought to examine the balance between ideology and expediency that 
is evident in political discussions about fear-of-crime. While an exact numerical figure 
cannot be placed on the balancing of ideology and expediency, these discussions do 
highlight the utility of fear-of-crime in political discourse. It has been shown that 
parliamentarians perceive fear-of-crime to be useful in gaining self-interested advantage 
during the workings of political competition. It has also been shown that fear-of-crime is 
perceived to be useful in achieving the realization of one’s ideal society by provided 
evidence of the ‘truth’ of that image. Discussing the public’s fears and the government’s 
response is useful in politics irrespective of the mixture of influence from concerns of 
expediency and ideology. This finding is supported by the mixed influence that institutional 
factors such as being in the government or oppositional role have on the way in which fear- 
of-crime is debated in Australian parliaments. Despite the inability to demonstrate that the 
scales are tipped one way or the other towards ideology or expediency in guiding these 
debates, the results contained in this chapter do nonetheless highlight the utility of talking 
about fear-of-crime.
There is of course, a danger that lies with the utility of fear-of-crime. The debates about 
fear-of-crime by parliamentarians may increase the level of actual fear that is felt in the 
community. This warning has been sounded by academics such as: “[P]eople seem to be 
highly concerned with crime only when the media and politicians tell them that they should 
be highly concerned with crime” (Schwartz & Israel, 2000: 337 (see also Beckett 1997; 
Braithwaite et al., 1979)). The process of shaping or distorting images of crime within the 
politics of law and order may generate and spread fear-of-crime (Scheingold, 1984; 
Steinert, 2003). It is this danger that needs to be kept in mind when considering the utility
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of talking about fear-of-crime, whether that utility is derived from expediency or ideology, 
in parliamentary debates about law and order.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
This chapter sought to examine the data from the perspective of how images of society are 
reflected in language. It is a case study that is situated on the far extreme of the continuum 
between language and societal influences on the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. 
On the basis of Downs’ theory of political party competition, theoretical research was 
presented that suggested parliamentarians balance ideological principles with their desire 
for short-term self-interested political advantage. Empirical evidence from Australian 
politics was then presented in regard to the balancing of these tensions in debates about 
fear-of-crime. On the basis of this evidence it was argued that fear-of-crime is a useful topic 
in politics because it assists in the realization of a particular image of society by providing 
support for the means of its achievement and it provides support for policies, programs, 
arguments and other activities that are perceived to grant short-term political advantage. 
This utility also heralds a hidden danger that such debates about fear-of-crime may raise the 
level of actual fear felt by members of the community, irrespective of whether the issue is 
being “used” for ideological or expedient reasons.
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Three  D iscourses  on Fe a r -o f -C rime
Chapter Eleven Three Discourses
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore and characterize Australian parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime. This chapter has the aim of bringing together all of those 
characteristics and identifying commonalities that may indicate the presence of discourses 
relating to fear-of-crime. To do this, I will present a discussion of the three discourses that, 
I argue, are evident in the debates about fear-of-crime based on the results of the case 
studies. The implications for criminological research of both those discourses and the 
research presented in this thesis will be discussed in the Chapter that follows.
Based on the case studies examining the data from various perspectives of linguistic and 
societal influences, particular characteristics were identified in parliamentary debates about 
fear-of-crime (see Figure 1 given at the end of the Introduction to this thesis). The 
commonalities and sources of overlap between these characteristics serve to highlight three 
particular ways of organizing parliamentary talk about this type of fear (i.e., three 
discourses). The discourses identified are the following:
■ The Protector Discourse -  The government is in control and protecting the public
from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). 
The public is legitimately afraid but is passive and 
dependent on the government to be relieved of their 
suffering.
■ The Supporter Discourse -  The government will support the public but cannot be
blamed for the actions of criminals who cause the public to 
be afraid. The public is active and responsible for their 
safety that is threatened by, and their fear that is caused, by 
street crimes and other dangers in the environment.
276
Chapter Eleven Three Discourses
■ The Manipulator Discourse -  The parliamentarian is selfishly oriented towards their
personal gain and sees only the utility of the public’s fear- 
of-crime.
These discourses have been identified by studying the commonalities between the results of 
the previous chapters. While acknowledging that the case studies formed only portals into 
the characteristics of fear-of-crime debates, the results still have the capability of 
suggesting the existence of these discourses. Verification and expansion of these discourses 
would occur with further research into other linguistic and societal influences not studied 
here.
D i s c o u r s e  1: T he P r o t e c t o r  D i s c o u r s e
The government is in control and protecting the public from a causeless, timeless and 
placeless fear (-of-crime). The public is legitimately afraid but is passive and 
dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering.
Figure 11.1 below depicts the links between the case studies in the first of the discourses 
identified in political debates about fear-of-crime -  the protector discourse.
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Figure 11.1: The Protector Discourse
CS4: Responsibility CS2: Metaphors
7 a
C^The government is in control and protecting the pubhc^>
C^from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime) CS1: Agency
The public is legitimately afraid")— —----► CS3: Common Sense
^buTis passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their suffering!^)— — ► CS1: Agency
The description of the protector discourse can be broken into four segments based on their 
source case study. Segment A (“the government is in control and protecting the public”) is 
drawn from Case Study 4 (Chapter Nine) that examined attempts to shift responsibility for 
crime and fear-of-crime. It was argued that the actions of governments were suggestive of 
an attempt to shift causal responsibility and its associated blame onto the public but for 
treatment responsibility and the associated image of control to remain firmly in the hands of 
government and political representatives. As will be discussed below, this image of control 
facilitates the political utility of fear-of-crime.
The debate about responsibility for fear-of-crime also served to define the roles and 
responsibilities of actors in the discourse. This definition was assisted through the use of 
war-related metaphors as discussed in Case Study 2 (Chapter Seven). The government has 
the responsibility and the ability (through control of the arms of law enforcement etc) to 
‘treat’ fear-of-crime. The government argues that it will protect “us”, the frightened public,
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in the war on crime; it is the commander-in-chief of the forces that do battle with “them”, 
the threatening criminal.
The characteristics of public fear (Segment B) that generate these identities and 
responsibilities were given mainly through Case Study 1 (Chapter Six). Two conceptions of 
fear-of-crime were identified: one as an abstract entity and the other as a concrete fear of an 
external stimulus. In the protector discourse, it is the abstract conception of fear-of-crime 
that is dominant. This is indicated by the unspecified nature of the threat emphasized 
through the use of war-related metaphors (discussed in Chapter Seven) and through the 
treatment of the “problem” of fear-of-crime (discussed below). These commonalities 
suggest the dominance of this concept of fear-of-crime in the protector discourse.
The consequence of this abstract entity in the discourse is that the government is protecting 
the public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). In Chapter Six, it was 
argued that this concept is causeless in that the link to a particular agent has been removed; 
it is no longer possible to identify the actor, only the affected. It is also rendered timeless 
and placeless through further linguistic deletions of the classifications of modality and 
tense. This abstract concept of fear-of-crime affects the public with little or no reference to 
when, where and why. It is to protect the public from this fear-of-crime that the government 
needs to utilize its control and protect the public.
Segment C (“the public is legitimately afraid”) is again suggested through the results of a 
combination of the case studies. In Chapter Seven, the use of war-related metaphors was 
argued to construct the identity of a fearful public. Chapter Eight showed that this fear (and
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the associated identity) gained a sense of legitimacy because of its grounding in 
commonsense. Finally, in Chapter Ten, members of the public reporting that they are afraid 
was rarely the topic of contention. Instead, parliamentarians debated government responses, 
legislation, police practices and so on that were in response to this fear. It was rarely 
questioned in the arguments in this discourse that the public is afraid. These results support 
the notion that in the protector discourse, the public is considered to be legitimately afraid.
The final segment (D) refers to the public being “passive and dependent on the government 
to be relieved of their suffering”. This segment again stems from the results of Case Study 
1 on agency and abstract entities. Given that the concept of fear-of-crime being used in this 
discourse is abstract and removed from reality, the consequences discussed for this type of 
fear need also to be applied to the discourse itself. The abstract fear-of-crime takes on its 
own agency and thereby denies that of the public. Due to their inability to protect 
themselves, the public becomes dependent on the government for protection against the 
fear that plagues them. Fear-of-crime, as an independent entity, is something that affects 
members of the public rather than the public feeling afraid. Thus, the concept of fear-of- 
crime renders the public as passive and dependent on government action to remove that 
fear.
In summary, the characteristics of political debates about fear-of-crime can be organized 
into three discourses, the first of which has been discussed above. The protector discourse 
depicts the government as being in control and protecting the public from a causeless, 
timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). At the same time, the public is portrayed as being 
legitimately afraid but passive and dependent on the government to be relieved of their
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suffering from fear-of-crime. The following section will analyze a number of particular 
aspects of social practices in which this discourse exists and the impact that the discourse 
itself has on those practices. This analysis will provide a deeper examination of the social 
identities and relations involved, as well as the ideological and political effects of the 
protector discourse.
Social Practices and the Protector Discourse
The following sections will first discuss the social identities and relations that are involved 
in the protector discourse. Second, the ideological effects and thirdly the political effects of 
the discourse will be examined. By integrating both the results of the case studies and a 
general analysis of social practices, a greater understanding of the effects of the protector 
discourse on the social reality will be sought.
Social Identities of Protection
There are three key social identities that are used by the protector discourse. The first is the 
image of the public as vulnerable to crime. This image was particularly applied to the 
elderly with slightly less emphasis being placed on vulnerability when discussing the fear- 
of-crime among women and children. Vulnerability among these demographics was used as 
reasons for why the parliamentarian’s arguments should be accepted. Parliamentarians used 
arguments based on the reason that such people were afraid because of a perceived 
vulnerability to criminal victimization (e.g., inability to physically defend oneself due to 
frailty). The main focus of such debates was whether people were afraid of their
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vulnerability to crime. At no stage was there questioning of the image of the elderly, 
women and children as being vulnerable. It was accepted as the prevailing social identity.
The second social identity was that of the public being in need of government protection. 
This identity is, in part, connected to the image of certain sub-groups of the population 
being vulnerable to crime. However, the desire for protection was depicted as being felt by 
all members of the community. The public in the parliamentary debates were described as 
‘demanding’, ‘crying out for’ and ‘expecting’ government action to make people aware of 
possible criminal behavior; that the level of the fear-of-crime in the community made it 
imperative that the government act to address crime. Public fears about crime formed the 
impetus for them wanting greater protection.
The final social identity that was evident in the protector discourse was for the government 
to be the protector of the community. This identity has been discussed in-depth in Chapter 
Nine in regard to responsibility for crime and fear-of-crime. That responsibility (and thus 
certain aspects of the identity as a protector) was shared amongst the various arms of 
government. Government programs were run at national, state, and council levels with 
federally-run programs intended to gather information and council-run programs designed 
to address specific grass-roots problems. Consequently, the identity of protector was taken 
up at the federal level through the collection of information about the fear-of-crime, while 
protection was given through local council initiatives to fix individual problems such as 
low street lighting or anti-social behavior that may cause public fear. Each level of 
government argued that it had taken on that identity of a protector of the community in 
some way.
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The police were also described as an instrument of government used to protect the public. 
Such discussions focused on increasing police numbers, visibility, presence and contact 
with the public. Despite different topics and themes, the discussions were all following the 
same principle: the more police that are perceived to be on the streets ‘protecting the 
public’, the lower the public’s level of fear-of-crime. Police practices such as high visibility 
policing, community policing, police beats and shop-fronts and police volunteers were 
directed to increasing the perceived presence of the police in the community. These 
strategies were intended to deal with the fear-of-crime through the management of 
perceptions rather than reducing the crime rate. The dislocation of public fear from crime as 
evidenced by police strategies to address it, supports the concept of the fear-of-crime as an 
independent entity (a key part of the protector discourse and discussed in detail in Chapter 
Six).
In summary, the protector discourse relies on the recognition of three social identities. First, 
the public, and in particular women, the elderly and children, are seen as vulnerable to 
crime and (therefore) afraid. Second, the public is argued to be in need of and demanding 
government protection from crime. Third, all levels of government have sought to take on 
the identity of the provider of that protection for the community through programs and the 
gathering of information. In particular, the police are used to help construct this identity by 
altering the perception of their ability to protect every individual. Each of these identities 
have inherent roles and responsibilities that guide the way in which people interact, the 
construction of the social structures in which they interact and ultimately the way they talk 
about and respond to the problem of crime and the fear-of-crime.
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Social Relations of Protection
In the protector discourse, there are also certain social relations that were created and/or 
reproduced through the identities just discussed as well as through the general body of 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. The first social relation that is relevant to the 
protector discourse is the relationship between the community and the government. As 
indicated in the discussion above of social identities, this relationship is one where the 
public is vulnerable and in need of protection from the government with the government 
seeking to fulfill that role of protector. The relationship between the community and the 
government was discussed in the debates collected from both the perspective of the 
community and their perceived role of the government, and the perspective of the 
government and their perception of how the community is feeling (about crime). In each 
case, concerns about issues of safety, protection and fear from crime were paramount. The 
main characteristic of this set of social relations was one of dependence of the public on the 
government.
The relationship between parliamentarians and police was also touched on by this 
discourse. The police were generally seen as an arm of the government and as a 
consequence, take on the role of protecting the public in ways discussed above. However, 
this particular relationship is between police and parliamentarians as against government 
members. As a result much of the debates involved in this set of social relations are 
dominated by opposition comments criticizing the police for not doing enough to 
acknowledge the fear-of-crime in the community. In contrast to the relationship between 
the community and the government, the parliamentary debates analyzed depicted the
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interaction between parliamentarians and police as being an antagonistic one-sided diatribe 
against the police.
Parliamentarians’ relationship with the community also contrasted with the government’s 
relationship with the community. Where the government sought to show action on law and 
order issues, parliamentarians were concerned with public emotive sentiment. 
Parliamentarians (on both sides) attempted to demonstrate their empathy with the fears of 
the public, to show that they not only recognized the public’s fear but also gave that fear 
legitimacy and rationality. It was evident that such displays of empathy (along with 
criticisms of these displays to be discussed in regard to the manipulator discourse below) 
were part of a competitive strategy (see Chapter Ten).
Thus, there are three main social relations that are referred to in the protector discourse: the 
protective role of the government over a vulnerable and frightened public; the antagonistic 
one-sided critical relationship of parliamentarians to police; and the strategic empathetic 
relationship between the parliamentarian and the community. These relations, combined 
with the social structures described in Chapter Three, serve to highlight aspects of the 
social reality in which the protector discourse exists, creates and maintains.
The Ideological Effect of the Protector Discourse
Each discourse will have an ideological effect on both the speaker and the target audience. 
The same definition of ideology will be used here as was given Chapter Ten: ideology is a 
coherent and interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior. As 
such, a particular organization of words and sentences into a discourse will necessarily
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affect the messages, images and beliefs that those words and sentences are intended to 
convey. This in turn will change the way in which a person responds both to the discourse 
itself and to the external subject matter. In other words, the framing of an issue will change 
how the audiences respond in terms of their beliefs, values and principles as well as their 
overt behavior. This is the ideological effect of discourses.
In order to examine the ideological effects of the protector discourse specifically, the 
associated assumptions made by the speaker about the knowledge of the target audience 
and the required belief system(s) will be discussed in the sections below. Following on 
from this, the behavioral changes that were depicted in the parliamentary debates as 
resulting from fear-of-crime will be given as a means of highlighting the component of 
ideology that guides human behavior. It should be noted that this thesis does not seek to 
empirically test the behavioral effect of parliamentary discourses about crime. As a result, 
the behaviors depicted in the discourses will be used as a proxy for the behavior desired by 
the ideology. While benefiting from further research, it is the combination of knowledge, 
beliefs and (suggested) behaviors that will identity the ideological effects of the protector 
discourse.
Knowledge and Beliefs about Protection
In the majority of instances of communication, there are some assumptions made by the 
speaker about the knowledge of the target audience. In the protector discourse, it was 
commonly assumed that all parliamentarians had knowledge about fear-of-crime. This 
knowledge encompassed research on the issue, types of crimes that may provoke fear, and 
definitions of the fear-of-crime itself. The focus of this assumed knowledge on the
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“problem” of fear-of-crime as against the experience of it or the occurrence of crime 
contrasts with that assumed in the supporter discourse. It also supports an abstract 
conception of fear-of-crime and suggests that the “problem” has “solutions”. More 
fundamentally however, it allows a wider array of issues to be collected (strategically) 
under its banner. This facilitates the utility of discussing fear-of-crime in politics.
In addition to an assumed base of knowledge, the protector discourse also requires that the 
audience has a particular belief system if they are to accept unchallenged the maxims 
within the discourse. For the purposes of this discussion, a belief system refers to a distinct 
organization of knowledge, elements of discourse, as well as social relations and identities, 
that guide expectations about how a society will function. It refers to the beliefs about how 
a society should work, about the roles that people take and the responsibilities that they 
hold.
In the case of the protector discourse, the assumptions about knowledge combine with the 
social relations and identities discussed above to indicate that it is the government’s role 
and responsibility to protect the vulnerable in the community from the problem of fear-of- 
crime. It is a combination of beliefs stemming from: the identities of the public as 
vulnerable and in need of protection and the government as the provider of that protection; 
the relations between the community, government, parliamentarians and police; and finally 
the assumed knowledge about the problem of fear-of-crime itself. This belief system, as 
given by the protector discourse, provides a strong influence on expectations of how society 
should function, parliamentarians should act and citizens should behave.
287
Chapter Eleven Three Discourses
Behavioral Changes in Search of Protection
The last part of the ideological effects to be examined here is that of the behavioral changes 
in members of the public that are described by parliamentarians to be as a result of fear-of- 
crime. In general, the behavior of citizens in response to fear-of-crime was not dependent 
on the discourse being used by the parliamentarian. The argued effect of fear-of-crime is to 
change behavioral patterns in an attempt to reduce that fear. Members of the public are seen 
to withdraw from the street and into their homes. The home takes on significance as a 
sacred place of safety. Physical and personal measures are then taken to ensure that that 
safety is not compromised. These behaviors will be discussed in greater detail below.
Fear-of-crime was argued to affect the community in four ways. First, there was argued to 
be a change in the way in which people interacted with each other. For example, there may 
be a redefinition of what is personal and what is public, a weakening of the social fabric of 
the community or attacking the heart of the community and reducing social standards of 
behavior. Fear-of-crime was argued to have affected interpersonal networks in society 
making people more distant from each other and changing the standards by which people 
operate. In effect, fear-of-crime reduced the level of informal social control that was 
exercised and expected to be exercised.
Secondly, fear-of-crime restricted or changed the community’s behavior. Restrictions were 
evident in the use of the community for activities in public places. More general arguments 
were also made that fear-of-crime restricted the quality of day-to-day lives. The behavior of 
the community was perceived to have changed either generally or in an attempt to avoid 
victimization by looking around them for threats, closing doors and changing previously
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frequented public places. All of these behaviors could be described as attempts by the 
community to reduce their perceived risk of victimization and thereby their fear-of-crime.
Thirdly, there were two specific behavioral changes that were frequently discussed by 
parliamentarians. The first was the effect of fear-of-crime on people’s use of the streets. 
Here, people were either prevented from walking the streets purely from fear or prevented 
because of fear generated by darkness. In these situations, it was the location and the levels 
of lighting that was seen to generate fear-of-crime, rather than a specific type of crime or 
offender. The streets were argued to be a place of fear and a place to be avoided.
The second specific type of behavioral effect was to stay at home. This type of behavioral 
change was manifested through people not going out because of a fear of an unspecified 
crime, or a fear of home-related offences such as break and enters. People also did not go 
out because of the amount of light (i.e. after a certain time of day or at night). Finally, the 
elderly especially were argued to ‘build fortresses’ for their own protection. These 
arguments emphasized that it was the streets or even just ‘outside’ and the time of day that 
create fear. Homes appear to be places of safety and people feel a need to protect those 
places either through physical barriers or through simply being at home.
The fourth and final behavioral change that was discussed by parliamentarians as resulting 
from fear-of-crime focused on the use of physical and environmental changes. These 
responses were generally to build walls around homes, fit bars onto doors and/or windows, 
lock doors or simply (excessive) expenditure on unspecified security measures. Within 
these responses, there was frequently a ‘fortress’ or a ‘prisoner’ mentality described. Being
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able to describe a ‘mentality’ seemed to give the parliamentarian a ready-made symbol that
conjures up dramatic images of the negative effects that fear-of-crime may have. Again, the 
home is considered to be a place of safety and there is perceived to be a general need to 
protect that place through security measures.
In summary, the political debates about fear-of-crime depicted four types of behavioral 
changes in the public in response to that fear: a change in the social relations between 
members of the public, restricted or changed behavior (including avoiding walking the 
streets and staying at home) and the promotion of physical and environmental changes 
especially around the home. These behavioral changes were discussed irrespective of the 
political persuasion of the speaker or the discourse in which they were mentioned.
However, the discourse did affect the purpose for which they were mentioned. In the 
protector discourse, these behavioral changes were used as evidence for the need for 
government action to protect the community from crime and the fear-of-crime. 
Parliamentarians argued that the public should not have to change their behavior in this way 
because it was the government’s responsibility to protect the public. Again, the social 
relations and identities and the assumed knowledge already discussed are evident in these 
arguments relating to the behavior of the public and the role of the government. While there 
were behavioral changes identified by parliamentarians, these changes were used in much 
the same way as fear-of-crime itself is used in parliamentary debates -  as rhetorical support 
for the conclusions of the argument (see the discussion in Chapter Ten).
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Thus, the ideological effects of the protector discourse are to portray reality in terms of a 
public that is vulnerable to and fearful of crime and a government that will protect them 
from crime. It is a reality in which the government acts to address crime, spurred on by 
empathetic parliamentarians who recognize the plight of the public and believe that more 
should be done for protection in response to the problem of the fear-of-crime. The 
behavioral changes of the public are simply evidence of their vulnerability and their need 
for protection.
The Political Effects of the Protector Discourse
Finally, the political effects of the protector discourse can be discussed on the basis of the 
results of the case studies, the social identities and relations and the ideological effects 
examined above. Examining the political effects seeks to examine the reasons behind the 
development and maintenance of a particular discourse; to ask what purpose a discourse 
serves.
In the case of the protector discourse, there were two main political effects identified. First, 
the discourse allows parliamentarians to show action on law and order issues in general and 
more specifically, on issues relating to the fear-of-crime. Action is demonstrated through 
political speeches recognizing the public’s fear and the behavioral consequences of that fear 
as well as more traditional means such as implementing government initiatives and 
changing police practices. As described above, the type of knowledge about the fear-of- 
crime among parliamentarians required by this discourse enables action to be demonstrated 
in a wide variety of domains due to the perceived magnitude and urgency of the problem.
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The second political effect of the protector discourse is that it places the government in a
position of control. The social relations and identities inherent in this discourse construct 
the public as passive, vulnerable, responsible (and blamed) for their victimization and yet 
dependent on the government for protection. Meanwhile the government takes on 
responsibility for protecting the public granting them an image of strength and power 
through their control of the means of securing that protection. These two political effects of 
the protector discourse combine to create an image of a government that is actively and 
effectively serving the needs of the public in a responsive manner.
Summary of the Protector Discourse
The protector discourse depicts the government as being in control and protecting the 
public from a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). At the same time, the 
public is portrayed as being legitimately afraid but passive and dependent on the 
government to be relieved of their suffering from fear-of-crime. This way of organizing 
particular characteristics of the parliamentary debates studied was then analyzed in regard 
to its existence in and influence on aspects of social practices -  identities, relations and 
ideological and political effects.
There were three social identities involved in this discourse: the public as vulnerable to 
crime and (therefore) afraid, the public in need of and demanding government protection 
from crime, and the government as the provider of that protection. There were also three 
main social relations that were referred to: the protective role of the government over a 
vulnerable, dependent and frightened public; the antagonistic one-sided critical relationship
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of parliamentarians to police; and the strategic empathetic relationship between the 
parliamentarian and the community.
The ideological effects of the protector discourse are to portray reality in terms of a public 
that is vulnerable to and fearful of crime and a government that will protect them from 
crime. There were two political effects identified as resulting from the protector discourse: 
parliamentarians were able to show action on law and order issues, and the government was 
able to show that they are in control. The two political effects of the protector discourse 
combine with the ideological effects to create an image of a government that is actively and 
effectively responding to and serving the needs of the public.
Thus the protector discourse, identified in political debates about fear-of-crime, serves as a 
means of organizing statements about a passive, frightened and dependent yet responsible 
public that seeks the protection of an empathetic/responsive and able government from the 
effects of a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The discourse seeks to create 
a reality in which the government acts to address crime, spurred on by empathetic 
parliamentarians who recognize the plight of the public and believe that more should be 
done for protection in response to the problem of the fear-of-crime.
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D i s c o u r s e  2: T he S u p p o r t e r  D i s c o u r s e
The government will support the public but cannot be blamed for the actions of 
criminals who cause the public to be afraid. The public is active and responsible for 
their safety that is threatened by and their fear that is caused by street crimes and other 
dangers in the environment.
As with the protector discourse, the supporter discourse is derived from the characteristics 
identified in the case studies of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. Figure 11.2 
below depicts how the description of this discourse was drawn together from those case 
studies.
Figure 11.2: The Supporter Discourse
The government will support the p ub lic)--------- ► CS2: Metaphors
but cannot be blamed ^ — ► C$4: Responsibility
(^ fb rth e  actions of criminals who cause the public to be afraid.
CS1: Agency; CS2: Metaphors; 
CS3: Common Sense
(The public is active CS1: Agency
and responsible for their safety and fear CS4: Responsibility
(clueto" to street crimes and other threats in the environment. CS2: Metaphors; CS3: Common Sense
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The description can be divided into six segments. Segment A (“government will support 
the public” is drawn from the definition of actors’ roles that was identified through the use 
of fight-related metaphors described in Case Study 2 (Chapter Seven). Fight-related 
metaphors were argued to set the role of government as one of support -  where the 
government was supporting the community in their fight against crime and fear-of-crime.
Segment B (“cannot be blamed”) is the other half of the characteristic of the protector 
discourse “government is in control”. In the supporter discourse, the government wishes to 
maintain treatment responsibility for law and order issues. Treatment responsibility grants 
images of control of resources to fix problems whereas causal responsibility grants 
potential blame for the event occurring. Therefore, in both the protector and the support 
discourses, the government maintains treatment responsibility and attempts to shift causal 
responsibility to the community.
However, there is a different emphasis in the supporter discourse. The focus is no longer on 
the ability to control the resources of the state and utilize them for the protection of the 
public. Instead, emphasis is placed on the inappropriateness of attributions of causal 
responsibility to the government. The government is presenting itself as not being 
responsible for the criminal events occurring and therefore they cannot be blamed for any 
fear that the public may feel. It is the negative effect of blame associations that is inherent 
in attributions of treatment responsibility (as against the positive effect of granting the 
image of control) that is emphasized in the supporter discourse.
295
Chapter Eleven Three Discourses
Segment C (“actions of criminals who cause the public to be afraid”) is a group of 
characteristics that are drawn from three of the six case studies: Case Study 1 on agency 
and abstract entities, Case Study 2 examining violence metaphors, and Case Study Three 
discussing common sense statements about fear-of-crime. Each of these case studies 
defined the actors involved in the cause of fear-of-crime. Criminals were depicted as being 
the reason for the public’s fear. In the agency- and metaphor- related case studies, this was 
done through the definitions of “us” versus “them”, constructions of identity and the setting 
of roles for actors. The agency case study in particular identified a concrete conception of 
fear-of-crime (as against the abstract entity conceived of in the protector discourse) that had 
a strong link between fear and the criminal act. Case Study 3 examined common sense 
statements about fear-of-crime and its link with rates of crime. These results identified the 
characteristic in some parliamentary debates that public fear-of-crime was caused by the 
actions of criminals.
Segment D (“the public is active”) sees the follow on from the use of the concrete concept 
of fear-of-crime in segment C. When a causal link is maintained between fear-of-crime and 
crime, public agency is not denied. The public is described as being active and able to 
participate in their own victimization prevention and fear reduction. This was demonstrated 
in detail in Case Study 1 (Chapter Six).
Segment E (“responsible for their safety and fear”) is a characteristic that was identified in 
Case Study 4 investigating attributions of responsibility (Chapter Nine). It was shown that 
the government is attempting to shift causal responsibility onto the community. In other 
words, the community is increasingly considered to be responsible for the opportunities
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they provide to offenders as well as protecting themselves against possible criminal 
victimization. Coming along with that responsibility for safety and feelings of fear-of- 
crime, is also the blame for criminal events -  the blame that is denied by the government in 
Segment B.
The final segment (F) referred to “street crimes and other dangers in the environment” as 
being the reason that the community is responsible for their safety and fear. This 
characteristic was identified through the case studies that examined the use of violence 
metaphors and appeals to common sense. In particular, fight-related metaphors were found 
to be used in conjunction with specific (street) crimes or events not necessarily criminal but 
that are considered to provoke feelings of fear (e.g., anti-social behavior). Certain 
environments were also discussed as being fear-evoking such as dark alleyways or ill-lit 
parks. The relationship of these perceived threats to safety and the resultant feelings of fear 
were captured by the common sense statements examined. It was the street that was the 
source of threat and as a consequence, a source of fear.
In summary, the supporter discourse was identified out of commonalities between 
particular characteristics that were identified in the case studies. It is a discourse that 
depicts the government as taking a supportive role of the public. In doing so, the 
government rejects attempts to lay blame at their feet for the actions of criminals that cause 
the public to feel afraid. Instead, the public is considered to be active and responsible for 
their safety and reduction of fear, where threat to that safety is a result of street crimes and 
other dangers in the environment. In contrast to the protector discourse, the supporter 
discourse is heavily focused on the causal link between crime and fear-of-crime. It also
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almost reverses the roles and relationships taken by the public and the government. These 
and other features of the social practices will be discussed in the following section.
Social Practices and the Supporter D iscourse
This section will discuss the social practices that influence and are influenced by the 
supporter discourse. It will follow the same structure and rationale as the discussion of 
social practices and the protector discourse -  the social relations and identities, and the 
ideological and political effects. As a consequence, some justifications will be omitted in 
order to reduce duplication with the previous sections.
Social Identities of Support
The public are given a complex mix of two identities; of being at once active and 
responsible while also being fearful. Much of the first identity has already been discussed 
in Chapter Nine. The public is active and responsible. In effect, they are considered to be 
rational players in their own experience of life. The second identity given to the public is 
that of being fearful. This is a state that is traditionally perceived as being irrational (see for 
example the ir/rationality debates in regard to fear-of-crime: Ferraro, 1995; Lotz, 1979; RI 
Mawby, 1988; Mawby et al., 2000; Mugford, 1984; Ward, 1986). The combination of these 
two identities results in the public being responsible for the need to rationally respond to 
their irrational fears. It is an identity that is praised for its proactive stance but derided when 
action is taken because it is action initiated by an irrational reason.
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The government has a far more simple identity in this discourse. They are there to support 
the public. However, this support is given at arms length with little evident desire to get 
involved in the issues between the community and outsiders for whom they hold no 
responsibility. The supporter discourse portrays the government as agreeing that the fight 
against crime should be fought and promising to support the public in doing that. While not 
fully passive, the role taken by the government is less active and involved than that taken in 
the protector discourse.
Social Rela tions of Support
These identities are reflected in the three sets of social relations evident in this discourse. 
The first was the relationship between members of the community, with a subset of this 
being the relationship between the community and criminals. Fear-of-crime was described 
as a result of the actions of certain members of the community against others. Specific 
groups of people were described as being afraid -  elderly, women, and children -  and the 
focus was on the fear these people felt rather than the criminal actions. As a result, the 
relationship between members of the community was depicted from the point of view of the 
fearful and their actions and demands. The relationship was one where there were deviant 
subsections of the community preying on fearful people who were then acting in response 
to those deviants. Such a relationship reflects the identities described above. The public is 
at once fearful and active, and the government is not directly involved.
The second set of social relations was between the government and the community. As a 
general category of social relations, the relationship between the government and the 
community has been discussed at length in regard to the protector discourse. However,
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when the supporter discourse was used the government initiatives, funding and programs 
were given not with the intention of ‘protecting’ the public but with the intention of 
‘helping’ them. This reflects the secondary role which the government takes in this 
discourse.
Similarly the final set of social relations relevant to the supporter discourse was also 
described with regard to the protector discourse above. This is the relationship between the 
parliamentarian and the community. Parliamentarians were described as attempting to 
demonstrate their empathy with a fearful public. Such displays sought to provide a sense of 
legitimacy and rationality to public fear (although in the case of the supporter discourse this 
sense is limited by the perception of irrationality attached to the identity of the fearful 
public). The overlap between these discourses indicates both the common ground on which 
they exist and a potential place of tension in regard to the display of empathy as a protector 
or as a supporter.
In summary, this section has described the social identities and relations involved in the 
supporter discourse. It has been argued that the public is given a complex mix of two 
identities by this discourse. First, the public is seen as active and responsible for their own 
protection. Secondly, the public is given the identity of being afraid. When combined, these 
identities exist in tension through the complex mix of behavior in response to an allegedly 
irrational feeling. The identity of the government is more straightforward as a supportive 
mentor. These identities influence the social relations that were evident in the discourse. 
Crime and fear-of-crime were depicted as a result of the relationship between members of
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the community with the government there as a supporter and occasional mediator rather 
than as champion -  like a parent of squabbling siblings.
The Ideological Effect of the Supporter Discourse
With these social identities and relations in mind, the ideological effect of the supporter 
discourse can be outlined in terms of the assumed knowledge of the target audience, the 
required belief system and the behaviors that are described within the supporter discourse.
Knowledge and Beliefs about Support
Similar to the protector discourse, those using the supporter discourse tended to assume that 
their audience would have some knowledge of fear-of-crime (i.e., related research, types of 
crimes and definitions). While this indicates that fear-of-crime is again being set up as a 
“problem” to be fixed, it is tempered in this case by the other two domains of assumed 
knowledge required by this discourse. It was assumed that the audience would first, have 
some (direct or indirect) experience with criminal victimization and second, have an 
understanding of crime statistics. These latter two assumptions of knowledge reflect the 
causal link between crime and fear-of-crime that is evident in this discourse; and as a 
consequence, tie the potentially abstract problem of fear-of-crime to incidents of criminal 
behavior.
Associated with these assumptions in knowledge is the requirement of a particular set of
beliefs in order that the maxims of the discourse are accepted. For the supporter discourse,
this belief system was that levels of fear-of-crime are related to the incidence or rates of
crime. This again reinforces the concrete concept used in this discourse - that this type of
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fear truly is a fear of crime. Without this belief, the arguments referring to the causal 
relationship between these phenomena would be rejected as would the identities and 
relations described above.
Behavioral Changes in Search of Support
The final element of the ideological effects is in the behaviors that are described in the 
discourse. As stated above, the type of behavioral changes that are argued by 
parliamentarians to be a result of fear-of-crime were not dependent on the discourse being 
used. Instead, the way in which those behaviors were used within the argument differed in 
relation to the discourse. In the supporter discourse, government action was called for in 
order to support the public in their fight against crime. While parliamentarians 
acknowledged that protection did need to be given in some form, it was the public’s 
responsibility to protect themselves (despite at times needing government help to do so).
From these discussions, it can be said that the ideological effect of the supporter discourse 
was to create a reality based on the belief that fear-of-crime was felt as a result of criminal 
behavior and the experience of such behavior was understood by most people. It is a reality 
where the behaviors of the public are intended to protect themselves from criminal 
victimization; and in situations when their ability falls short of their responsibility, the 
government functions to support the public in ensuring protection.
The Political Effects of the Supporter Discourse
The main political effects of the supporter discourse are two-fold. First, parliamentarians
are granted an opportunity to show action on law and order issues in general and more 
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specifically, on issues relating to crime and fear-of-crime. Similar to the protector 
discourse, action can be demonstrated through recognition of feelings of fear as well as 
implementing government initiatives and programs or changing police practices. However 
in this discourse, those actions are specific to crime or to fear-of-crime. In the protector 
discourse, the required knowledge allowed parliamentarians to incorporate a variety of 
issues within the problem of fear. The strong causal link between crime and fear that 
pervades the supporter discourse prevents this. Parliamentarians are required to show action 
against crime because crime is the reason for the public feeling afraid.
The second political effect of the supporter discourse is to shift the burden of responsibility 
for victimization prevention and the reduction of fear to members of the community. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter Nine, the community is increasingly being asked to take 
causal responsibility (and blame) for crime and fear-of-crime. The supporter discourse 
reflects this trend with the government taking a secondary role and depicting a public that is 
active and able to participate in their own protection.
These two political effects of the supporter discourse combine to frame the action 
demonstrated on law and order issues in a different manner. Whereas in the protector 
discourse the government depicted itself as leading the battle against crime, the supporter 
discourse sets the purpose of any action to be helping those fighting crime. Consequently, 
there is a different standard by which the success of the action is judged because 
governments only have to demonstrate that their action has helped the public rather than 
showing that it reduced crime rates or levels of fear. Ultimately, the political effect of the
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supporter discourse is to limit the scope of responsibility for addressing crime and fear-of- 
crime.
Summary of the Supporter Discourse
The supporter discourse has been argued to present a reality where the government seeks to 
help the public in their attempts to address crime and fear-of-crime. The public takes on a 
complex mix of two identities: of being frightened and of being active and able to 
participate in their own safety and protection. In this discourse, the threat to that safety and 
the reason for public fear is clearly depicted as being a result of street crimes and other 
dangers in the environment. This focus on the causal link between crime and fear-of-crime 
is maintained throughout the mix of social identities and relations, and the ideological and 
political effects of the discourse. As a result of this mix of social practices, the supporter 
discourse provides the opportunity for the parliamentarians (and those in government 
especially) to shift the burden of responsibility onto the community and deny attributions of 
blame, while demonstrating action and empathy towards the public.
D i s c o u r s e  3: T he M a n i p u l a t o r  D i s c o u r s e
The parliamentarian is selfishly oriented towards their personal gain and sees only the
utility of the public’s fear-of-crime.
The manipulator discourse is about politics rather than governance. A discourse with a 
focus on brinkmanship rather than serving the community, it pervades much of what is said 
and debated in politics. This discourse was perhaps most explicitly investigated in Case
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Study 5 (Chapter Ten) that examined the balancing of political ideology with behaviors for 
short-term advantage. However, many of the implications discussed at the end of each case 
study also speak to the manipulator discourse.
For example, AACIW metaphors and the identity of the fearful public were argued to 
potentially increase the effectiveness of political rhetoric about crime in order to generate 
support for parties, individual parliamentarians or policies. Parliamentarians may also be 
able to create, manipulate and use the power of common sense that is granted by its 
perceived legitimacy and authority to allow the language of fear to become a reality of fear. 
Finally, changing attributions of responsibility allow for the control of images related to 
control and effectiveness. These implications that have been drawn from the characteristics 
of political debates about fear-of-crime all speak in some way to the manipulator discourse.
However, it the purpose for which such characteristics are used that give the manipulator 
discourse its distinct flavor. The rhetoric, power of common sense, ideology and locations 
of responsibility are used in this discourse to further distinctly political ends. The aim is to 
gain political advantage in party competition. It is a discourse that has strong negative 
overtones of deceit, egoism and manipulation; and as such, the use of the discourse 
functions as a means of regulating parliamentarians’ behavior through criticism. The 
manipulator discourse, while in this thesis conceived in terms of debates about fear-of- 
crime, is likely to be identifiable in political discussions about many issues and social 
problems.
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Social Practices and the Manipulator Discourse
The social practices in which the manipulator discourse exists and influences differ from 
those discussed for the supporter and protector discourses in that the focus is on politics. In 
the other two discourses, politics formed merely the forum through which governance 
occurred and crime and fear-of-crime were addressed. In the manipulator discourse, that 
focus is reversed with emphasis being placed on the politics itself with minimal reference 
being made to the problem of fear-of-crime. This orientation will be evident in the 
discussion of social practices below. Given the focus of this discourse on politics, the 
political effects will be discussed throughout the sections below and not separately as 
occurred when examining the protector and supporter discourses above.
Social Identities of Manipula tion
Reflecting the discourse’s focus on politics, the social identities and relations involved also 
emphasize politics rather than governance. The social identities referred to are: that the 
public is interested and participating in politics; and that parliamentarians are untrustworthy 
and self-interested. The identity of the public as interested and involved in politics stems 
from the assumption that criticizing a fellow parliamentarian for manipulating public fear 
for personal gain will have some kind of costly impact. This cost often assumes that such 
criticisms may damage their public image of honesty and accountability which in turn may 
reduce the public’s likelihood of supporting them in the next election.
Furthermore, the public identity of being interested in politics was not openly discussed in 
the way that occurred for the public as vulnerable or frightened. These latter identities
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needed argumentative justification in most cases -  indicating that they may still be 
contested identities in the process of being formed. However, there was no such contest for 
a politically interested public identity. This identity, given through the principles of 
democratic government, was taken for granted in the manipulator discourse.
The second identity involved in this discourse was that the parliamentarian is untrustworthy 
and self-interested. In contrast to the interested public identity, the image of the 
parliamentarian was contested. Indeed, that image is the ultimate target of the discourse 
itself. The underlying claim of this discourse is that parliamentarians, may at times, 
manipulate and use public fears to make use of the malleability of public support that it 
creates -  a frightened public is expected to be more likely to accept greater infringements 
on civil liberties in the hope that it generates feelings of safety and security. In regard to 
law and order issues, such infringements embodied in legislation and increases in police 
powers provide opportunities for demonstrable short-term action.
However, this strategic use of political and government action needs to be motivated by a 
desire to serve and respond to the demands of the public. The manipulator discourse is 
based on the identity of a parliamentarian who is motivated by greed and personal gain to 
manipulate those actions and demands. It is the identity of the self-interested 
parliamentarian that is the focus of this discourse and it is a source of contestation as to 
who takes on that identity.
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Social Rela tions of Manipula tion
As a result of the identities of the politically interested public and the self-interested 
parliamentarian, the social relations center on the role of the parliamentarian. The first 
social relation is that between the parliamentarian and the government. This was discussed 
in detail in Chapter Ten. Suffice it to say here, this relationship is largely adversarial 
between opposition and government parliamentarians utilizing strategies of attack and 
defense in order to gain votes and achieve office and policy goals.
The second social relation is between the parliamentarian and the community. It is a 
relationship that is common through all of the three discourses identified. In each case, 
parliamentarians are attempting to show empathy with the public. However, in the 
manipulator discourse this empathy is influenced by the identity of the parliamentarian as 
being untrustworthy and is tinged with similar questions over their motives. Given the 
focus of this discourse on the image of the parliamentarian and the centrality of politics, 
motivations for displaying empathy tended to be attributed dominance over the display 
itself.
In summary, the social atmosphere in which the manipulator discourse operates is largely 
one of cynicism. The public is assumed to be interested in politics and their voting behavior 
is the ultimate target of political strategy. However, the main focus of this discourse is the 
contestation over the identity of the parliamentarian. Parliamentarians have a strong 
negative identity of deceit, manipulation and self-interest in this discourse; and the 
discourse itself is part of the battle to avoid that identity. As a consequence, the social 
relations of politics (parliamentarians, government and the community) form the main
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ground on which to contest that identity; and the actions of parliamentarians such as the 
display of empathy become liable for criticisms of manipulation of public fear for self- 
interested advantage.
The Ideological Effect of the Manipula tor D iscourse
The ideological effect of the manipulator discourse can be demonstrated though the 
assumed knowledge, required belief system and behavioral effects in the target audience. In 
the manipulator discourse, an assumed knowledge of the problem of fear-of-crime is 
secondary to knowledge of politics and the workings of government. This order is not 
surprising considering the extent to which this discourse is removed from the public and 
their fear. To utilize this discourse effectively, knowledge of the parliamentary conventions 
and “tricks” of politics is far more important and is also assumed of the target audience.
Similarly, the belief system required by this discourse bears little relevance to feelings of 
fear in the community. Instead, those hearing this discourse need to believe that public 
opinion (and thus voting behavior) is open to change by political rhetoric. The criticisms 
inherent in the manipulator discourse would have little value if public opinion was not 
influenced by what is said in political debates in parliament or in the media. The criticisms, 
and the utility of the discourse itself, rely on their ability to ‘cost’ the target parliamentarian 
in some way. While the behavioral changes that are potentially a result of the discourse 
provide the last element of ideological effects, this thesis does not empirically study the 
behavioral impact of the political discourses about fear-of-crime and will therefore leave 
such a discussion for future research.
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In summary, the ideological effect of the manipulator discourse is situated in the realm of 
politics, government and least of all governance. This discourse seeks to create a reality 
where the opposing members of parliament are deceitful and self-interested, where they 
would manipulate public fears for political gain. As a result the identities and relations are 
highly contested as parliamentarians vie for control over the direction of the manipulator 
discourse.
Summary of the Manipulator Discourse
The manipulator discourse identified in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime focused 
on politics rather than governance, on political strategy in party competition rather than 
serving the community. It is characterized by questions over the motivations that direct the 
debates about fear-of-crime. The manipulator discourse posits that much of political 
behavior is motivated by the desire to gain advantage over competitors, and debating issues 
related to fear-of-crime is but one strategy in gaining that advantage. As such, it is a 
discourse in which the identity of the parliamentarian is the source of greatest dispute as 
users seek to control their own public image. Any action by a parliamentarian then becomes 
liable for criticisms of self-interest. The ideological and political effects of this discourse 
are to create a reality where the opposing members of parliament are perceived as 
untrustworthy, deceitful and self-interested -  thereby hoping to cost those parliamentarians 
valuable public support. The manipulator discourse is inherently linked with political 
competition and is largely removed from the public, crime and fear-of-crime.
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C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
This chapter sought to bring together all of the characteristics of political debates about 
fear-of-crime that had been identified through the previous chapters. In some respects, it 
was intended to function as both the final chapter of analysis of those debates and as a 
summary chapter of the characteristics themselves. With these functions and goals in mind, 
each of the three discourses were presented through first, a short description and an 
explanation of the source of the segments of that description, and secondly a deeper 
examination using the focal points of the social identities and relations involved in, and the 
ideological and political effects of, the discourse as a system of organization. The last goal 
was to be able to respond to the main question posed by this thesis -  how do 
parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime?
The protector discourse, identified in political debates about fear-of-crime, serves as a 
means of organizing statements about a passive, frightened and dependent yet responsible 
public that seeks the protection of an empathetic/responsive and able government from the 
effects of a causeless, timeless and placeless fear (-of-crime). The discourse seeks to create 
a reality in which the government acts to address crime, spurred on by empathetic 
parliamentarians who recognize the plight of the public and believe that more should be 
done for protection in response to the problem of fear-of-crime.
The supporter discourse presents a reality where the government seeks to help the public in
their attempts to address crime and fear-of-crime. The public takes on a complex mix of
two identities: of being frightened and of being active and able to participate in their own
safety and protection. In this discourse, the threat to that safety and the reason for public
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fear is clearly depicted as a result of street crimes and other dangers in the environment. 
The supporter discourse provided the opportunity for the parliamentarian (and those in 
government especially) to shift the burden of responsibility onto the community and deny 
attributions of blame, while demonstrating action and empathy towards the public.
Finally, the manipulator discourse focused on politics rather than governance, on political 
strategy in party competition rather than on efforts to serve the community. This discourse 
posits that much of political behavior is motivated by the desire to gain advantage over 
competitors, and debating issues related to fear-of-crime is but one strategy in gaining that 
advantage. As such, it is a discourse in which the identity of the parliamentarian is the 
source of greatest dispute as users seek to manage their own public image. Any action by a 
parliamentarian then becomes liable for criticisms of self-interest. The manipulator 
discourse creates a reality where the opposing members of parliament are perceived as 
untrustworthy, deceitful and self-interested -  thereby hoping to cost those parliamentarians 
valuable public support. The manipulator discourse is inherently linked with political 
competition and is largely removed from the public, crime and fear-of-crime.
Thus in response to the initial question posed by this thesis, it can now be argued that, in 
general, Australian parliamentarians, in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime in three ways: 
(a) in terms of a passive and frightened public requiring protection given by the government 
to reduce their fear-of-crime; (b) in terms of an active and frightened public requiring 
support in their attempts to protect themselves from crime and reduce their fear-of-crime; 
and (c) in terms of political competition where discussing fear-of-crime is but one strategy
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used by the self-interested parliamentarian to gain short-term advantage. The implications 
of talking about fear-of-crime in these ways will be discussed in the Chapter that follows.
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Theories  and Imp li c at io ns
Chapter Twelve Theories and Implications
In Chapter Four of this thesis, I presented the methodology that I intended to use to 
examine parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. The purpose of this research was to 
challenge or at least verily the assumptions made in the literature about how politicians 
‘used’ fear-of-crime. I then developed, and carried out, an exploratory data-driven study. 
Using CDA as the guiding approach with individual methodologies detailed in each case 
study, I identified specific characteristics about the parliamentary debates, examined the 
broader implications of these characteristics, and finally, drew out three discourses that 
were evident as a result of the analysis of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.
My intention in this chapter is to begin situating the research contained here, within the 
existent body of criminological literature. In contrast to most of the previous chapters, this 
chapter is primarily theoretical: its purpose is to present the research gap that this thesis is 
intended to address. To do this, I will first use Garland’s (2001) expansive study of the 
social, political and cultural changes that have occurred in regard to the criminal justice 
state as a means of providing an overview of the environment (including scholarly 
environment) in which the debates about fear-of-crime were produced.
I will then use the criticisms that have been made of The Culture o f Control as a means of 
indicating where further work is needed to produce a more comprehensive ‘history of the 
present’. These criticisms, together with Garland’s work itself, serve as a mechanism to 
highlight the theoretical research gap that this thesis is intended to begin to fill. The chapter 
that follows will test a number of hypotheses about how politicians talk about fear-of- 
crime, as drawn from the criminological literature, with a view to establishing a base from 
which to discuss the theoretical implications of the work contained in this thesis.
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H i stori cal & T heoreti cal  Context  
of the Parli amentary  D ebates
In this section, I will use the 12 indices of changes that are presented by Garland in The 
Culture o f Control to provide a succinct description of the history and the present climate in 
which the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime were produced. I will then present 
some of the criticisms of Garland’s work in order to highlight where there are perceived 
inadequacies in his explanation and alternative fields in which change needs to be 
acknowledged. Through this discussion, I hope to detail the environment in which the 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime were produced, and to situate the current 
research in the already existing criminological literature.
The Culture of Control -  A Summary of Changes
In 2001, David Garland published The Culture o f Control. Garland’s intention in this work 
was to explain the shift away from penal welfarism to a culture of control that focuses on 
punishment and incapacitation rather than rehabilitation and correction. He sought to 
identify and examine the broad themes and changes that have occurred in the crime control 
field. This is a field that he sees as including “policing, sentencing, punishment, 
criminological theory, penal philosophy, penal politics, private security, crime prevention, 
the treatment of victims and so on” (p.x). Garland identifies themes by comparing the 
policies and practices that existed up until the 1970s with those that exist today in the first 
decade of the 21st century. This mainly secondary comparative analysis is focused on 
cultures of control in Britain and the United States. In doing so, Garland presents a history 
of penal and social change, the criminal justice state, and the changing influence of the
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social, economic and culture forces of late modem society on criminological thought, crime 
policies and popular culture. It is within this changing environment that the parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime occurred and consequently, these changes need to be 
acknowledged in order to discuss the implication of the way in which parliamentarians talk 
about public fears.
Garland argues that the contemporary arrangements for controlling crime have been shaped 
by two forces: first, the social organizations of late modernity; and second, the free-market 
driven, conservative politics dominating UK and US politics during the 1980s. Rather than 
asserting that the changes in crime control were merely a response to these two social 
forces, Garland seeks to describe the processes by which those forces changed crime 
control measures and the mechanisms by which crime policy was changed by contemporary 
culture and social relations.
While Garland’s main focus is the transformation of the penal system and increasing 
punitiveness, I wish to use the history he gives of social change and crime control since 
1970 as background for later discussions about the hypotheses for the parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime. These changes in contemporary crime control are identified 
under 12 ‘indices of change’ or sets of observations about the transformations in the crime 
control field. A brief summary of each will be provided below. Further information about 
these changes can be found in Garland (2001).
l.The decline of the rehabilitative ideal: this was the erosion during the 1970s of 
rehabilitative goals as a core role of penal institutions. While Garland acknowledges
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that rehabilitative programs still continue in prisons and elsewhere, he argues that 
these concerns have been subordinated to other penal goals such as retribution, 
incapacitation and risk management.
2. The re-emergence of punitive sanctions and expressive justice: in the last 20
years, late modem societies have seen the re-emergence of penalties whose specific 
and explicit goals are retribution. Such “just deserts” policy goals, with their 
concern for fixed sentences, have allowed politicians to espouse openly punitive 
sentiments and present increasingly draconian laws. Garland provides examples of 
the re-emergence of punitive measures such as the death penalty, chain gangs, 
corporal punishment, shaming and public notification of some types of offenders. 
Expressive justice has also re-emerged as politicians express public outrage, anger 
and resentment when discussing crime and penal policy. Garland notes that the 
feelings of the victim, the victim’s family or a fearful and outraged public are now 
routinely appearing in rhetoric supporting new laws. The tone of official discourse 
has changed with this adoption of language that seeks to condemn and punish at the 
behest of public sentiment.
3. Changes in the emotional tone of crime policy: Garland argues that the emotional
temperature of crime policy has shifted from ‘cool to hot’. This shift has occurred 
through the increased salience of fear-of-crime in the 1970s. Instead of afflicting 
only the ‘worst-off individuals or neighborhoods, fear-of-crime is now recognized 
as a major social problem. Garland argues that public fear and insecurity are a 
“characteristic of contemporary culture” (p.10). Fear-of-crime (“a collectively 
raised consciousness of crime” (p. 163)) is combined with the assumption that crime 
rates are increasing and that the government lacks the ability to control crime. This
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fearful, angry public has influenced the formulation of public policy to be 
increasingly based on stereotypes of unruly youths, predators, career criminals and 
fearful members of the public demanding protection.
4. The return of the victim: Noting bills colloquially known by the name of the victim
(e.g. “Megan’s law” 1, “Jenna’s law”2, and the “Brady Bill”3), Garland argues that 
the interests and feelings of (direct and indirect) victims are consistently invoked in 
support of punitive measures. The symbolic figure of the victim has become 
someone who is representative of the public. Victimage is a common and collective 
experience rather than atypical and abnormal.
5. Above all, the public must be protected: this theme has developed out of a sense
that security is urgently needed, danger needs to be contained and, in general, risk 
needs to be identified and managed. Garland cites increasing use of policies that: 
use prison as a means of incapacitation, de-emphasize parole and probation, 
increase sentences and introduce community notification laws. In these policies, the 
emphasis has been on effective law enforcement and crime control rather than civil 
liberties and rights of prisoners / offenders.
6. Politicization and the new populism: crime control issues have now become part of
electoral competition where policies are partisan and mistakes are scandals. Where 
previously crime policies were developed by professional experts, they are now
1 “Megan’s Law” refers to a collection of American state laws that require persons convicted of any sexual 
assault to notify the law enforcement authorities of their whereabouts. The first law was passed in New Jersey 
in 1994 after a convicted sex offender sexually assaulted and murdered his neighbor Megan Kanka.
2 “Jenna’s Law” (1998 New York Law Chapter 1) was part of the move towards ‘truth in sentencing’ where 
pre-determined sentences and periods of post-release supervision are set. This law also requires victim 
notification upon release of certain inmates. Jenna Grieshaber was murdered by Nicholas Pryor, released after 
serving two-thirds of a prison sentence.
3 The Brady Bill is named after James Brady who was shot by John Hinckley during the attempted 
assassination of President Ronald Reagan on March 30,1981. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 
(1993) requires that background checks for individuals be conducted a firearm may be purchased from a 
person holding a federal firearms license.
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constructed with a view to providing political advantage and being based on public 
opinion rather than evidence-based research. Such politicization and populism has 
seen a convergence of policy proposals from the parties studied in the US and UK: 
all parties have attempted to create policies that are seen by the public as ‘tough’ 
and ‘smart’.
7. The reinvention of the prison: Using rates of imprisonment as evidence for his case,
Garland argues that the purpose of the prison has changed from a penitentiary, 
reformatory, correctional facility to now being directed towards incapacitation and 
retributive punishment. The view of the prison as being the last resort has been 
reversed with the institution becoming an indispensable means of responding to 
public demands for protection and retribution.
8. The transformation of criminological thought: Garland argues that criminological
theories have progressed from an ‘eclectic mixture of abnormal psychology and 
sociological theories’ to focus on control. These latter theories see criminal behavior 
as a problem of a lack of control rather than deprivation. Crime itself is taken to be a 
normal feature of society and individuals are treated as being first and foremost self- 
serving: individuals will commit criminal behavior if there is not adequate control 
to restrain them. Garland emphasizes one genre of control theories which he calls 
‘the criminologies of everyday life’. These criminologies are those such as rational 
choice and routine activity theories. Such theories treat crime as an event which are 
not based in pathology or extraordinary motivation. As a result, official policies to 
address crime (that are based in these theories) tend to focus on the criminal event 
rather than the criminality of the individual.
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9. The expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety: Based
on the criminologies of everyday life, there have been increasing efforts by 
government and community groups to form ‘preventative partnerships’ that are 
dedicated to preventing crime, reducing fear and increasing security. These 
programs that attempt to build informal social controls and self-policing activities in 
a community exist in marked contrast to the punitive and divisive policies that are 
presented in populist crime policies.
10. Civil society and the commercialization of crime control: These preventative 
partnerships are part of a larger movement that sees the locus of crime control being 
spread between public and private agencies. In the late modem society, Garland 
argues, the state has begun to reduce its monopoly on crime control and encourage 
crime reduction activities on the part of communities, individuals and commercial 
entities. At the same time, there has been an increase in the private security sector, 
reaching a point where it is recognized as a partner of the state in the provision of 
security for the public. Similar attempts at spreading sources of crime control 
between public and private spheres can been seen in the policing and penal sectors.
11. New management styles and working practices: The changes already discussed 
in the points above have had a consequence for the explicit functions of criminal 
justice agencies. For example, Garland argues that the police now present 
themselves as a responsive public service dedicated to maintaining order; prisons as 
holding offenders rather than rehabilitating them; and sentencing as following a 
formula of fixed and rigid guidelines. Similarly, managerialism has narrowed 
discretion and regulated work practices by emphasizing performance indicators and 
cost-effectiveness of interventions.
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12. A perpetual sense of crisis: Garland argues that much of the last 20 years of the 
20th century were characterized by a sense of crisis: he talks of unrelenting 
upheavals, unmistakable malaise and demoralization with constant reforms, new 
legislation and policy development. This has now transformed into a sense that the 
actions being undertaken have been tried and have failed (either through 
implementation or through a faulty theoretical base). As a result, the public is 
growing less confident in the criminal justice provisions and politicians grow less 
likely to seek advice from criminological experts or personnel. In short, the criminal 
justice system is seen to be at a dangerous point where trust should not be placed in 
any one individual or group.
These 12 indices of change are used by Garland to demonstrate both the breadth of the 
crime control field and the benefit of understanding the field in its entirety. Garland 
continues from this point to flesh out his argument about changes in the penal system. He 
begins by developing a history of the modem penal-welfare state in the early 20th century, 
fleshing out the transformations (the 12 indices listed above) that have occurred in response 
to the penal-welfare state and its perceived flaws, and then finally to an examination of how 
the social changes of late modernity have assisted in creating a changed environment in 
comparison to the 1970s.
For my purposes, I wish to use these indices as background for the characteristics of the 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. In other words, they form a catalogue of both 
the changes that have led to and the characteristics of the political and social environment
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in which the parliamentary debates occur. Specific indices or elements of Garland’s later 
case studies will be drawn upon as appropriate in the discussion of the hypotheses below.
Before doing so, however, I will present an overview of Garland’s perceived role for fear- 
of-crime within the social, cultural and political changes that he details in late modem 
societies. As well as providing a more complete picture of Garland’s argument, this 
overview of fear-of-crime will be drawn upon in later discussions of the criticisms that have 
been made of The Culture o f Control. In turn, these criticisms will be used to highlight the 
research gap which this thesis is intended to begin to fill.
Garland and Fear of Crime
Fear-of-crime, in a very broad conception, is integral to Garland’s argument about the 
changing culture of control in late modem societies. He argues that the new politics of 
crime control are socially and culturally conditioned; that the policies that have emerged 
must find resonance with the ‘cultural sensibilities’ of the community in order to be 
effective. In order to examine the cultural sensibilities that have given the punitive policies 
support, Garland begins by arguing that the ‘victim’ has taken on an independent symbolic 
existence. No longer is the victim an abnormal, individual and atypical figure but has now 
become representative of a collective and common experience. The rising figure of the 
victim has shifted debate from rational and instrumental goals towards expressing emotions 
and righteous indignation. Garland argues that: “If the centre-piece of penal-welfarism was 
the (expert projection of) the individual offender and his or her needs, the centre of 
contemporary penal discourse is (a political projection of) the individual victim and his or 
her feelings” (p.144).
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From here, Garland argues that to understand the new penal culture it is necessary to 
explore the new meaning of victimhood with its changed experience of crime and resulting 
insecurity. It is this insecurity and anxiety, and the antidote expression of anger and 
outrage, that Garland refers to under the title of fear-of-crime. However, for the most part, 
Garland adopts a wide conception of fear-of-crime or what he terms a “collectively raised 
consciousness of crime” (p. 163) to examine as part of the new meaning of victimhood. In 
what follows, I will present a brief overview of Garland’s argument concerning fear-of- 
crime. The purpose of this overview is to (a) provide a more complete picture of Garland’s 
argument about the social changes that have resulted in the present focus on expressive 
justice, retribution and incapacitation; and (b) provide background to the criticisms made of 
The Culture o f Control and from there, the research gap identified for this thesis.
Garland argues that high rates of crime have become a normal social fact in the US and 
UK. As a result, the general population has developed a new ‘collective experience of 
crime’. Garland focuses this argument by saying that it is the middle class that have 
developed this collective experience. Once an event that was almost exclusively 
experienced by the poor, the high crime rates of the 1960s meant that the signs of crime and 
disorder led to fear-of-crime becoming a rountinized part of the middle class’ daily life. 
Fear-of-crime then combined with the general insecurities felt by the population as a result 
of the rapid social change and economic recession during that decade. As time progressed 
into the 1970s, there developed a two-way interaction between these anxieties and reactive 
politics. The politics developed off the back of these anxieties, and in turn, the politics 
focused those anxieties into a set of attitudes, with a named problem and scapegoats.
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Garland argues that the new middle class concerns about crime were affected by three 
social developments. First, the typical household changed into a complex and fragile 
organization that required management, scheduling and co-ordination to a degree not 
required before. The fragility of the household left many members of the middle-class 
feeling vulnerable to the effects of crime and resulted in the increased experience of 
anxiety, resentment and anger about the imposition of crime and the dangerous world.
Second, Garland argues that changes in crime policy during the 1960s may also have 
resulted in the middle class’ new experience of crime. It is suggested that a major state 
response to the rising rates of crime was to ‘define deviance down’: in effect to tolerate low 
level crime and dedicate resources to serious crimes. As a result, minor offences went 
unchecked and signs of disorder became more apparent and prevalent. This changing 
landscape, combined with increasing rates of crime and fear-of-crime, led many to believe 
that the state was retreating from the problem, leaving them unprotected.
Third, the mass media (or more specifically television viewing) had a strong influence on 
the popular perception of crime. Garland highlights TV’s “focus upon national rather than 
local news; its affinity for crime as a theme; its sympathetic portrayal of individual victims 
who have suffered at the hands of criminals and been let down by an uncaring, ineffectual 
system” (p. 157) as factors in transforming the perceptions of crime by the middle class to 
seeing it as close and common. Garland argues that the mass media “tapped into, then 
dramatized and reinforced... [and] institutionalized that experience” (p. 158) of crime. As a 
result, the salience of crime in everyday life was increased for the middle class.
326
Chapter Twelve Theories and Implications
Garland argues that these three changes are not in themselves sufficient to explain the 
changes in the social attitudes to crime. Instead, the changes demand actions and responses. 
Garland lists two responses: first, the victims’ movement and its goals of increasing 
recognition of the interests of the victim; and second, the use of social and situational crime 
control measures (otherwise known as ‘informal social control’) through crime prevention 
programs in order to cover a perceived inadequacy in state-run criminal justice agencies. 
Based on these responses, certain precautions such as installing security devices, locking 
doors, changing behavior on the streets and so on have been adopted as routine precautions. 
Similarly, urban planners have followed public demand and adapted designs to increase 
security (for example, gated communities). These adaptations, so frequently argued to be 
prompted from fear-of-crime, are argued by Garland to have resulted in ‘settled cultural 
effects’ (p.163): they have become part of common sense and the routines of everyday life.
The cultural effects are termed by Garland to be the ‘crime complex’ of high crime 
societies. This complex then has an effect on politics and policy as citizens become 
conscious of crime and fearful of victimization. The identity of the victim is imposed upon 
them (or is voluntarily adopted) and forces them to engage with crime and crime 
prevention. This in turn generates an ambivalent response that oscillates between accepting 
new behavioral adaptations of avoidance and feeling a sense of frustration and anger at the 
irritation of crime. The combination of fear and powerlessness prompts calls for action 
from the public which then finds political representation and ultimately political action.
It is this crime control complex with its patterns of “social routines, cultural practices and 
collective sensibilities” (p.164) that form the foundation for current crime control
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strategies. They result in policies of preventative partnerships and punitive segregation 
based on the themes of: “expressivity, punitiveness, victim-centredness, public protection, 
exclusion, enhanced control, loss-prevention, public-private partnership, [and] 
responsibilization” (p. 165). Yet at the heart of these strategies, is the new collectively 
raised consciousness of crime -  fear-of-crime -giving such strategies meaning and purpose.
Using as a foundation the foregoing discussion about fear-of-crime and the changing 
culture of the criminal justice state, I will now use the criticisms that have been made of 
The Culture o f Control as a means of situating the research undertaken in this thesis within 
the criminological theory already established. These criticisms will also highlight perceived 
inadequacies of the summary and explanations given by Garland; and as a consequence, 
provide a more comprehensive account of the changes in crime control, public policy on 
crime and criminology that have lead to the current environment in which parliamentarians 
discuss fear-of-crime.
The Culture of Control -  The Criticisms
Garland’s The Culture o f  Control has been criticized in a number of areas. The first 
criticism lies in his choice of a comparative methodology and its perhaps unintended 
consequences. Beckett (2001) criticizes Garland’s decision to deemphasize differences 
between the United States and Britain in order to emphasize the qualitative aspects of the 
field of crime control. However, she does acknowledge that such a decision allows Garland 
to identify less than obvious dimensions of the field and the generalizations allow for 
explanations of changes over time. Other criticisms made by Beckett include:
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1. not acknowledging further the differences between each county’s political and 
institutional differences. Beckett cites the decentralized nature of the US political 
system as having important implications in relation to the influence of public 
opinion (Savelsberg (2002) makes the same criticisms for the differences between 
the US and Germany);
2. the different scope of the welfare state in each country. Similarly, Hannah-Moffat 
(2002) has also criticized Garland for giving only a partial history of the penal 
welfare state that does not acknowledge its punitive aspects. This point is made by 
Russell Hogg (2002) but in the context of a lack of recognition of the detriments of 
the ‘social democratic solidarity project’;
3. underemphasizing the role of racial tension in the United States in the 
transformation of responses to crime (a point also made by Hannah-Moffat (2002)); 
and
4. ignoring differences between Britain’s and the United States’:
• incarceration rates: These rates act as a proxy or a comparative measure of 
the two country’s propensity to ascribe prison sentences. As a result, the 
differences in the incarceration rates between the countries may have 
important implications for Garland’s argument.
• crime rates: Jock Young (2002) raises the difference between the United 
States and other late modem societies such as Western Europe and Japan in 
terms of their crime rates. Young argues that such differences are on a scale 
comparable to key criminological variables such as age and gender, and 
cannot be ignored.
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This lack of acknowledgement within the methodology of the differences between the 
countries, also lead Beckett to criticize the use of a research design that openly denies the 
ability to evaluate the argument. This denial stems from Garland’s disclaimer that 
variations between countries in the patterns of social, economic and cultural relations and 
its responses to crime are evidence of the mediating effect that human actors may have on 
the effects of structural pressures. Beckett argues that the disclaimer underestimates the 
scope of the variations between late modem societies and instead such variations should be 
able to be used to test Garland’s argument.
The criticism made by Beckett (2001) and Hannah-Moffat (2002) of providing only a 
partial history of the welfare state was extended by Savelsberg (2002) with a focus on the 
analysis of causal factors. Savelsberg (2002) argued that Garland provided an 
oversimplified account of the causes for the social changes he identified because he focuses 
on the institutional nature of the state. ‘Tn addition, historically sedimented nation-specific 
cultures, affected by religious traditions and historical contingencies contribute to shaping 
emergent cultures of control, in combination with and despite common structural 
challenges and pressures of globalization” (p.700). Savelsberg argues that the explanatory 
model provided by Garland needs to be more complex in order to account for the 
differences between nation states.
Young (2002) raised a further criticism of Garland’s work arguing that there was an 
inappropriate de-emphasis of some strands of criminology such as feminism and critical 
criminology. These types of criminology, Young argued, provide a narrative that fits closer 
to everyday life in late modem societies than do the control theories emphasized by
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Garland. Furthermore, Young criticizes the absence of these focusing on inequality in the 
criminologies that are drawn upon: criminologies such as the anomie tradition of Dürkheim 
and Merton as well as the Marxist influences in critical criminology. While Young 
acknowledges that they are mentioned by Garland, the criticism is made that such mentions 
are not elaborated to an appropriate degree. In short, Young is arguing that Garland’s 
criminologies are providing only one voice of everyday life (see also Savelsberg (2002) 
who argues that the selective approach taken by Garland in regard to discussing the 
different strands of criminology, is short-sighted and prematurely ignores what each has to 
say about control and crime).
Young (2002) also criticizes Garland for his “metanarratives of succession” (p.238). By 
this, he is referring to the way in which the penal welfare system transforms into a new 
culture of control, social deprivation theories transform into control theories, and social 
democratic politics is replaced by neo-liberalism and the rise of the New Right. Young 
argues that Garland has not given sufficient emphasis to the overlap and simple co­
existence of these trends.
The final criticism by Young of Garland is that The Culture o f Control produces poor 
policy outcomes. While Garland does speak of crime prevention and preventative 
partnerships as a means of mediating the effects of the new crime control complex, Young 
argues that there needs to be significant structural changes to address the problems of crime 
and punishment that have been identified.
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The criticisms discussed up to this point have been given as a means of providing a more 
complete history of the environment in which parliamentary debate about fear-of-crime 
occurs. However, it is the third criticism made by Beckett (2001) about the argument 
presented in The Culture o f Control that provides the link to the theoretical hypotheses 
being addressed by this chapter. Beckett highlights the perceived neglect of the role of 
political and cultural discourses in the development of the ideas behind the new culture of 
crime control and penal policy. In addition, Garland stands accused of having neglected 
several bodies of evidence that, Beckett argues, may alter the interpretations and as a result, 
give politics a greater role in the transformation of crime control.
“In sum, the empirical evidence for several of Garland’s key claims is quite 
mixed, and, I think, casts doubt on his argument that consequences of late 
modem social organization — rising crime rates, official disregard of minor 
forms of disorder, and widespread loss of faith in correctionalism -  triggered 
the transformation of the crime control field”, (p.915)
Instead, Beckett argues that Garland’s focus on the structural and experiential basis of 
changes in the culture of crime control has led him to underestimate the impact of public, 
political and cultural discourses in these changes. She argues that these discourses have the 
“power to shape beliefs, perceptions and emotions” and by ignoring this power, Garland 
denies their ability to give expression to and potentially reinforce “preexisting perceptions 
of and anxieties about order” (Beckett, 2001: 139). In effect Beckett is arguing for the 
reciprocal recognition of the ability of political discourse to influence public perceptions of 
crime and feelings of insecurity and anxiety upon which Garland bases so much of his 
argument.
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It is this perceived ability of political discourses to express and even construct the public’s 
fears and insecurities that provides a basis for the current research. With such a central role 
being given to the public’s raised awareness of crime and the resulting feelings of 
insecurity, Garland argues that politicians have taken the presented opportunity to represent 
the public’s frustration, irritation and fear as well as to champion their demands for action. 
Similarly, the crime policies developed have been directed towards expressive ends either 
through a political desire to represent public fears or through the need to find public support 
for the policies (with a fearful public wanting punitive policies).
Given the centrality of fear-of-crime to the discussion of political action, Beckett (2001) 
argues that Garland has not examined in sufficient depth the interaction between political 
discourses and those feelings of insecurity: that political discourse has the potential to 
influence public fears of crime. This potential to influence has been highlighted in many of 
the studies reviewed in earlier chapters, and as previously described, criminologists have 
taken up the cause to determine to what extent levels of fear-of-crime are influenced by 
political rhetoric. This thesis was intended to verify the assumptions that are made by such 
researchers about the homogenous style and content of that rhetoric.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
The purpose of this chapter was to situate the exploratory data-driven study of previous 
chapters within the body of criminological literature and to establish the research gap that it 
intended to begin to fill. To do this, I first used Garland’s The Culture o f Control as a 
means of presenting the environment in which the parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime were produced. This environment included the changing influence of the social,
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economic and cultural forces of late modem society on criminological thought, crime 
policies and popular culture. I then used the criticisms that have been made of The Culture 
o f Control as a means of indicating where further work is needed to produce a more 
comprehensive ‘history of the present’.
It was the last of the presented criticisms, together with Garland’s work itself, which served 
as a mechanism to highlight the theoretical research gap that this thesis is intended to begin 
to fill. Garland was criticized for not acknowledging sufficiently that political discourse has 
the potential to influence public fears of crime, as well as public fears influencing the talk 
of politicians. While criminologists have attempted to determine the level to which fear-of- 
crime is influenced by political rhetoric, I argued that a ‘gap’ had been left: how do 
politicians talk about fear-of-crime?
The following chapter will test a number of hypotheses about how parliamentarians talk 
about fear-of-crime. The research questions and hypotheses are drawn from the 
criminological literature and tested with the exploratory data-driven study contained in 
previous chapters. By doing so, I attempt to demonstrate the importance of a more naunced 
understanding of political discourses about fear-of-crime -  of filling the identified research 
gap. The broader theoretical implications of this research will be discussed in the 
Conclusion.
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Chapter Thirteen Combining Data and Theory
This chapter will present a description of the parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime that 
can be derived from previous research on political rhetoric, crime and public fears. This 
description has three components: the type of knowledge claims made, the identity of the 
public that is portrayed and the process of negotiating responsibility for addressing fear-of- 
crime. Focusing on each of these components separately, I will examine their theoretical 
background and test a number of hypotheses that can be derived from that background, 
using the empirical data from the present research. The results of this process of hypothesis 
testing and theoretical review will be discussed in the final chapter. A more nuanced 
description of parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime than is currently assumed by 
criminologists will be presented. It is this complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric 
that I argue needs to be recognized by those studying how politicians talk about public 
fears.
Having established the research gap for this thesis from a theoretical perspective in the 
previous chapter, I now wish to combine this overview with the literature reviewed in 
Chapters Two and Three especially. This will then be followed by a review of the research 
questions, the characteristics examined and the three discourses identified. Each of these 
reviews will be brief in order to avoid excessive repetition with what has already been 
given in detail in earlier chapters. It is at this point, that I will present the hypotheses that 
are intended to serve as a link between what has essentially be a ‘real’ world or 
a-theoretical focus on the specifics of parliamentary debates with a discussion of their 
theoretical implications for criminologists studying the crime control field. In effect, the 
hypotheses are intended to rephrase the findings about the characteristics of parliamentary 
debates into a form that tests the claims made in the criminological literature.
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In Chapter Three of this thesis, I argued that many western countries (late modern societies) 
such as the US, UK and Australia are obsessed by crime. It is a subject that has come to 
symbolize much more than simply the violation of behavioral boundaries. Law and order 
politics is a phrase that refers to the political maneuvering around the issues of crime and its 
control. The changes in law and order politics have been detailed in a practical sense in 
Chapter Three and a theoretical sense, by Garland in Chapter Twelve. Suffice it to say here 
that this topic in politics has seen increasing demands made upon it for retribution from the 
public and the rhetoric employed by politicians have developed an overtly expressive 
quality.
It is in this expressive quality that fear-of-crime plays a central role. In Chapter Three, I 
presented the history of fear-of-crime -  from its ‘discovery’ in national crime surveys to its 
acceptance as a social problem requiring state intervention. This central role of fear-of- 
crime has also been examined by Garland who argued that in the increasingly expressive 
nature of crime policy, the image of an angry and fearful public has become integral to 
political debate; and as a consequence, has become a stated reason for the changes towards 
punitive and retributive crime policies.
As discussed in Chapter Three, during this evolution of fear-of-crime and law and order 
politics, academics have devoted much effort to learning more about this type of fear. 
Research has covered such topics as: ways of predicting fear from demographic and 
environmental factors, the impact of the media, ways of using policing practices to reduce 
fear and the influence of crime policies and political rhetoric more generally on levels of 
fear-of-crime in the community. It is this last point that is of most importance to the current
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research. I argued that much of the literature focusing on the fear-of-crime within law and 
order politics was based on a largely untested assumption that (all) politicians use fear-of- 
crime as if they were part of a law and order auction: using fear-of-crime as evidence for 
the need for their crime policies which they argue are ‘tougher’ than their opponents. 
Scholars have then focused their research on the impact of such rhetoric on levels of fear- 
of-crime. I argued that that assumption needed verification and developed the following 
research question around which to conduct an exploratory study:
How do Australian politicians, when in parliament, talk about fear-of-crime?
The study to provide answers to this question sought to identify discourses that exist within 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime; and to do so based on characteristics drawn 
from unmediated political debate (hence parliamentary debate). Rather than attempt to 
identify all linguistic, social, and political characteristics of debates about fear-of-crime, 1 
focused on five case studies existing on a continuum between linguistic and social 
influences. These were:
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Linguistic Influences
Case Study 1: Use of passive voice, the definitive article (“the”) and nominalization 
Case Study 2: Use of metaphors (more specifically those of war and fights)
Case Study 3: Appeals to common sense
Case Study 4: Location of responsibility in fear-of-crime debates 
* Case Study 5: Balancing ideology and expediency 
Societal Influences
Each of these case studies: examined a characteristic of the fear-of-crime debates, presented 
the results drawn from data collected, and discussed those results with reference to the 
relevant theory.
After examining five case studies of characteristics of those parliamentary debates, I 
identified three discourses that were present:
1. Protector discourse -  a passive and frightened public requiring protection given by 
the government to reduce their fear-of-crime;
2. Supporter discourse -  an active and frightened public requiring support in their 
attempts to protect themselves from crime and reduce their fear-of-crime;
3. Manipulator discourse -  political competition where discussing fear-of-crime is but 
one strategy used by the self-interested politician to gain short-term advantage.
The identification of these discourses formed the conclusion to the exploratory, data-driven 
part of this research. Having examined the characteristics and discourses found within the 
parliamentary debates, I now wish to combine the theoretical literature reviewed at the
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beginning of this thesis, the theories drawn upon when discussing the individual 
characteristics in the case studies, and the background literature reviewed in the previous 
chapter on the social, cultural and political changes that have occurred during the period 
when the parliamentary debates were produced. On the basis of this existing body of 
literature, the following description can be given of parliamentary debates about fear-of- 
crime:
Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by the use of 
experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as 
dictated by the parliamentarian’s political ideology, while 
parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing 
fear.
There are three components to this description:
1. the type of knowledge claims used as supportive evidence in arguments by 
parliamentarians;
2. the identity of the public that is portrayed through the arguments made by 
parliamentarians; and
3. the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.
In the description above, political ideology is treated as an independent variable influencing 
the type of knowledge claims made by parliamentarians and the type of identities portrayed 
of the public in the debates. As such, the role of political ideology will be investigated 
within components one and two.
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Component One: Knowledge Claims in Crime Debates
1: The type o f knowledge claims used as supportive evidence in arguments about fear-of- 
crime by parliamentarians.
This component is concerned with the type of knowledge claims that are employed by 
parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. The type of knowledge is indicated by the 
evidence that is drawn upon by the parliamentarian to support their argument. For instance, 
the use of crime statistics, research evidence and criminological theories on deviancy would 
indicate that a technical knowledge is being employed. This can be contrasted with 
arguments that are based on public opinion, testimony and other such claims to common 
sense, with these being indicative of the use of experiential knowledge. The dichotomy 
between technical and experiential knowledge claims has become traditional in relation to 
the type of claims made in a legal setting (e.g., Valverde (2003)).
The purpose of this section is to identify the knowledge claims that are used by 
parliamentarians when arguing about fear-of-crime (and indirectly each other’s crime 
policies). I will test a number of hypotheses about knowledge claims, made by 
parliamentarians. These will be based on the evidence and arguments presented in the 
criminological literature. The hypotheses are:
1. experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting 
evidence when debating fear-of-crime;
2. right-wing parliamentarians and political parties talk about fear-of-crime more than 
left-wing parliamentarians and political parties (and its null hypothesis: there is no 
difference in the proportion that representatives from each political party talk about 
fear-of-crime); and
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3. right-wing parliamentarians are responsible for the majority of the increase in the 
number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime.
For the purposes of hypotheses 2 and 3, “right-wing parliamentarian” is used to refer to a 
member of the Liberal or National parties, and “left-wing parliamentarian” refers to a 
member of the Australian Labor Party as discussed in Chapter Ten.
After exploring these hypotheses and testing their validity for this dataset, I will argue that 
there is a hybridity of experiential, technical and ideological knowledge claims being made 
by parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. However, I find no support for arguments 
that common sense or experiential knowledge is dominating public debate of this kind. In 
addition, I find only minimal support for those arguments presenting right-wing political 
ideology as responsible for the majority of the rising frequency with which fear-of-crime is 
being debated in parliament. These conclusions, while challenging some previous research, 
highlight the hybridity in the type of knowledge that is drawn upon in argumentation.
Theories on Knowledge Claims
In the criminological literature studying the use of research evidence by politicians and 
other officials when developing public policy, there have been calls for more informed 
public policy debate. Some argue that the responsibility for increasing the use of research 
evidence in policy debates lies with the politician. For example, Weatherbum (2004) argues 
that policy initiatives proposed by many Australian state and territory governments have, at 
best, only tenuous justifications. This, he argues, is because they are not forced to explain 
the details of how their policies will reduce crime (Weatherbum, 2004). It is hoped by such
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authors that the inclusion of research evidence may encourage more evidence-based 
justifications of crime policies and, as a consequence, more effectively achieve their stated 
purpose.
Others have argued that criminologists need to reconsider the presentation of their research 
and even the type of methodologies they choose in order to be more relevant to politicians 
when developing public policy. Sarre (2002) argues that policy makers face particular 
difficulties when trying to draw on research. These difficulties include: the quality of 
research, reaching a consensus on the recommendations from research, getting 
parliamentarians to adopt the recommendations and making the recommendations 
operational. Although Sarre does place responsibility on the academic for increasing the 
use of research in public policy development, this conclusion is tempered by arguing that 
such recommendations still need to make themselves heard over “the din of a law and order 
'auction’” (Sarre, 2002).
Sherman (2005) also finds that criminologists must bear some responsibility for their lack 
of influence in policy development. Sherman argued that the majority of published 
criminology was analytical rather than experimental and, as a result, tended to lack the clear 
operational conclusions and recommendations needed for the development of public policy. 
In this respect, the influence of analytical academic work on public policy development was 
reduced by the tendency to draw timid or highly qualified conclusions that made it difficult 
to generalize findings and recommendations to other areas (Sherman, 2005).
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By contrast, Dixon (1995) argues against privileging the role of the expert. Instead, the 
author suggests that politics and public policy will always reflect some less than rational 
decision making. Dixon argues two points: first, that political debate about crime should be 
informed and look beyond using such debate for short-term advantage; and second, that 
criminology should take on the role of informing public debate and policy-making rather 
than dictating policy decisions. Dixon supports the view that the discipline is better placed 
to inform than to dictate because of the often tentative and contradictory findings that are 
produced by criminologists (Dixon, 1995).
Meanwhile other researchers see responsibility for creating an informed policy debate 
resting on both politicians and criminologists: that it is in fact more worthwhile to study the 
type of knowledge that is drawn upon by policy makers. Freiberg (2001) argues for the 
inclusion or recognition of emotional or affective dimensions of crime. He argues that a 
rationalist approach to developing public policy is undermined by the emotive tendency of 
law and order policies. These emotive policies resonate with the public, appearing to meet 
their psychological needs. Freiberg argues that responses to crime must address 
instrumental, emotional and functional (i.e., producing social cohesion) elements.
However, for Freiberg, crime policies are directed more at the emotional than the 
instrumental level. Crime policies arc successful when they are comprised of symbols and 
rhetoric that resonate with common sense, common myths and common experiences of the 
community. Consequently, argues Freiberg, the most successful politicians are those who 
understand the emotional undercurrents of society. The results of research evidence are less 
powerful in speaking to this undercurrent than the emotive policies currently finding favor
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in political agendas (Freiberg, 2001). In other words, a claim to experiential knowledge 
about a media report of an elderly woman being bashed will have more resonance with the 
public than an argument based on reduced statistically indicated risk (i.e., an argument 
based on technical knowledge).
Valverde (2003) challenges this dichotomy between experiential and technical knowledge. 
She argues that there are many types of knowledge claims that are used (in the field of law) 
and rejects the Foucauldian view that law is becoming dominated by expert and technical 
knowledge. In effect, Valverde is arguing against the traditional dichotomy of knowledge 
fields that is made by those making a sociological study of law. This dichotomy has been 
expert (technical) versus experiential knowledge; or high status knowledge such as 
psychiatry, psychology, clinical medicine, statistics and epidemiology versus low status 
knowledge used by ordinary folk in their everyday lives and by state and private sector 
business people in regulatory and administrative tasks. Instead, Valverde argues that there 
is a hybridity of those types of knowledge rather than a dichotomy (Valverde, 2003): 
speakers will use both experiential and technical knowledge in an argument rather than one 
or the other in isolation.
Experiential versus Technical Knowledge
The hybridity emphasized by Valverde between experiential and technical knowledge 
claims is supported by data presented earlier in this thesis in regard to parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime. Chapter Eight questioned why parliamentarians mentioned but 
rarely discussed fear-of-crime. It was argued that they did not often discuss fear-of-crime 
because being afraid of crime was perceived as common sense and therefore argumentative
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justification would have been redundant. Everyone knows that crime is something to be 
feared, and for the most part, the consequences of that fear are also assumed to be known 
by all.
This result presented in Chapter Eight can be extended through the analysis of numerical 
data showing the ratio of statistics and/or research evidence to rhetorical claims based on 
common sense that are present within the parliamentary debates studied. For example,
“In the amount of time we spent on this subject, I spent some time on the issue 
of the statistic of fear of crime in the community. It is something that now is a 
statistic that the ABS actually tracks. There is only one grab so far at about 70 
per cent which I understand is in national terms relatively good. Of course it 
means that about 150 000 people out there do not feel all that safe in the 
community. But for all that we have to take what we can (Hidding, 1998).”
Such data indicates that statistics and research evidence were used in 49% of the debates 
with the remaining 51% drawing on evidence drawn from experience such as common 
sense, public opinion and personal testimony. A CHI-squared goodness of fit test shows 
that the different proportion of experiential to technical knowledge used by 
parliamentarians is not statistically significant (p = 0.991).
This result supports the argument for a hybrid use of types of knowledge. Evidence-based 
research findings and crime statistics were used by parliamentarians to support their 
arguments. Similarly arguments were also based on common sense, or what ‘everybody 
knows’. In effect, the evidence from this research and that reported in previous studies,
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suggests that there is a hybridity of knowledge claims that are used by parliamentarians and 
politicians more generally when debating public policy initiatives on crime and fear-of- 
crime.
Moreover, other authors wish to examine knowledge claims further and posit a changing 
balance between types of knowledge. For example, Garland (2001) argues that:
The dominant voice of crime policy is no longer the expert or even the 
practitioner but that of the long-suffering, ill-served people -  especially of ‘the 
victim’ and the fearful, anxious members of the public. A few decades ago 
public opinion functioned as an occasional brake on policy initiatives: now it 
operates as a privileged source. The importance of research and criminological 
knowledge is downgraded and in its place is a new deference to the voice of 
‘experience’, of ‘common sense’, of ‘what everyone knows’ (Garland, 2001: 
13).
In effect, Garland is arguing that experiential knowledge has become (or at least is going 
through a process of becoming) dominant over technical knowledge claims. This argument 
is seconded by authors reviewed in this and previous chapters who argue that common 
sense is overriding statistical and research evidence in their influence on public policy 
development. Based on the results of an extension to Chapter Eight, I have already shown 
that overall there is no significant difference between the proportions of types of knowledge 
claims. However, this result is silent about the trends over time of the use of experiential 
and technical knowledge. To test these trends, I hypothesized that:
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Hypothesis One: Trends in Experiential Knowledge
Experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians 
as supporting evidence when debating fear-of-crime.
Based on the data collected for this research, the following chart (Figure 13.1) depicts the 
proportion of experiential to technical knowledge claims over time from 1991 to 2003.
Figure 13.1: Percentage of Experiential or Technical Knowledge Claims
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From this chart, it can be seen that there appears to be great variation in the proportions 
used each year of both types of knowledge claim. For the purposes of the hypothesis being 
tested, experiential knowledge claims were isolated for further analysis. The focus of the 
hypothesis is on whether there has been an increased use of experiential knowledge about 
fear-of-crime: is common sense coming to dominate parliamentarians’ arguments?
In order to test the trend of this type of knowledge claim, random variation was reduced 
using exponential smoothing (damping factor w = 0.3) and represented on the graph below
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as a forecast line (Figure 13.2). Linear regression modeling of that forecast line was then 
used to quantity the trend in the use of experiential knowledge claims. This modeling 
produced a trend line of:
y = 0.457 -0.00472t
(where t = the number of years past 1991).
Using this formula, a trend line was generated and plotted on the graph below.
Figure 13.2: Percentage of Experiential Knowledge Claims (forecasts and trends)
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The linear regression for experiential knowledge shows a small decrease in the percentage 
of documents produced each year (-0.5%) using experiential knowledge claims as evidence 
in debating fear of crime. As a result, the hypothesis that experiential knowledge is 
increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting evidence when debating fear-of- 
crime is disproved: common sense is not coming to dominate parliamentary debate on this 
topic.
So far, I have examined the theoretical basis for the arguments that there should be a more 
informed policy debate and that there should be greater recognition of the hybridity of the
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types of knowledge claims made. I sought to test the argument that there is a hybridity of 
knowledge claims through the qualitative results of this research. Furthermore, I sought to 
examine the potentially changing balance of experiential and technical knowledge by 
empirically testing hypothesis one. To this point, I have focused on using the data collected 
for this research to verify the arguments surrounding only two of the types of knowledge 
claims. However, a third type of knowledge has been highlighted in the literature as having 
a strong influence on political rhetoric and the formulation of public policies. It is to this 
type of knowledge that I now turn.
Ideological Knowledge
Tilley and Laycock (2000), like Valverde (2003), also challenge the dichotomy of 
knowledge. However, they make this challenge by examining three different types of 
knowledge claims: evidence-based research, common sense and ideology. Tilley and 
Laycock argue that evidence-based policy is good in theory but faces many difficulties in 
combining evidence and policy. In addition to what has been said above, these authors 
suggest that much of the research relevant to crime policies is technically weak. For 
instance, single studies with results of questionable generalizability, programs that are 
specific to a particular environmental area only, or research that yields valid but un-useable 
policy-relevant findings (i.e., findings that cannot be made operational).
In contrast, Tilley and Laycock argue that common sense ideas (experiential knowledge) 
about crime are an important influence on crime policy development and are often resistant 
to contradictions from research evidence. Policy development, they argue, begins from the 
basis of common sense knowledge (‘folk knowledge’ or what people already know). The
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sources of common sense can be: media reports of crime, dramas and documentaries, 
fiction, personal experiences of crime and anecdotes of other’s experiences. These sources, 
Tilley and Laycock argue, reproduce public interest in crime and criminals as well as the 
popular images of them. These common sense understandings, or knowledge based on 
people’s own experience of crime, are important influences on policy-makers, politicians 
and practitioners.
Finally, Tilley and Laycock extend the traditional dichotomy between experiential and 
technical knowledge by recognizing the impact of ideas on policy development. They 
highlight the influence of ideology on a policy makers’ openness to ideas; that there is a 
strong tendency when formulating public policy to approach crime in ideological terms. For 
example: “Crime is wicked so some wickedness must be rooted out to deal with it. 
Individuals must be blamed, or defective social arrangements must be held responsible” 
(Tilley & Laycock, 2000: 215). Tilley and Laycock argue that these images and other 
understandings given through ideology are more powerful and resonate better with policy­
makers than much of the social scientific research. It is suggested that social scientific 
research’s concern with explanation rather than judgment and the tendency to suggest a 
clinical rather than an emotive/affective approach to reducing crime is responsible for their 
evidence’s lack of influence on ideological and common sense knowledge.
The influence of ideology that is recognized by Tilley and Laycock is evidenced in the area 
of law and order politics. The 1980s saw the publication of a number of texts arguing that 
policies about law and order were mainly found under the purview of the political right. 
These arguments came after over a decade of increasing energy being spent on debating
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law and order issues at the national level in the United States (the UK and Australia were to 
follow later). For instance in 1981, Horton argued that with the right’s general focus on 
economic advancement through free market forces, their political and ideological policies 
were designed to manage the effects of monetary exploitation. As a result, Horton argued, 
the right had become associated with increased publicity and public concern about “street 
crime” (what he described as working class crime and crimes committed by African 
Americans) and widening criminalization where more behaviors were becoming controlled 
by legal regulations (Horton, 1981).
As discussed in Chapter Ten, Dahrendorf (1985) also argued that law and order is usually 
part of the political right’s policies. He claimed that law and order had taken over from 
earlier class struggles in being an arena in which social responsibilities are negotiated. 
Describing class struggles as the “dominant expression of the unsociable sociability of 
man”, Dahrendorf argues that instead social aggression now manifests itself in more 
individualistic and occasional ways. Violations of law by individuals, gangs and crowds are 
prominent examples (Dahrendorf, 1985). It is this individualistic view of criminal behavior 
and society more generally that matches that adopted by the political right.
More recently, authors have enhanced this argument by adding that not only have the right 
increased the prominence of law and order issues in political debate, they have also 
changed the type of law and order policies being proposed. These have become punitive, 
legalistic and reactive policies. Garland (2001) argues that criminal justice has become less 
autonomous and more popularist with shorter term policies that are less likely to follow 
expert advice. Garland summarizes this ‘political culture of crime control’ as:
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“a kind of retaliatory law-making, acting out the punitive urges and controlling 
anxieties of expressive justice. Its chief aims are to assuage popular outrage, 
reassure the public, and restore the 'credibility' of the system, all of which are 
political rather than penological concerns” (Garland, 2001: 173).
This new political culture of crime control described by Garland has formed around the 
transformation of penal welfarism to now focus on prison as the predominant response to 
criminal behavior at the expense of the rehabilitative and welfare-oriented response. In 
terms of political ideology, these changes in law and order policy orientation can be 
described as a shift from left to right as a result of the increasing pervasiveness of neo­
liberalism.
This swing to the right had been evident since the early 1980s. For example in 1983, Ratner 
argued that debates and policy directions taken under the law and order banner had allowed 
increasingly punitive and repressive responses to crime instead of looking at the causes of 
crime. While Ratner did argue that such responses were typical of the political right, he did 
so within the broader framework that the responses to issues such as crime, punishment and 
law and order demonstrated the international swing to right -  that even traditionally left 
parties were proposing law and order policies that focused on punitive rather than 
rehabilitative measures (Ratner & McMullan, 1983).
A more recent example of this shift to the right and the influence of neo-liberal thinking 
was given by Zedner (1995). Zedner then noted that opposition parties in Britain (e.g. 
Labor) had shifted their rhetoric in a bid not to be classed as ‘soft on crime’ compared to
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the Conservatives (hence the slogan of “tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime”). 
Zedner argues that while this slogan may allude to the social factors that may be influential 
in the occurrence of criminal behavior, it is also representative of the adoption of more 
punitive policies typical of the right by traditionally left political parties (Zedner, 1995).
At the heart of these debates about the changes from a rehabilitative to a punitive ideal, 
from left to right on the political spectrum, is the place that law and order issues have in a 
political party’s ideology. In Chapter Ten of this thesis, I referred to ideology as a coherent 
and interrelated set of beliefs, values and principles that guide human behavior; a set of 
beliefs that contain not only an image of society but also a way to achieve it. Therefore, by 
studying the place that law and order issues have in a party’s ideology, authors seek the role 
that each party gives to these issues not only as something to be addressed but also as 
something to be used to achieve their desired image of society.
For instance, Zedner (1995) used a comparative approach between Germany and Britain to 
highlight the peculiarities of domestic debates: to challenge the seemingly self-evident 
nature of law and order in British political life. Since 1979, law and order has been a staple 
of general election manifestos and the subject of political debate in Britain. These law and 
order debates have developed a life of their own becoming independent of criminal justice 
policy and almost independent of crime itself. Zedner argues that these debates are more 
about reproducing assumptions about the state’s role in maintaining social order (and help 
to determine what that role should be) than ensuring law and order (Zedner, 1995). In this 
way, ideology can both be constructed and be served through law and order debates.
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By attributing responsibility for the increasing prominence of law and order politics to the 
political right, the authors paraphrased above are arguing that such issues or the prominent 
approaches to such issues play a greater role in the right’s ideology than that of the left. In 
other words, the ideological knowledge claims made by the right will have a greater 
propensity than the left to use law and order related actions as a solution to a wide variety 
of problems. Consequently, their ideas about the world would lead right-wing politicians to 
talk about crime more than left-wing politicians. In effect, knowledge claims based in 
ideology both guide the arguments that are made and support their premises.
Given these arguments, I hypothesized that:
Hypothesis Two: Ideological Talk about Fear-of-Crime
(Hi) Right-wing parliamentarians and political parties talk about fear- 
of-crime more than left-wing parliamentarians and political parties.
(Ho): There is no difference in the number of documents mentioning fear 
of crime produced by representatives of each political party.
In Chapter Ten, I showed that out of the two major political parties in Australian politics, it 
was the Australian Labor Party (representative of the left) that discussed fear-of-crime more 
than the Liberal/National Party Coalition (representative of the right) -  54% to 46% 
respectively. However, a CHI-squared goodness of fit test indicates that this difference in 
the proportion by which each party discusses fear-of-crime is not statistically significant (p 
= 0.933) and therefore the null hypothesis is not rejected. From these results, there is no 
difference in the overall frequency with which parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime 
when grouped by their ideology (as indicated by their membership in a political party). This
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would suggest that ideological knowledge claims are not a driving force on political 
debates about public fear.
However, similar to the theoretical arguments surrounding experiential knowledge, the 
statement that “law and order politics” (as characterized by punitiveness and a “just 
deserts” mentality) are the politics of the right comes with the associated statement that the 
increasing prominence of law and order in national politics is the responsibility of the right. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that:
Hypothesis Three: Ideology and Increasing Prominence of Fear-of-Crime
Right-wing parliamentarians are responsible for the majority of the 
increase (>50%) in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime.
Given that political talk in its transcribed and written form is being analyzed, the phrase 
“number of documents” is used here to refer to the number of individual speeches that 
mention fear-of-crime. Each speech in its entirety is counted as one document irrespective 
of the number of times fear-of-crime is mentioned within that particular speech.
Before testing hypothesis three, it is necessary to verify its underlying assumption that there 
has been an increase in the number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime over time. To 
check this assumption, the number of documents produced each year that mention fear-of- 
crime was plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.3).
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Figure 13.3: Number of documents per year that mention fear-of-crime
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This graph displays an apparent strong increase in the number of documents that are 
produced each year mentioning fear-of-crime. In order to analyze this trend more fully and 
study productivity from all federal and state parliaments, the number of documents between 
1990 and 2003 was isolated. A forecast line was generated using exponential smoothing to 
remove some of the random variation (damping factor w = 0.5). A linear regression model 
was then generated based on this forecast line:
y = -19.8 + 3.88t
-y
(where t is the number of years past 1990, R“ = 0.89)
A trend line based on this formula was then plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.4).
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Figure 13.4: Number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime (forecast and trends)
Number of Documents Mentioning Fear of Crime per Year 
from 1990
i-----1 Total — i Forecast — Trendline
From this analysis, it is evident that there has been an increase of (close to) four documents 
each year between 1990 and 2003 that mention fear-of-crime. This result supports the 
underlying assumption that there has been an increase in parliamentary talk about fear-of- 
crime.
Therefore to test the hypothesis that the right is responsible for the majority of the increase 
(> 50%) in documents mentioning fear-of-crime, the number of documents produced by 
Coalition parliamentary members only were isolated as representatives of the political right. 
This data is plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.5).
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Figure 13.5: Number of Documents mentioning fear-of-crime authored by the Coalition
Number of Documents mentioning Fear-of-Crime authored 
by the Coalition each year
w 40 
S 35 










1- cm coo  o  oo  o  o
CM CM CM
Year
A visual inspection of this graph indicates that the number of documents authored by the 
Coalition appears to be bi-modal with a peak in 1997 and a lesser peak in 1994/1995. 
Again, to analyze this trend in more detail, a forecast line was generated by exponential 
smoothing (w = 0.5), and a model based on linear regression was produced:
y = 2.09 + 1.95t
(where t is the number of years past 1990, R = 0.78)
The forecast and trend lines are plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.6).
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Figure 13.6: Mentions of fcar-of-crime authored by the Coalition (forecasts and trends)
Number of Documents Mentioning Fear of Crime Authored 
by the Coalition Each Year
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This analysis indicates that there has been an increase of 1.95 documents each year 
authored by Coalition members. Such an increase represents 50.2% of the total increase in 
documents mentioning fear-of-crime each year. The data presented herein provides only 
very minimal support for the hypothesis that the right is responsible for the majority of the 
increase in parliamentary talk about fear-of-crime. This finding of the right dominating the 
trend is tempered by the earlier result that, overall, there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of time spent by each political party in discussing fear-of-crime. Therefore, there 
is only minimal support for the argument that ideological knowledge influences 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime.
Thus, in this component, I examined the knowledge claims that are made by 
parliamentarians when discussing fear-of-crime. I began by exploring the calls the more 
informed public policy debate about law and order issues and the research on the type of 
knowledge claims that are made. Based on this literature, I then presented and tested three 
hypotheses:
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1. experiential knowledge is increasingly being used by parliamentarians as supporting 
evidence when debating fear-of-crime;
2. right-wing parliamentarians and political parties talk about fear-of-crime more than 
left-wing parliamentarians and political parties (and its null hypothesis: there is no 
difference in the proportion that representatives from each political party talk about 
fear-of-crime); and
3. right-wing parliamentarians are responsible for the majority of the increase in the 
number of documents mentioning fear-of-crime.
From the findings of this process, I can conclude that there is a hybridity of experiential, 
technical and ideological knowledge claims being made by parliamentarians when debating 
fear-of-crime. However, I find no support for the arguments that common sense or 
experiential knowledge is dominating public debate. Further, I find only minimal support 
for arguments that right-wing political ideology is responsible for the majority of the rising 
frequency with which fear-of-crime is debated. This support is further tempered by results 
showing that overall there is no significant difference in the quantity with which 
parliamentarians of different political persuasions talk about fear-of-crime. In sum, the 
knowledge claims that are made by parliamentarians when debating public fears about 
crime appear not to be dictated by the type of knowledge claim itself: they will use 
common experiences, research evidence and ideological images as needed to best support 
their argument.
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Component Two: Identities in Crime Debates
2: the identity o f the public that is portrayed through the arguments made by 
parliamentarians.
This hypothesis is drawn out of a long history of criminological investigation about the 
‘other’. In a study of the Puritan community that settled in Massachusetts Bay Colony in 
1630, Kai Erikson (1966) sought to investigate the role of deviant forms of behavior in the 
social life of a community and through this study, examined the role of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
attitudes. Erikson began from Durkheim’s 1895 argument in The Rules o f  Sociological 
Method where he argued that crime was a normal part of society and in fact, a functional 
part of society because it increases the solidarity of a community when people come 
together to express outrage, focusing group feeling and emphasizing common interests. In 
effect, deviance functions to ensure social organization (Dürkheim, 1926, 1938).
Erikson argued that communities are places that contain cultural and geographical 
boundaries. Those boundaries are maintained by defining conduct that is outside of them as 
being inappropriate or immoral. As such, a society’s behavioral boundaries are learnt 
through the observation of the behavior of its members. Deviant behavior is argued by 
Erikson to be the most effective means of teaching boundaries; deviant behavior itself is 
determined by the community’s response (for example, by confronting the deviant or 
calling on the police to confront them). In this way, deviancy serves a normative role that 
reinforces societal boundaries of behavior and core values. Erikson concludes from this 
argument that in controlled quantities, deviant behavior is important in preserving the 
stability of the social life of a community.
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Within Erikson’s argument, the perceived boundaries of a group play a crucial part in 
establishing the identity of those who are in and those who are out of a group. In the case of 
deviant behavior, Erikson argued that this type of behavior:
by marking the outer edges of group life, [boundaries] give the inner 
structure its special character and thus supply the framework within which the 
people of the group develop an orderly sense of their own cultural identity” 
(Erikson, 1966: 13).
Erikson argues that the boundaries of behavior and the community’s reaction to violations 
of those boundaries have a normative role and an identity forming role. In this way, the 
distinctions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ become important to a community’s sense of identity and 
the solidarity among members.
The process of ‘othering’ is part of developing those distinctions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Zedner 
states that “[perceptions of what constitute prevailing crime problems derive in part from 
the identification of these groups as a source of potential menace” (Zedner, 1995: 522). 
Following on from Erikson’s argument, focusing on a dangerous other in political rhetoric 
allows a politician to define the boundaries of acceptable behavior. They are able to argue 
that the dangerous other challenges society’s normative codes and seeks to change societal 
values (Garland, 2001). It is a means of confronting ‘them’ in order to reinforce the 
definitions of ‘us’.
However, this normative function of ‘others’ can be used towards political ends with the 
existence of that ‘other’ being largely based in political rhetoric. As an example of this
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argument, Ratner (1983) argues that the international swing to the (political) right has been 
legitimated by the use of “folk-devils” (he gives examples of welfare scroungers, liberal 
spendthrifts and terrorists) that challenge the images of nation, family, and authority. This 
“enemy within” is argued by Ratner to have created a moral climate that accepts monetarist 
economic policy while deflecting attention away from the negative consequences of such 
policy (Ratner & McMullan, 1983).
The concept of a ‘folk devil’ is attributable to Stanley Cohen’s (1973) study of Mods and 
Rockers of the 1960s. Cohen argues that deviancy, and more specifically the identification 
of people or a group of people as a threat to society, is socially constructed. Based on 
disaster research, Cohen uses the stages of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to 
describe the process by which societies respond to and facilitate a moral panic. While 
Cohen concentrates on the media’s role in whipping up public concern about particular 
types of behavior, he discusses the construction and labeling of ‘folk devils’ during the 
inventory phase. This is a process of whereby deviants are identified and labeled:
“The deviant is assigned to a role or social type, shared perspectives develop 
through which he and his behaviour are visualized and explained, motives are 
imputed, causal patterns are searched for and the behaviour is grouped with 
other behaviour thought to be of the same order” (Cohen, 1973: 74).
The original labels can lead to the evocation of secondary images where the events of ‘real’ 
world are transformed into myth. Cohen gives the example of the drug addict who is 
created into the mythology of the dope fiend with the associated attributions of being ‘dirty, 
degenerate, lazy and untrustworthy’. It is by creating such folk devils (and their
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mythologies and stereotypes) that the state responses developed during a moral panic can 
survive long after the demise of the perceived threat. Through this process of labeling and 
the creation of folk devils, politicians and other social commentators are provided with 
ready-made images from which to draw support for their proposed policies.
Similarly, Garland argues that, on the whole, criminals are seen as wicked and different 
from us and that the images of dangerous ‘others’ have a utility in political rhetoric to 
generate support for proposed crime policies:
... the images conjured up to accompany new legislation tend to be 
stereotypical depictions of unruly youth, dangerous predators, and incorrigible 
career criminals. Accompanying these projected images, and in rhetorical 
response to them, the new discourse of crime policy consistently invokes an 
angry public, tired of living in fear, demanding strong measures of punishment 
and protection.” (Garland, 2001: 10)
The interesting point in this quote is that not only is the identity of the dangerous other 
described and used to effect but also the identity of a fearful and angry public is made 
explicit. The source of the identity of this frightened public and that of the dangerous 
criminal has been discussed above in regard to Garland’s theory on the role of fear-of-crime 
and the frightened middle class (the ‘crime complex’) in the transformation to the new 
culture of control. However, it is noteworthy that the dangerous ‘other’ (criminal) has an 
influence in the construction of the identity of a frightened public.
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The argument of the growing prominence of the identities of a fearful public and dangerous 
criminal was discussed in greater detail in Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis in regard to 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. Chapter Six argued that there are two identities 
of the public that are consistently referred to in the parliamentary debates examined: (a) 
active and able to participate in their own victimization prevention and control their level of 
fear; (b) passive and dependent on the government for action to reduce their suffering due 
to the fear-of-crime. Chapter Seven argued that the war metaphors associated with action 
against crime define the roles of the actors as a fearful public in a dangerous and 
imminently threatening environment. These results provide support for arguments about a 
fearful public and dangerous other: the dominant identities discussed in parliamentary 
debates about fear-of-crime are those of the frightened public that is threatened by the 
criminal.
However, this supportive evidence is given with a qualification. Variations were identified 
in the conception of the public and their agency or their ability to act independently. While 
both may be fearful, one identity of the public is able to act to control their level of fear and 
participate in their own victimization prevention. The other identity is passive and 
dependent on the government for action to reduce their fear-of-crime.
A similar set of variations in the attribution of agency has been discussed by Lacey & 
Zedner (1995). The authors described different concepts of the community: as an agency 
that pursues social policy and is thus responsible for it; or as the focus for local policy 
initiatives involving particular interventions; or as the beneficiary of policies intended to 
regenerate feelings of cohesiveness, security and solidarity. These identities fluctuate
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between an active and passive conception of the public by the state (Lacey & Zedner, 
1995).
Within a study examining the development of actuarial reasoning in risk management and 
its implications for politics, crime prevention and the interaction between state and citizen, 
O’Malley (1996) examines variations of agency in different political ideologies. He 
describes the liberal subject as someone who is rational, responsible, knowledgeable, 
calculative, active and self-directive. This subject interacts differently with the authorities 
and professionals compared to the identities constructed by other ideologies. O’Malley 
argues that welfarism involves a subordinated “client” who interacts with a professional 
service provider of superior knowledge and status. In contrast, the subject in prudentialism 
enters into “partnerships” with public authorities or is a “customer” of the service. This 
change in relations is demonstrated by the rhetoric of “working together against crime” and 
“partnerships with police” (O'Malley, 1996).
O’Malley (1996) further argues that the free market requires a morally responsible 
individual whereas socialized risk-management techniques encourage collectivization and 
social dependency. The rational, responsible, autonomous and free individual pictured by 
neo-liberalism rejects the correctional and therapeutic aims of previous criminal justice 
policies that are based on welfare-oriented recognition of the links between crime, social 
deprivation and social justice. Previously, O’Malley (1992) had argued that it is this 
individual that is central to neo-conservative and New Right discourses. These discourses 
involve an individual that is entrepreneurial, naturally free, self-reliant, responsible and 
liberated from the constraints of the welfare state (O'Malley, 1992). In 1996, O’Malley
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argued that the new conception of the (liberal) subject is that of the rational choice actor 
thinking in cost-benefit terms where criminal behavior occurs when the gains outweigh the 
costs or risks. Criminality is no longer caused by social and psychological factors.
This rational choice actor was also detailed by Garland (2001) during his discussion of the 
rising prominence of the criminologies of everyday life. Garland argued that the changes in 
criminological thought had altered the criminal to being a rational actor, responsive to 
disincentives and fully responsible for their actions. It had also pushed the victim into being 
responsible for the opportunities they allowed potential offenders. In this way, behavior 
(including criminal behavior) had become rational, intentional and conscious. Thus, 
Garland from an analysis of criminological thought and O’Malley from an analysis of risk 
management and political ideology, both detail the changing image of individual agency.
However, I would argue that the dual conceptions of agency portrayed of individuals by 
parliamentary discourse, is indicative of the criticism made by Young (2002). Young 
argues that Garland’s description of the social, political and cultural transformations does 
not acknowledge the overlap and co-existence of these ideas. On the basis of Young’s 
argument, the dual conceptions of individual agency found represented in parliamentary 
debates may be suggestive of the overlap between the penal welfare state and the new 
punitive culture of crime control: the passive and dependent individual may be reminiscent 
of the subordinated client in the welfare state (as described by O’Malley above) while the 
active and participatory individual is reflective of the conception of the liberal individual 
under rational choice and control theories. The dual existence of these representations in the
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parliamentary debates studied is supportive of Young’s criticism of The Culture o f Control 
and its metanarratives of succession.
In order to investigate these arguments that there are different conceptions of individual 
agency dependent on the author’s political persuasion, I hypothesized that:
Hypothesis Five: Political Ideology and the Agency of a Fearful Public
There is no difference in the type of agency involved in the fearful public 
identity that is drawn upon by the different political ideologies.
To test this hypothesis, a contingency table was constructed that counted the number of 
documents mentioning a passive or active fearful public grouped by the author’s political 
party (Table 12.1). For the purposes of this test, a parliamentarians’ membership in a 
political party was used as a proxy for their adoption of a particular ideology.




A CHI-squared test of a contingency table was then used to test for a significant difference 
between these combinations thereby indicating that depiction of a type of agency can be 
aligned with a particular political ideology. No significant difference was found between 
the political parties (and therefore political ideology) in terms of their evocation of a 
passive or active fearful public (p = 0.1168). Therefore, the null hypothesis was supported.
This result challenges the arguments presented above that posit ideology as the determinant 
in the type of public agency depicted: that liberal politicians will talk in terms of an active,
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rational actor while left-wing political will talk in terms of a passive and dependent actor. 
While this is not to say that there are different levels of agency depicted in political 
rhetoric, the findings do suggest that political ideology may not be the determining factor in 
deciding which type of agency is evoked.
Thus, in this section I have sought to examine the identities of the public that are evoked by 
parliamentarians in their debates about fear-of-crime. I began by exploring the literature on 
‘othering’ and the rising prominence of a fearful public identity. These arguments were 
supported by the qualitative descriptions given in earlier chapters: when talking about fear- 
of-crime, parliamentarians do discuss a fearful public that is under threat from a dangerous 
criminal.
I qualified this by highlighting the different types of agency that were evident in the 
debates. A fearful public could be depicted as being active and capable of participating in 
their own fear-reduction, or they could be described as being passive and dependent on the 
government to reduce their fear-of-crime. These different types of agency have been 
examined in a number of academic texts where the type of agency evoked is dependent on 
the author’s political ideology. However, I found no statistical support for the argument that 
political ideology was the determinant in depicting passive or active agency. In sum, there 
is theoretical and qualitative support for the use of the identities of a criminal ‘other’ and a 
fearful public in parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime. However, there is no support 
given by this data for the hypothesis that the type of agency varies between political 
parties/ideologies in their evocation of a fearful public.
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Component Three: Responsibility in Crime Debates
3: the location o f responsibility fo r addressingfear-of-crime.
Over at least the last decade, it has been argued by scholars that responsibility for crime 
control, crime prevention and community safety is increasingly shifting from the 
government to individual members of the community. Garland (2001) argues that the new 
culture of crime control has seen government-run law enforcement agencies, and through 
them the state, try to shift responsibility for controlling criminal behaviours. Through a 
process of “responsibilization”, he argues that crime control has surpassed the limits of the 
state and must be shared by government, community organizations, commercial businesses 
and individuals in a civil society (Garland, 2001). As a result, responsibility for maintaining 
social order increasingly lies on citizens as well as government agencies of criminal justice.
Similarly, Zedner (1995) observes that over the past decade, the focus on the state’s role 
has seen a change as British governments have increasingly tried to rid themselves of 
responsibility for law and order. They have attempted to shift that responsibility to families, 
schools, churches and the media. This has been done by emphasizing their potential 
contribution to social stability. “The message here was clear: that as a society we could no 
longer expect the onus for maintaining order to lie solely with central government nor with 
the formal agencies of criminal justice” (Zedner, 1995: 524). Instead, institutions such as 
schools, families and the media are expected to take on at least some of the responsibility 
for maintaining order in the community.
O’Malley (1996) argues that in this shift, the state and private agencies have taken on the 
role of educator, of providing empowering knowledge and skills. “Information is provided
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about local crime rates, about how to recognize suspicious persons, how to make the home 
and its contents secure, how to recognize and avoid high-crime-risk situations, about the 
value of insuring and marking property, and so on” (O'Malley, 1996: 201). Such 
information is intended to promote true autonomy and to emphasize the “irrationalities of 
irresponsibility” while discouraging reliance on the state. The individual will invest in 
improving their personal and property security, for example, by making use of private 
security agencies or installing physical barriers to crime such as locks, shutters and alarms. 
By doing so, they will be fulfilling their responsibility to deter crime and maintain order in 
their community.
This shift in responsibility acts to relieve pressure on police forces and politicians to control 
crime (O'Malley, 1992). Zedner (1995) argues that governments can deflect attention by: 
diffusing (political) responsibility away from the legal system and onto the community; 
supporting informal and voluntary efforts at crime control; and by encouraging general 
members of the public to protect themselves, engage in crime prevention and increase the 
use of community-based penalties. These strategies form part of a rhetoric of an “active 
citizen” (or an “empowered public” (O'Malley, 1997)) which has been used to promote a 
greater sense of responsibility by members of the public to maintain order in their 
communities and work with formal agencies such as the police.
Similarly, O’Malley (1992) argues that punitiveness or “just deserts” sentencing has 
received increased use because of this focus on individual responsibility. Increasingly 
punitive sentencing is justified through a perceived lack of worth of developing a program 
of sentencing to rehabilitate a person when societal factors of criminal behavior are only
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recognized as risk-enhancing factors that are predictive of behavior rather than an 
explanation for action taken. The consequence of this change for the application of criminal 
justice is that rehabilitative or therapeutic interventions are considered to be inappropriate 
because there is nothing “wrong” with the individual -  they made the rational choice to 
commit the crime. From this position has risen the focus on punitive or “just deserts” 
sentencing: it is a way of increasing the cost of criminal behavior with the hope that 
potential offenders will be deterred from such behavior because the gains no longer 
outweigh the cost or risks (O'Malley, 1992, 1996).
In summary, there is a consensus in the literature that states are trying to shift at least some 
of the burden of crime control and prevention away from government-run law enforcement 
agencies and onto members of the public. This has been done by emphasizing individual 
responsibility for victimization prevention, for protecting one’s own person and property. 
States create these active citizens or empowered publics by providing information and 
education about how to avoid being a victim of crime. This seeks to raise awareness of 
individual responsibility and discourages reliance on the state.
On the basis of this literature, I hypothesized that:
Hypothesis Six: Responsibility Shifting from State to Non-State Actors
(Hi) Responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime is increasingly being 
shifted from state to non-state actors
(Ho) There is no difference in the number of documents attributing 
responsibility from state to non-state actors for addressing fear-of- 
crime
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To test this hypothesis, a clustered column chart was constructed to depict the changing 
number of documents over time when grouped by the location of responsibility for 
addressing fear-of-crime (Figure 13.7). For the purposes of this hypothesis, the location 
was simplified to either a state actor (e.g., police) or a non-state actor (e.g., the community).
Figure 13.7: Proportion of Responsibility Attributions to State or Non-State Actors
Percentage of Documents Attributing Responsibility for 
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Overall, responsibility was attributed to state actors 55% of the time with non-state actors 
comprising 45%. A CHI-squared goodness of fit test indicated that this difference in 
proportions was not statistically significant (p = 0.913). This suggests that there is little 
difference in the frequency with which parliamentarians attribute responsibility for 
addressing fear-of-crime to either actor.
In order to test the claims in the literature that responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime 
was increasingly being shifted state to non-state actors, the percentage of documents 
attributing responsibility to non-state actors was isolated for analysis of its trends. This was
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done by linear regression modelling of the trendline based on a forecast line generated 
through exponential smoothing (w = 0.3).
y = 0.691 -0 .023t
(where t is the number of years past 1984, R" = 0.23)
The forecast and trend lines are plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.8).
Figure 13.8: Responsibility Attributions to Non-State Actors (forecast and trends)
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This analysis indicates that there has been a 2.3% decrease over time in proportion of 
attributions of responsibility to non-state actors for addressing fear-of-crime. Therefore, the 
alternative hypothesis (Hi) is rejected: responsibility is not increasingly being attributed to 
non-state actors.
Causal versus Treatment Responsibility
However, it was found in Chapter Ten of this thesis that there are two different types of 
responsibility that are assigned for events in the future or in the past. When treatment 
responsibility is attributed, the person assigns control over or the power to solve events that
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may occur in the future. When causal responsibility is attributed, the person attaches blame 
for those (negative) events that had already occurred for which they hold the target 
responsible for causing. Blame is to be avoided by politicians whereas the image of holding 
control and power is to be desired.
Based on the qualitative results presented and the literature reviewed in Chapter Nine, the 
argument was posited that politicians wish to be seen as someone that did not cause the 
problems relating to fear-of-crime (blame avoidance) but are ready and willing to help 
solve the problem (treatment responsibility). An image of being seen to respond to a 
problem is a political necessity even in situations such as natural disasters when no causal 
responsibility can be attributed. The results of this and previous research show that when 
the cause of a situation can be attributed to someone, politicians take care to avoid that type 
of responsibility and the associated blame.
Therefore, it could be argued that parliamentarians are only trying to shift the (causal) 
responsibility for causing (fear-of-) crime and the associated blame for (fear-of-) 
victimization. Causal responsibility and blame for victimization are passed onto the public. 
“[R]ising-crime rates are repackaged as providing evidence not of the failure of law 
enforcement but of the negligence of the general public in protecting their property and 
persons” (Zedner, 1995: 525). It is this blame and negative imagery that is to be avoided by 
the politician and parliamentarian because of its threat to their political credibility, to their 
image as an effective and active representative of the public.
376
Chapter Thirteen Combining Data and Theory
In contrast, holding treatment responsibility or the responsibility to fix problems and 
control future events is to be desired by the parliamentarian. It is a low-risk option that 
allows them to argue for a change in law and order policies, debate alternatives and criticize 
their opponents. All this can be done without the risk of being blamed for the poor 
performance of the crime policies because that lies with individual citizens after the 
transference of causal responsibility.
In short, it can be said that these two types of responsibility, and their consequences for the 
situating of blame and control, combine to create a environment where parliamentarians 
can argue that they have been acting to control crime but that they cannot be blamed for 
any increases in the crime rate or even specific instances of criminal victimization because 
it is the public’s individual responsibility to protect themselves and their property.
To verify this argument, the following hypotheses were stated:
(Hi) Causal responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime is increasingly 
being shifted from state to non-state actors
(Ho) There is no difference in the number of documents attributing 
causal responsibility from state to non-state actors for addressing fear- 
of-crime
To test these hypotheses, the data on the attributions of causal responsibility to non-state 
actors was isolated. The slope of the trend over time was tested using linear regression 
modeling on a exponentially smoothed forecast line (w = 0.5).
y = 0.208 + 0.0204t
'y
(where t is the number of years past 1984, R = 0.32)
The forecast and trend lines are plotted on the graph below (Figure 13.9).
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Figure 13.9: Causal Responsibility Attributions to Non-State actors (forecast and trends)
%of Documents Attributing Causal Responsibility to 
































NonState Forecast • Trend Line
The slope of the trend estimate shows that there has been a 2% increase in the number of 
documents attributing causal responsibility to non-state actors over the time period 
investigated. However, a CHI-squared goodness of fit test on the overall proportions of 
attributions to either state or non-state actors indicates that there is no significant difference 
(p = 0.779) in the changing location of causal responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.
Thus, after exploring the arguments that the state is attempting to shift responsibility for 
crime control and victimization prevention onto the community, I found no evidence in 
parliamentary debates that such a shift was occurring in regard to addressing fear-of-crime. 
A similar lack of evidence for a shift in the location of responsibility continued when the 
type of responsibility (causal) was specified. These results suggest that should such a shift 
be being attempted, it is not reflected in the political rhetoric that is employed by 
parliamentarians.
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All Components and an Additional Variable
The political party ’s role in parliament -  government or opposition
Before summarizing this chapter, I briefly wish to introduce one more variable into the 
testing of the three components above. In Chapter Ten, I discussed the different roles of a 
political party depending on whether they are a party in government or in opposition. It was 
found that fear-of-crime was mentioned less (though not significantly less (p = 0.92)) by 
opposition parties than by incumbent governments, irrespective of a political party’s 
ideological persuasion. Given this, I sought to determine the impact of the party’s role in 
parliament on the type of knowledge claims used by parliamentarians; the type of agency 
used in the evocation of a fearful public identity; and the location of responsibility for 
addressing fear-of-crime.
Based on the data collected for this research:
■ There was no significant difference in the type of knowledge claims made by 
parliamentarians in government or in opposition (p = 0.56);
■ There was no significant difference in the type of agency attributed to the frightened 
public by government or opposition members (p = 0.58);
■ There was no significant difference in the type of responsibility (causal or 
treatment) attributed by government or opposition members (p = 0.27); and
■ There was no significant difference in the type of responsibility attributed to state or 
non-state actors by government or opposition members (p = 0.9).
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From these results it is evident that the role of a party in parliament does not have a 
statistically significant bearing on the way in which the parliamentarian talks about fear-of- 
crime: their use of knowledge claims, agency or the attribution of responsibility.
C h a p t e r  S u m m a r y
This chapter sought to test a number of research questions and hypotheses about how 
parliamentarians talk about fear-of-crime, as drawn from the criminological literature. On 
the basis of this existing body of research, the following description was given of 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime:
Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by the use of 
experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as 
dictated by the parliamentarian’s political ideology, while 
parliamentarians attempt to redistribute responsibility for reducing 
fear.
There were three components to this description:
1. the type of knowledge claims used as supportive evidence in arguments by 
parliamentarians;
2. the identity of the public that is portrayed through the arguments made by 
parliamentarians; and
3. the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime.
In the description above, political ideology was treated as an independent variable 
influencing the type of knowledge claims made by parliamentarians and the type of
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identities portrayed of the public in the debates. As such, the role of political ideology was 
investigated within components one and two. The description and its components were then 
tested using the results and the data from the research contained in this thesis. The chapter 
that follows will discuss the findings of this hypothesis testing, and the broader 
implications for the criminological literature.
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Co n c l u s i o n : Veri fying  A ssumptions
Chapter Fourteen Conclusion
Thus far, I have sought to take the motivation, logic and results from an exploratory, data- 
driven study and situate them in the criminological literature with the ultimate intention of 
reexamining the results of that study from a theoretical perspective. To do so, I began, in 
Chapter Twelve, by presenting an overview of the 12 indices of change that Garland (2001) 
identified as influencing the changes in the criminal justice state. These indices of change 
were used as a catalogue of changes that have shaped the environment in which the 
parliamentary debates about fear-of-crime occurred.
After also giving an overview of the role of fear-of-crime in The Culture o f Control, I then 
used the criticisms that have been made of Garland’s work as a means of highlighting the 
research gap applicable to this thesis. Beckett (2001) argues that given the centrality of 
fear-of-crime to his discussion of political action, Garland does not examine in sufficient 
depth the interaction between political discourses and feelings of insecurity. This ability of 
political rhetoric to influence public sentiment has been the motivating factor for many 
scholars who have attempted to quantify the extent to which fear-of-crime is increased or 
decreased by what politicians say. However throughout this thesis, I have argued that these 
researchers have only assumed the style and content of rhetoric on fear-of-crime. This 
thesis is an attempt at verifying those assumptions: with these last three chapters being an 
attempt to situate this research into the relevant body of criminological literature.
Having established the research gap, I then summarised the assumptions made by 
researchers about political rhetoric on fear-of-crime:
Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by the use of 
experiential knowledge about frightened members of the public as dictated by
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the parliamentarian’s political ideology, while parliamentarians attempt to 
redistribute responsibility for reducing fear.
This description had three components: the type of knowledge claims used by 
parliamentarians; the type of agency used in the evocation of a fearful public identity; and 
the location of responsibility for addressing fear-of-crime. From a discussion of the relevant 
theory and testing of empirical hypotheses, it can be concluded that:
1. There is a hybridity of experiential, technical and ideological knowledge claims 
being made by parliamentarians when debating fear-of-crime. However, there is no 
support for the arguments that common sense or experiential knowledge is 
dominating public debate or that right-wing political ideology is responsible for the 
majority of the rising frequency with which fear-of-crime is debated.
2. There is theoretical and qualitative support for the use of the identities of a criminal 
‘other’ and a fearful public in parliamentary debates about fear of crime. However, 
there is no support given by this data for the hypothesis that the type of agency 
varies between political parties in their evocation of a fearful public.
3. The data presented here does not support the argument that the state is attempting to 
shift responsibility for crime from itself to non-state actors. This lack of evidence 




Within components one and two, it was shown that political ideology does not greatly 
influence the frequency with which fear-of-crime is mentioned in parliamentary debates. In 
addition, political ideology does not significantly influence the whether the fearful public is 
portrayed as passive and dependent on the state or active and independent of the state in 
addressing fear-of-crime, crime control and victimization prevention.
Based on these conclusions, the description given above could now be more accurately 
expressed as:
Parliamentary debates on fear-of-crime are characterized by hybridity: of 
technical and experiential knowledge about a frightened public; of perceived 
identities of this frightened public as being both active and independent, and 
passive and dependent; and of responsibility for reducing fear-of-crime. Finally, 
the existence of a frightened public serves an evidentiary and not ideological 
role in parliamentary debates about crime and its control.
I m p l i c a t i o n s  of  a N u a n c e d  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  
It is this complex and hybrid nature of political rhetoric that is missed by some 
criminologists when they make assumptions about how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. 
In Chapter Eleven, I concluded the exploratory, data-driven study by arguing that 
parliamentarians talked about fear-of-crime in three ways or as part of three discourses: one 
that protects the public, one that supports the public and one that manipulates other 
politicians. Now within this and previous chapters, I have highlighted the hybridity of 
knowledge claims and identities that are used within the parliamentary debates. By 
assuming political rhetoric is homogenous in style and content, researchers deny
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themselves the ability to determine why such rhetoric has an influence on the public’s fear- 
of-crime.
For example, Jock Collins (2003) argues that fear-of-crime is something “that politicians of 
most sides of the political spectrum find irresistible to exploit in an opportunist, though 
dangerously myopic, way” (p.6) or that it is “compounded by the political opportunism of 
state politicians on all sides of the political spectrum” (p.31). The results contained in this 
thesis support his argument that politicians of both sides use fear-of-crime: it forms 
evidence for their arguments. However, I would maintain that public insecurity is not 
always used towards opportunistic ends nor does fear-of-crime remain in the realm of state 
politics.
Lee (2001) argues that fear-of-crime has become a tactic of governance in that “we are 
expected to govern our risks of becoming a victim of crime through being subjected to 
images and narratives of the results of poor self-governance — we are imaged as, and 
indeed asked to become, fearing subjects” (p.481). The research presented herein partially 
supports the redistribution of responsibility to citizens. However, I have also shown that 
politicians are keen to keep the responsibility for ‘fixing’ the problem of public fear. 
Similarly, I have shown that there are contrasting perceptions of agency held by the 
‘fearing subject’. An understanding of these differences in responsibility and agency may 
have allowed Lee to provide a more detailed conception of the politicians/state’s role in the 
‘feedback loop’ of the genesis of fear-of-crime.
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Schwartz and Israel (2000) argue that “people seem to be highly concerned with crime only 
when the media and politicians tell them that they should be highly concerned with crime” 
(Schwartz, 2000: 337). Similarly, Beckett (2001) argued that “political elites have played a 
leading role in calling attention to crime-related problems” (p.7) and that “political 
initiative played a crucial role in generating public concern about crime and drugs” (p.23) 
(Beckett, 2001). My challenge to these authors would be to answer how political discourse 
impacted on fear-of-crime. What was it about the way in which a politician was talking 
about crime or drugs that generated public concern about these issues? Was it the shifting 
location of responsibility or passive agency ascribed to them or a different characteristic 
altogether? I argue that without attention given to such details, the conclusions that political 
discourse influences fear-of-crime does not reflect the necessary complexity to account for 
the phenomena.
Finally, let me return to the scholarly work by Garland (2001) with which I began. The 
Culture o f Control was a work that was intended to examine the demise of penal welfarism 
and the culture of crime control that replaced it. Within the new crime control culture, 
Garland gave fear-of-crime a central role in what he termed the ‘crime complex’ of high 
crime societies. In effect, the new experience of crime and victimhood that was felt by the 
middle-classes led to a resulting insecurity and anxiety. This insecurity and its antidote 
expression of outrage and anger spurred political action in the form of support for punitive 
policies focused on punishment and incapacitation. While Garland does describe a two-way 
interaction between fear-of-crime and reactive policies during the 1970s especially, Beckett 
(2001) criticizes him for not giving sufficient recognition of the ability of political rhetoric 
to influence public fears. The research contained herein would suggest that political
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rhetoric about fear of crime is not as homogenous as both authors portray, with particular 
challenges being raised to Garland in terms of the overlap and co-existence of changing 
ideas in the social, political and cultural trends that he detailed.
These challenges to previous conclusions represent the implications of this research for the 
existent literature on fear-of-crime and political debates. The data and its results have 
provided an insight into the complexity with which parliamentarians have talked about 
public fears. It was this complexity that I argued had been missed by criminologists when 
researching the topic. A nuanced understanding has indicated areas in which previous (and 
future) work could be extended and refined. In other words, asking how fear-of-crime is 
being ‘used’ in a particular political situation is important to gaining an accurate picture of 
how talking about fear may impact on actual reported levels of fear.
C o n c l u s i o n : T he F i nal  W o r d s
To conclude this thesis, I wish to offer a way forward. I suggest that researchers studying 
the interaction between public fear and political debate on crime should focus on the use of 
talking about fear-of-crime, instead of its misuse.
The background to the current research was a tendency of criminologists to focus on the 
misuse of political debate about public fear and then to examine how such judged misuse 
impacts on the actual level of fear reportedly felt by the community. The research contained 
herein has demonstrated the potential of focusing on the ‘use’ of talking about fear without 
the necessity of negative connotations being associated with that talk. In other words, by 
working under the assumption that politicians are misusing their opportunities for speech,
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criminologists have been expecting to see increases in reported levels of fear-of-crime 
whenever politicians are talking about it. The onus is then on the criminologist to explain 
why the reported levels of fear do not always increase during a so called law and order 
auction. I argue that this onus is created by the dominant assumption underlying much of 
the research that politicians are already and will continue to misuse opportunities to talk 
about how scared the public allegedly feels about crime.
Shifting the focus from misuse to use has two effects. First, researchers are encouraged to 
determine how fear-of-crime is actually used in political debates. This thesis has shown that 
it is used to support many arguments, irrespective of ideology, topic or conclusion. In itself, 
talking about fear-of-crime can take on many forms depending on the language that is used 
(e.g., words and metaphors), the knowledge claims that are made or the identities that are 
represented. Through a detailed analysis of these forms, I have argued that political debate, 
in parliament at least, is not characterized only by misuse: it is characterized by hybridity of 
use. I argue that this hybridity arises from parliamentarians using, and not solely misusing, 
speaking about fear-of-crime for their own self-interested purpose.
The second effect of focusing on use is that it allows the researcher to consider increases 
and decreases in levels of reported fear when attempting to find correlates with political 
rhetoric. The current research has demonstrated the potential importance of this open- 
mindedness. If a politician talks about supporting the community in their fight against fear, 
agency or ability to act remains with that community. Feelings of fear may decrease rather 
than increase as a result of such speeches because the public are or remain empowered: 
they are allowed not to be the ‘frightened public’. Consequently, studying the
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multidimensional use of fear-of-crime by politicians, rather than solely the misuse, allows 
the researcher to consider, from the beginning of a research project, the complex and 
complete impact of talking about fear.
Thus in response to a perceived lack of knowledge about how politicians (when in 
parliament) talked about fear-of-crime, I have sought to provide descriptive characteristics 
of the debates, an analysis of the effect of those characteristics and finally the theoretical 
context and implications of a non-homogenous understanding of political talk about public 
fears. While further research is needed into the nature of debating fear-of-crime in electoral 
politics especially, it is hoped that this research will prompt recognition of the benefits of a 
more sensitive and in-depth understanding of how politicians talk about fear-of-crime. I 
have sought to show that it is only through such an understanding that future research will 
be better able to ascertain how political talk about fear-of-crime affects the “real-world” 
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